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Executive summary 
 
It is known that, following a period of recession, employment effects are felt by 
individuals for some time afterwards, including rising levels of unemployment, 
reduced income levels, etc. The effects of this are not always borne evenly, with 
some groups more affected than others. Against this background, the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission) requested the University of Warwick Institute for 
Employment Research to look at the impact of the recession with respect to four 
strands of the Commission‟s mandate: 
 
 gender 
 race/ethnicity 
 age, and 
 disability. 
 
The current recession 
The recession which commenced in mid 2008 differs from the recessions of 1980–81 
and 1990–91 in two important respects: 
 
i. The simultaneous worldwide nature of the economic downturn means there is 
no economy in the world which can provide a level of demand to stimulate 
growth in the world economy. 
 
ii. The unprecedented actions taken by governments aimed at preventing the 
collapse of the financial system and thereby maintaining the supply of money in 
the economy. 
 
The employment effects of the two previous recessions were severe, with 
unemployment continuing to rise and employment continuing to fall for some 
considerable time after the recession technically came to an end (and output growth 
became positive). 
 
Despite the depth of the current recession – reflected in the steep falls in output – the 
initial indications are that the employment effects may not be as abject as they were 
in the 1980s and 1990s. There are potentially a number of reasons for this: 
 
i. The fiscal stimulus the government has given the economy is beginning to work 
through the system. 
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ii. The extent of flexibility in the labour market is now considerably greater than 
during the two earlier recessions and this is slowing the decline in employment. 
 
iii. The impact of the recession has not yet been felt by the public sector. 
 
That said, unemployment has risen quickly during 2009 with the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) recording 2.4 million people being unemployed in Great Britain during 
the period June–August 2009. 
 
The projections of future employment growth presented in this report suggest that 
employment will return to its long-run growth path over the medium term. There 
remain, however, uncertainties in the projection of future employment trends because 
the speed of the recovery is dependent upon a number of macroeconomic factors.  
 
The study 
The research is concerned with the following strands of the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission‟s mandate: 
 
 gender 
 race/ethnicity 
 age, and 
 disability. 
 
With reference to each of these strands, the study: 
 
 identifies equality issues which have been exacerbated by the impact of the 
current recession on the labour market; 
 
 quantifies the impact of the recession on employment on different groups, with 
particular reference to its effect on at-risk groups in the workplace: women, 
ethnic minorities, younger or older workers, and disabled people; 
 
 projects trends and the future negative impact on these four equality groups (for 
example, the risk of financial distress), if the current economic downturn 
continues; and 
 
 establishes a base line for future research on the equality impact of economic 
recession. 
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The study is concerned with change in the labour market. It needs to be 
remembered, however, that some of the groups on which the study focuses have 
disadvantaged positions in the labour market. The recession in some instances may 
be further weakening an already weak labour market position.  
 
The analysis is based upon: 
 
i. A literature review. 
 
ii. A descriptive analysis of LFS data. 
 
iii. Estimates of future employment levels of the various groups using the Institute 
for Employment Research (IER)/Cambridge Econometrics (CE) Employment 
Forecasting Model, and the implications of these estimates for levels of 
unemployment and economic activity. 
 
The recession and the equality agenda 
 The recession is characterised by weak labour demand, with the number of 
people chasing jobs being greatly in excess of the number of job openings. 
From being a seller‟s market during much of the 2000s, the labour market is 
now a buyer‟s one. 
 
 The initial impact of the recession may result in the loss of relatively high-skilled 
jobs, for instance in the financial services sector, but the highly skilled and 
qualified individuals losing their jobs will be expected to find other jobs relatively 
quickly, typically at the expense of less qualified people. There is likely to be, 
therefore, a period of „bumping down‟ in the labour market. 
 
 The net result of bumping down in the labour market is that the recession is 
likely to have a similar impact to previous ones, which disproportionately 
affected the less skilled and least qualified. 
 
 Where there is an excess supply of labour, employers are, other things being 
equal, better able to obtain a match between employees and the jobs they 
undertake, where the term „better match‟ may relate to objectively defined 
capabilities of employees and the employer‟s perceptions of certain groups  
of workers. 
 
 Perceptions may relate to the relative costs of employing certain groups  
(for example, where workers may have special requirements) or a range of 
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other factors that cannot be objectively determined. This is likely to affect hiring 
and firing decisions. 
 
 At this early stage of the recession – and given that employment levels are 
expected to fall for some time after the economy returns to growth – it is too 
early to say whether the current recession will either slow the momentum of  
the equality agenda or lead to reversals. It is possible, however, to provide 
evidence from previous recessions.  
 
The evidence from previous recessions  
The evidence from previous recessions suggests the following in relation to each  
of the groups on which this study has focused. 
 
Men and women 
 Previous recessions have tended to drive down levels of employment in  
sectors typically dominated by men. Hence the rate of job loss has been  
greater for men. 
 
 Women were more likely to be employed in less cyclically sensitive occupations 
and so were relatively protected from unemployment, but where women were 
employed in male-dominated sectors, they were often the first to be dismissed. 
 
 Women with childcare responsibilities were often at a greater disadvantage than 
either men or other women in continuous employment, due to restricted internal 
labour markets and employer perceptions of unreliability and inflexibility. 
 
 Single mothers, older women and those with lower skills and long-standing 
disability were especially negatively affected, with little support provided by the 
UK‟s relatively deregulated labour market. 
 
 During more recent recessions, there is some evidence of an increase in lower-
qualified women entering the labour market, possibly to compensate for a 
reduced household income. 
 
Younger and older people 
 Demand for the labour of young people and old people is „hyper-cyclical‟  
(that is, it responds more closely to the cycle than demand for core age  
workers does). 
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 When demand is low, this shows up in inactivity as much as in unemployment 
(that is, people drop out of the labour market entirely). 
 
 Young people have difficulty entering the labour market and, if they are in jobs, 
they are likely to lose them. 
 
 Older people are encouraged to take early retirement while those who lose their 
jobs find it particularly hard to re-enter work. 
 
 Older and younger people can be „scarred‟ (the implications of failing to enter 
work smoothly or being obliged to leave the labour market entirely are long term 
and not merely short term). 
 
Disabled people 
 Before the last recession, the wage gap between disabled and non-disabled 
people had narrowed, but following the recession, the wage gap had widened 
and struggled to get back to its pre-recession level. 
 
 The recession also affected activity rates with a fall in these for disabled people 
as a result of the recession. 
 
 Recessions also increase the level of disabilities reported with a notable rise in 
work-related disability resulting from psychological problems. 
 
 It should be noted that comparisons across time by disability are difficult to 
gauge because of changes in the definition of disability and policy change  
(such as the introduction of the Disability Discrimination Act). 
 
People from different ethnic groups 
• The labour market situation of ethnic minority groups first began to deteriorate 
in the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
• The Racial Disadvantage in Britain reports produced by the Policy Studies 
Institute first highlighted the phenomenon of hyper-cyclical unemployment for 
ethnic minority groups; that is, their unemployment rate rising faster than White 
unemployment rates in a recession and falling faster in a recovery. 
 
• Historical data reveal that unemployment for Caribbean and African men was 
more sensitive to the business cycle than that for White men, but that 
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unemployment for Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men was relatively 
insensitive to the business cycle. 
 
• There is evidence of the „partial‟ hyper-cyclicality for ethnic minority groups 
during the 1980s and 1990s; that is, minority unemployment rates increased 
faster than White unemployment rates on entry to recession, but did not fall 
faster during a recovery. This suggests that minority unemployment may stay 
relatively high after a recession. 
 
The economic recovery 
• The projections of future employment are based on an assessment of how 
employment is likely to change given current economic conditions, trends and 
policies. There are considerable uncertainties attached to these projections – as 
there are with any set of projections – depending upon how conditions in the 
economy develop. 
 
• The projections of employment suggest that the economy will enter recovery 
during 2011 but that employment levels will not pick up until the middle of the 
next decade. This will affect all groups in the labour market, but it appears to be 
especially marked for men and younger people. 
 
• Men and people from selected ethnic groups lose out because they tend to be 
concentrated in sectors of the economy where the long-run decline in 
employment has been accelerated by the recession. In relation to younger 
people, this relates very much to difficulties that they have in accessing 
employment upon exit from the education system. 
 
• It is also apparent – notwithstanding replacement demands due to retirement, 
etc – that future labour demand will be concentrated in relatively high-skilled 
and qualified jobs (managers, professionals and associate professionals), and 
sales and personal service jobs. Much of the increasing demand for labour will 
be concentrated in business and financial services and non-marketed services. 
 
• The characteristics of the recovery may also have implications for certain 
groups. For instance, some ethnic minority groups, older workers and women 
are more dependent upon public sector employment. 
 
   It is also apparent over the period covered by the projections that there is a 
degree of equalling out in the labour market with, for example, prime-age men 
entering sectors of employment in which they have previously been under-
represented, such as part-time employment. In many respects, this reflects 
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long-run changes in the structure of employment, but it is likely that this change 
may be hastened by the current recession. 
 
The implications of the recession for different groups 
 
Men and women 
 Work-life balance and diversity initiatives, as well as the right to request flexible 
working, are likely to be given lower priority by employers during the current 
recession, with implications for both men‟s and women‟s employment. 
 
 Equal pay and sex discrimination claims made by women have decreased 
during the current recession, as a result, presumably, of women being 
increasingly fearful of losing their jobs. 
 
 While men have experienced higher job losses to date in the current recession, 
women may be more likely to be affected later, with a second wave of job 
losses expected in the public sector. 
 
 The indirect effects of the current recession will affect both men and women (for 
example, in terms of relationship problems). However, it may be women who 
bear a disproportionately high share of the costs, given what is known about the 
impact of job loss in the household, and in view of reports of increased domestic 
violence, relationship breakdown and reduced divorce settlements, with 
associated longer-term concerns over child wellbeing. 
 
 The erosion of traditionally female administrative and secretarial occupations 
will coincide with a higher proportion of men moving in to the service sector, 
with evidence indicating that men are taking on an increasing share of  
part-time jobs. 
 
Younger and older people 
 In order to ensure that the labour force continues to grow rather than shrink  
and that pension systems are sustainable, more older people will be required  
to work.  
 
 But, the current recession might see a return to the encouragement of early 
retirement by employers and might deflect them from making adjustments to 
employment practices to accommodate older people. 
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 High levels of youth unemployment are foreseen and this will affect „highly 
qualified‟ young people as well as those with few or no qualifications. 
 
 The productive capacity of young people might be devalued by extensive 
periods of being without work or of precarious employment. 
 
 Disabled people 
 In light of the recession and the increased difficulty for disabled people to find 
jobs, there is likely to be increased demand for, and use of, support 
programmes for such people. The extent to which such programmes are 
available, of course, is dependent upon the funding available in the light of the 
government‟s need to reduce the level of its borrowing. 
 
 The overall decline in employment is likely to have a levelling effect in which the 
gap between disabled and non-disabled people will narrow. Unfortunately, this 
is likely to be due to decreased employment rates for non-disabled people as 
opposed to any significant gains for disabled workers. 
 
 Disabled people appear to be a group that is afforded a degree of employment 
protection during the current recession. Current social attitudes, policy and 
legislation help to ensure that disabled people are not easy targets for job cuts. 
This protection is unlikely to be taken away from this group in the future, but the 
need for employers to contain costs during recessionary periods may pose an 
obstacle for disabled people requiring extra support in work.  
 
 In the current benefit regulatory system, it is unlikely that there will be mass 
movement of people from unemployment into disability-related inactivity as  
was witnessed in previous recessions. Some movement of disabled people 
from unemployment to inactivity is likely, however, in the face of decreasing 
labour market opportunities. Increased inactivity has implications for future 
labour supply and for the quality of workers that re-enter the labour market  
in the future. 
 
 The duration of the recession will impact on the duration of spells of 
unemployment and inactivity that people may experience. Longer spells  
of unemployment or inactivity may negatively impact on people‟s health, 
particularly in terms of psychological and mental wellbeing. This may result in a 
higher incidence of disability or health problems in the working age population.  
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People from different ethnic groups 
 Claimant count data indicate that the increase in unemployment in late 2008 
was faster for White than ethnic minority groups. The share of ethnic minority 
groups in the total claimant count fell as unemployment rose. 
 
 Ethnic minority groups still experience labour market disadvantage, but the 
differential between White and ethnic minority groups has been narrowing. 
 
 Ethnic minority groups may be relatively insulated from the recession because  
a high percentage of them live in London. Economic forecasts suggest that 
London and the South East will recover relatively quickly from the recession 
compared with other regions. 
 
 This pattern may change as the recession progresses. Spending cuts in the 
public sector may have a disproportionate effect on ethnic minority groups, 
because this is a sector where they are disproportionately employed. 
 
 Moreover, there is great diversity in the experience of the current recession by 
ethnic minority groups. While the impact of the recession seems to be greater 
on White people than on ethnic minority groups as a whole, some local studies 
suggest that this average may disguise a much greater impact upon people of 
mixed parentage and from Black and Black British ethnic groups and a lesser 
impact on Asian and Asian British people as a whole. 
 
The equality implications of the recession over the medium term 
 For the time being, it is too early to assess the full implications of the recession 
for different groups, but a number of issues can be highlighted which may 
require a watching brief to see how they develop. 
 
 As labour demand weakens, it has done so in those sectors of the economy 
more likely to be dominated by men, such that men will be increasingly forced to 
seek employment in sectors where women have previously been in the majority. 
Over the medium term, the increase in the number of jobs is such that it is likely 
that men and women can be accommodated without one losing out to the other, 
but over the short term when labour demand is weak, there is the potential for 
men to „take the jobs of women‟. 
 
 Improvements in equality and diversity have been observed over recent years, 
hence the increasing employment rates of disabled people and some ethnic 
minority groups. Great strides in the extent to which people are able to achieve 
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some form of work-life balance have been made as a result of the introduction 
of a range of flexible working practices. Whether these can withstand the 
pressures of the recession is an interesting issue. Certainly in relation to work-
life balance, the evidence has suggested that this benefits employers and 
employees, so there is, other things being equal, no reason why this should not 
prove resilient to the recession. There are, however, two principal dangers:  
 
i  Where reductions in the number of people employed in the 
organisation result in more demanding jobs for the people who 
remain. This may mean that employees need to work longer  
hours when needed, and this may affect decisions about hiring 
and firing. 
 
ii  Where employers have, in the past, engaged in recruitment and 
human resource practices consistent with work-life balance 
because of the extent of labour demand rather than recognition  
of the intrinsic merits of such practices. 
 
 The role of the public sector is of central importance to certain groups and the 
public sector has been in the vanguard of diversity and work-life balance 
policies. There are continued uncertainties about the employment levels in  
the public sector. 
 
 Employers view recruitment and retention differently. There is a risk posed to 
young people who are unable to gain access to the labour market upon exit 
from the education system. One response to this is for young people to attempt 
to stay on in full-time education in the hope that gaining additional qualifications 
will aid job search and the period of additional education will tide them over the 
recessionary period. However, if their window of opportunity in which employers 
expect them to enter the labour market closes, then they may miss out on 
getting onto the first rung of the career ladder. 
 
 There are also the indirect effects of the recession upon employment to 
consider. Evidence has been presented in this report that job loss causes 
psychological stress, especially among men. This can impact upon the 
household with increased levels of marital breakdown and domestic violence, 
having repercussions long after the recession has ended and employment has 
returned to its long-run growth path. 
 
 Finally, government policy can potentially impact on the labour market. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) points to 
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policies being used by national governments during economic downturns in the 
past to constrain the supply of labour through policies such as early exit from 
the labour force, the use of benefits which fosters inactivity, and so on. Given 
the pressures on public finances, there is limited scope to achieve this end; it 
also runs counter to government policy over recent decades, which has been 
very much focused upon boosting, not constraining, labour supply. 
 
 On balance, the recession is likely to slow progress towards meeting the 
objectives of the equality agenda rather than lead to a reversal of the gains 
made to date. The exception appears to be in relation to young people, who 
may be at particular risk. But it needs to be remembered that the labour market 
implications of the recession are only just becoming manifest, so it is important 
to maintain a watching brief of its impact on equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 The current recession 
Britain has recently experienced an unprecedented period of continuous economic 
growth resulting in, for most of the 2000s, dynamic excess demand for labour. The 
growth in demand for labour was met through a number of routes: immigration 
(especially from new European Union Member States); persuading people out of 
inactivity (for example, by tightening the rules on claiming Incapacity Benefit), and 
encouraging the participation of groups historically under-represented in the labour 
market. The growth in the demand for labour also affected the equality agenda – 
notwithstanding policy changes over the last few decades - in so far as the labour 
market became a „seller‟s‟ one. Groups that have historically occupied a relatively 
weak position in the labour market – because of their relative lack of skills and 
qualifications, or because of employers‟ perceptions of their employability – were 
better placed to find work. At the same time, the cost-benefit calculations made by 
employers when hiring, even if only tacitly, during a period of excess labour demand 
are likely to differ from when labour demand is weak. For instance, employers may 
be more willing to hire people who have, for whatever reason, relatively high costs 
attached to their employment. The seller‟s market for labour also potentially allowed 
employees to obtain a better match between their employment and out of work 
activities – which may have also had the effect of boosting labour supply – with work-
life balance becoming more prominent in the workplace. 
 
Equality in the labour market is not simply a product of economic growth, but neither 
is it independent of it. As the labour market switches from a seller‟s to a buyer‟s 
market, employers have a greater choice in recruitment and more scope to satisfy, 
what is termed in the economics literature, their tastes (Becker, 1971). The shedding 
of labour during the recession also has implications for the equality agenda 
depending upon the criteria used to select people for redundancy. There are a 
number of institutions in place to prevent the recession riding roughshod over the 
equality agenda, not least: anti-discrimination legislation; regulations relating to unfair 
dismissal; equality polices adopted by employers and trade unions; and changes in 
society‟s normative values as diversity in the workforce becomes the norm.  
 
A report on the recession jointly prepared by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission and the Department for Work and Pensions (EHRC/DWP, 2009) 
summarises progress made in the labour market with respect to different groups 
within the scope of the Commission over the recent past. It also indicates how the 
recession has affected these groups between 2008 and 2009. It shows how the 
recession has lowered the employment rate and raised the unemployment rate for all 
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groups over the past year. It is the rate of change as the recession gives way to 
recovery which is the prime interest of this study. 
 
It is too early to tell what the final impact of the current recession will be on equality 
and whether some of the advances made over recent years will be lost. It is possible, 
however, to look at what happened during previous recessions, both in this country 
and abroad, to gauge the risks which may be posed to certain groups this time 
around. It is known from previous recessions that even where output growth in the 
economy bounces back quickly to pre-recession levels, unemployment continues to 
rise for a substantial period of time afterwards. It took nearly 10 years for employment 
levels to recover from the 1990-91 recession. There is concern that recovery from the 
current recession may be slow – in part because the weight of public borrowing acts 
as drag on growth – which has somewhat onerous implications for the job market.  
A slow recovery also has implications for those entering the labour market for the  
first time. In the Japanese economy, which was largely stagnant during much of the 
1990s and early 2000s, those exiting the education system found it difficult to access 
jobs commensurate with their skills and subsequently failed to make the same 
progress their similarly qualified older counterparts had done years earlier. This may 
be an unduly pessimistic assessment; all the evidence points to economies making a 
recovery, often quite rapidly, to resume long-run growth trends over the medium term 
once a recession ends. The projections of employment presented in this report, for 
instance, are predicated on a return to trend by around 2015/2020.  
 
As will be seen, employment forecasts suggest that the fall in employment resulting 
from this recession may not be as bad as that which resulted from the 1980-81 and 
1990-91 recessions. But great uncertainties remain, especially so as unemployment 
continues to rise. During 2009, unemployment has risen rapidly across Great Britain 
such that between June and August 2009, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) recorded 
2.4 million people as being unemployed (or 7.9 per cent of the workforce). 
 
1.2 The study  
In early 2009, the Warwick Institute for Employment Research (IER) was 
commissioned to examine the equality impacts of the current recession. The 
research is concerned with the following strands of the Commission‟s mandate: 
 
 gender 
 race/ethnicity 
 age, and 
 disability. 
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With reference to each of these strands, the study: 
 
i.  identifies equality issues which have been exacerbated by the impact of the 
current recession on the labour market; 
 
ii. quantifies the impact of the recession on employment in different groups, with 
particular reference to its effect on at-risk groups in the workplace: women, 
ethnic minorities, younger or older workers, and disabled people 
 
iii. predicts trends and the future negative impact on these four equality groups  
(for example, the risk of financial distress), if the current economic downturn 
continues; and 
 
iv. establishes a base line for future research on the equality impact of economic 
recession. 
 
The study is concerned with change in the labour market. Some of the groups on 
which the study focuses have a disadvantaged position in the labour market. What  
is of interest to this study is less the current state of that disadvantage but rather the 
changes in relative advantage/disadvantage as a result of the recession. 
 
1.3 The analysis 
The analysis is based upon: 
 
 A literature review of the effect of recessions and economic downturns on 
different groups in society and the impact of flexible labour market policies  
and equal opportunities policies on the economic activity and employment 
levels of these groups. The review is based on literature published up to  
June 2009 and does not therefore discuss useful more recent analyses,  
such as Berthoud (2009). 
 
 A descriptive analysis of LFS data – and other data as necessary - for the 
1993-2008 period of the relationship between the economic activity of the 
various groups identified above to levels of growth in the economy. 
 
 Estimates of future employment levels of the various groups using the Institute 
for Employment Research (IER)/Cambridge Econometrics Employment 
Forecasting Model, and the implications of these estimates for levels of 
unemployment and economic activity (see Wilson et al., 2008). The 
employment projections are based on a macroeconomic forecast for the 
economy produced in February 2010. 
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A workshop was held in June 2009 at the University of Warwick IER which included 
participants from the Equality and Human Rights Commission and selected 
academics to discuss early findings from the literature review and projections of 
employment. The views obtained in the workshop have been included in the  
current report. 
 
This report is based upon data sources and literature published up to June 2009. 
More recent data and research literature have in some cases confirmed, and in other 
cases reversed, prior trends identified in this research paper. In particular, we note 
that the labour market performance of ethnic minorities relative to that of White 
people has deteriorated during 2009. 
 
However, the analyses presented here remain valid overall, because the forecasts 
are concerned with the medium term and encompass the observed impacts on the 
various equality groups which were realised in previous recessions. They are 
therefore likely to identify correctly the effects of the downturn on disadvantaged 
groups. There are other factors, unique to this recession, which have not yet fully 
emerged, such as the severe future constraints on public finances. These may also 
negatively affect people from the equality groups who are more strongly represented 
in the public sector. 
 
1.4 Structure of the report 
Chapter 2 provides an assessment of the current recession and its impact on the 
labour market given the experience learnt from previous recessions. Chapters 3 to 6 
consider the likely impact of the recession by gender, age group, disability and 
ethnicity, respectively, based on a review of the literature. The projections of future 
employment are provided in Chapters 7 and 8. Finally, Chapter 9 provides a 
conclusion and summary of the study‟s findings and highlights the implications for  
the equality agenda. 
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2.  The consequences of the current recession for the UK  
 labour market 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad economic and labour market context for 
later examination of the evidence relating to the equality implications of the current 
recession. It begins by commenting on the origin of the current recession and then 
considering how, if at all, the current recession compares with earlier significant 
economic downturns. The implications of the recession for employment and 
unemployment are considered. The chapter concludes by setting out some of the 
mechanisms by which the recession can impact in a differential manner on people 
participating in the labour market. 
 
2.2 The origins of the current recession 
The current recession in the UK is often described as like nothing ever seen before in 
the Post-War period. While this may be true to some extent, as Paul Krugman 
(2008:165-66), winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics, observed: 
 
…it might be more accurate to say that it‟s like everything we‟ve seen 
before, all at once: a bursting real estate bubble comparable to what 
happened in Japan at the end of the 1980s; a wave of bank runs 
comparable to those of the early 1930s (albeit mainly involving the shadow 
banking system rather than conventional banks); a liquidity trap in the 
United States, again reminiscent of Japan; and, most recently, a disruption 
of international capital flows and a wave of currency crises all too 
reminiscent of what happened to Asia in the late 1990s.  
 
While Krugman‟s observation emphasises the financial aspects of the current 
economic crisis, these financial events have implications for the real economy of 
production, employment and unemployment. The bursting of the house price „bubble‟ 
and falling house prices has reduced household wealth and led to cutbacks in 
consumption spending. The weakness of banks and other financial institutions has 
resulted in restrictions on the availability, and increased cost, of finance. This has 
reinforced cutbacks in spending, especially in regard to housing and large purchases 
such as motor vehicles. A lack of access to finance and its increasing cost has also 
impacted on businesses, exacerbating cash-flow problems and restricting investment 
(leading to the paradoxical situation of businesses with full order books closing down 
for want of cash to finance production). 
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While the emphasis in this review of evidence is upon the „real‟ economy and, 
particularly, the labour market, it is important to appreciate the driving forces behind 
the recession since those forces will shape the form of change. In many respects, the 
recession of 2008-09 appears to be the mirror image (that is, the reverse) of that of 
the mid 1980s. The UK economy then suffered from high interest rates and an over-
valued pound, which made imports cheap and goods very expensive to export as 
well as inhibiting investment by UK companies. As a consequence, the UK economy 
experienced significant import penetration, loss of overseas demand and a major 
restructuring of the economy, especially in the form of a decline in manufacturing 
capacity. In contrast to the 1980s, the recession of 2008-09 is characterised by low 
interest rates and a depreciation of sterling against other currencies, notably the 
dollar and the euro. Both the currency depreciation and the low interest rate would 
normally be expected to provide mechanisms for boosting demand and, given time, 
expanding output. In the current context, however, the potential for export-led growth 
is seriously undermined by the global nature of the current recession. Moreover, 
households and businesses appear to be unable to gain access to finance as banks 
and other financial institutions attempt to replenish their capital to safer levels than 
hitherto. Restricted access to finance, plus a collapse of consumer confidence, has 
greatly reduced consumer demand and business investment. 
 
2.3 The current recession in historical context 
A recession is defined as two quarters of successive negative growth of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Figure 2.1 charts the level of GDP from the start of the 
1970s to the end of 2008. In terms of a long-term historical perspective, GDP shows 
a steady and continuous increase, but it is also evident that there have been periods 
when the growth of output has faltered to the extent that the economy was in 
recession (as defined above). Recessionary periods can be identified in 1974-75, 
1980, 1990-92 and 2008 to date. A clearer picture of these recessions can be gained 
from Figure 2.2 which charts the growth of GDP quarter on quarter during the same 
period (1970-2008).  
 
Figure 2.2 clearly show the four periods of recession referred to above where output 
has fallen for two or more quarters. The chart also highlights a number of additional 
features of output growth over the period. First, output fluctuated to a much greater 
extent during the 1970s, with growth in some quarters of over three per cent often 
being followed shortly afterwards by low or even negative growth in a quarter.1 Any 
period of negative growth was, however, short-lived and only in 1974 did negative 
growth occur in more than two consecutive quarters. During the 1980s, the extent of 
                                            
1
  This pattern could be a product of measurement errors where under-recording of GDP in 
one quarter leads to a corresponding over-recording in later quarters and vice versa. 
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output growth fluctuations were markedly less than in the previous decade although 
the period was marked at the start (1980) and at the end (1990-92) by brief periods 
of recession. Remarkably, no period of recession was experienced from 1992 
throughout the rest of the 1990s and 2000s until 2008 when output declined rapidly 
from the second quarter onwards. 
 
Table 2.1 describes some of the features of the four periods of recession identified 
since 1970. The table indicates that output declined sharply over a period of just one 
year during the recessions of 1974-75 and 1980 with output beginning to recover 
thereafter. The recession of 1980 was, however, particularly acute, with output 
declining by almost six per cent and taking over four years to recover to the level at 
the start of the recession. This contrasts with the later recession of 1990 during which 
output declined by only 2.3 per cent over a two-year period. Much of that period was 
marked by no growth rather than actual decline. After two years, when growth 
recommenced, it took less than a year for output to recover to pre-recession levels. 
Compared with the three previous recessions, the 2008 recession appears sharp in 
terms of the speed of decline - 2.3 per cent of output in just three quarters – but is not 
yet of the scale of the 1980 recession. Of course, this may simply be a reflection of 
the truncated evidence since further declines in output may emerge during 2009.  
It is difficult to say, therefore whether the current recession will be worse than that  
of 1980 or last longer. Only time will tell in this regard. 
 
Table 2.1 Four recent periods of recession in the UK 
 
 Start date 
Date of 
bottom of 
recession 
Length of 
period from 
start to 
bottom of 
recession 
Total decline 
in GDP (%) 
Time taken  
for GDP to 
recover to 
level at start 
of recession 
1 1974 Q4 1975 Q3 4 Quarters 3.77 7 Quarters 
2 1980 Q1 1980 Q4 4 Quarters 5.88 13 Quarters 
3 1990 Q3 1992 Q2 8 Quarters 2.33 11 Quarters 
4 2008 Q2 ? ? 2.30$ ? 
Notes: $ Decline in GDP over three quarters. 
 
Source:  Institute for Employment Research. 
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Figure 2.1 Gross Value Added, quarterly 1970-2008  
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Figure 2.2 Quarterly change in Gross Value Added, 1970-2008  
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Source: Institute for Employment Research. Derived from Office for National Statistics Time 
 Series YBFR, downloaded from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdtimezone.asp  
 
 
2.4 The impact of the recession on employment and worklessness 
 
Employment 
Employment is derived from employers‟ needs to produce outputs of goods and 
services (the demand for labour is a derived demand). Fluctuations in output, 
especially when on a significant scale, will thus impact on employment. The 
relationship between national output and jobs is, however, not a fixed, or 
mechanistic, one, and will vary according to the economic circumstances of business, 
the costs of adjusting employment and, particularly, expectations about the future. 
Small, random, fluctuations in business can be met in a number of ways, for instance 
by running stocks up or down (with output remaining constant), varying production 
through variations in productivity (with fixed employment levels), varying hours of 
work or hiring and firing labour as required. Continuous production processes, such 
as motor vehicle production, will tend to deal with fluctuations in business through 
variations in stocks of product. Service producers cannot generally store their 
services and will tend to meet fluctuations through variations in productivity or hours 
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of work. Where employers have invested in their workforce (for instance, through 
specific training), the potential loss of such an investment will mean that employers 
will seek to retain their workforce as long as possible. Where it is cheap and easy to 
fire or hire workers, fluctuations in business and output may be met in that manner. 
 
A period of recession needs to be distinguished from normal fluctuations of business 
activity. A recession involves a fall in demand for output of a magnitude not normally 
experienced by business. The response of employers to a period of recession will 
depend on several factors and these are to a considerable extent psychological.  
The first factor is their ability to recognise that any fall in demand or sales being 
experienced goes beyond the norm for day-to-day or seasonal business fluctuations. 
It may take some time for such recognition to occur; it is often precipitated by 
shrinking order books, the emergence of excessive stocks or enforced periods of 
idleness of the workforce. Second, an employer‟s response to a recession will 
depend, once the recession is recognised, on their expectation of how long the 
recession will last. If that expectation is that the recession will be short-lived, their 
response may be to „weather it out‟ as best they can until the economy returns to 
growth again. If the expectation is for a prolonged recession, then the business may 
need to seek more drastic adjustments in order to survive. 
 
Overall then, the employment consequences of entering a period of recession will 
depend on whether the recession was expected, on which sectors of the economy 
are initially affected (since different sectors respond in different ways) and 
expectations about the future. One key feature of the current recession was that it 
was signalled well in advance in the form of the financial crisis and the failure of 
several notable financial institutions – such as the Northern Rock bank in the case  
of the UK – and businesses were probably well aware of the impending economic 
downturn. In addition, the global nature of the economic downturn is likely to have 
generated expectations that any recession was likely to be serious and long lasting. 
The nature of the 2008 recession, driven as it was by a collapse of the housing 
market and restrictions on access to finance, meant that the initial impact of the 
downturn was visited upon sectors of the economy that either had a tradition of hiring 
and firing – such as the construction industry – or were of such a scale that even 
stock variation and short-time working was an inadequate response (this was 
particularly the case in regard to motor vehicles which suffered a catastrophic fall in 
sales in excess of 50 per cent). 
 
Figure 2.3 describes the pattern of output and employment in the UK over the period 
1970 to 2008. It is evident that employment fluctuated in a manner roughly in line 
with fluctuations in output growth but, notably, output increased at a faster rate than 
employment (implying increased productivity) until the mid 1990s. Thereafter, 
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employment growth tended to mirror that of output growth. To see the relationship in 
more detail, Figure 2.4 provides a picture of output and employment levels during the 
last full period of recession and recovery (1990 to 1994). The chart shows clearly 
how output fell sharply in 1990 with employment falling shortly thereafter. The 
recession lasted for two years, although much of the latter part of that period 
consisted of static output rather than further falls in output. By the end of 1992, the 
recovery of output was well under way but employment continued to fall before 
starting to increase again some 12 months later in mid 1993. The current recession 
displays similar characteristics to the earlier 1990 recession (see Figure 2.5), with 
output commencing a sharp decline in the second quarter of 2008 and employment 
falling sharply in line with output for the remainder of the year.  
 
Figure 2.3 UK output and employment, 1970-2008 
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Figure 2.4 UK output and employment, 1990-95 
 
22000
22250
22500
22750
23000
23250
23500
23750
24000
24250
24500
24750
1990
Q1
1990
Q2
1990
Q3
1990
Q4
1991
Q1
1991
Q2
1991
Q3
1991
Q4
1992
Q1
1992
Q2
1992
Q3
1992
Q4
1993
Q1
1993
Q2
1993
Q3
1993
Q4
1994
Q1
1994
Q2
1994
Q3
1994
Q4
1995
Q1
1995
Q2
1995
Q3
1995
Q4
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
In
d
e
x
 o
f 
G
D
P
Employee jobs (000s) Index of GDP in 2003 prices
 
Source: Institute for Employment Research. Derived from Office for National Statistics Time 
Series BCAJ and ABMI, downloaded from 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdtimezone.asp  
 
 
Figure 2.5 UK output and employment, 2006-08 
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Unemployment 
As would be expected, in periods of recession when output and employment are 
falling, significant increases in unemployment result. Figure 2.6 shows that each of 
the major recessions of recent decades (measured by falls in employment) are 
associated with major peaks of unemployment (measured by the number of people 
claiming unemployment benefits). Figures 2.7 to 2.9 provide more detail by relating 
changes in output (GDP) to changes in unemployment. Table 2.2 provides some 
summary measures of recession and the impact on unemployment. A number of 
striking features are evident from these figures and the table. These are that: 
 
 unemployment lags significantly behind changes in output 
 
 unemployment continues to rise long after output has recovered and a 
recession is technically over, and 
 
 a recession leaves a legacy of high unemployment for many years after the 
initial contraction of output. 
 
Figure 2.6 UK employment and unemployment, 1970-2008 
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Figure 2.7 UK output and unemployment, 1974-90 
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Figure 2.8 UK output and unemployment, 1988-2002 
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Figure 2.9 UK output and unemployment, 2006-08 
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Table 2.2 Unemployment in the last three UK recessions 
 
 
Start date of 
recession 
Number and date of 
unemployment high point  
(000s) 
Time for unemployment to 
fall to pre-recession level 
1 1974 Q4 1,484 in 1986 Never reached previous levels 
2 1980 Q1 3,293 in 1986 1990 
3 1990 Q3 2,919 in 1993 1997 
Source:  Institute for Employment Research. 
 
 
Nonetheless, not all recessions follow the same pattern. While in earlier recessions 
unemployment began to increase around the same time as output commenced its 
decline, in the current recession, somewhat unusually, unemployment appears to 
have begun to increase ahead of the onset of the decline in GDP, perhaps as early 
as the end of 2007 or early 2008. This might suggest that employers and businesses 
had actually anticipated the recession or it could be that other factors were impacting 
on employment and unemployment in addition to the impending recession. 
 
 
THE EQUALITY IMPACTS OF THE CURRENT RECESSION 
 
 16 
Earnings and recession 
A fall in the demand for labour (reduced employment) and increased competition  
for jobs (rising unemployment) might be expected to slow down or even reverse the 
trend growth in earnings. In fact, in the past there appears to have been only a weak 
relationship between unemployment and earnings growth. Figure 2.10, for instance, 
suggests that wages continued to increase with little diminution during the 1990s 
despite the high levels of unemployment. 
 
There are, however, indications that the current recession may be somewhat 
different from past downturns. In recent years, employers have tended to increase 
the proportion of pay that takes the form of a bonus. This appears to have given 
employers greater pay flexibility in the face of the recession. While pay excluding 
earnings has continued to increase, bonuses have fallen, in some cases 
dramatically. This is evident in Figure 2.11 which indicates some sharp falls  
in earnings including bonuses during early 2009. This ability to cut wage costs  
goes part of the way to explaining how some employers have been able to retain 
their workforce to a greater degree than in previous recessions (for the time being  
at least). 
 
Figure 2.10 Unemployment and earnings, 1990-2000, Great Britain 
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Figure 2.11 Earnings 2005-09, Great Britain 
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2.5 The differential impact of recession on the labour market 
Whatever the broad picture of falling output and employment and rising 
unemployment, recessions seldom bear equally on all participants in the labour 
market. Much will initially depend on the factors precipitating the recession. The 
immediate consequences of a recession triggered by a financial crisis (such as the 
current recession) may be expected to be different to one triggered by a loss of 
international competitiveness and an overvalued currency. As already observed, the 
early impact of the current recession has been to depress output and employment  
in sectors such as construction and motor vehicles. Rather less usually, the  
current recession has also impacted on employment in the financial sector  
(banking and insurance) following banking failures, mergers and government  
buyouts of financial institutions.  
 
There is some early evidence that unemployment has been increasing at a faster 
rate among professional and other white collar jobs to a greater extent than in 
previous recessions. Table 2.3 sets out the number of unemployment benefit 
(Jobseeker‟s Allowance or JSA) claimants in February 2009 in terms of their  
usual occupation and the percentage by which that number increased over the 
preceding six months.  
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Table 2.3 JSA claimants February 2009, by usual occupation, Great Britain 
 
 Number of claimants 
(thousands) 
% change 
Aug 08-Feb 09 
Occupation unknown 4.7 147 
Skilled construction and building trades 98.1 124 
Skilled metal and electronic trades 50.7 108 
Corporate managers 57.4 104 
Science and technology professionals 19.7 91 
Transport and mobile machine drivers and operatives 102.7 88 
Business and public service professionals 12.2 84 
Process, plant and machine operatives 1.6 82 
Protective service occupations 71.4 81 
Business and public service associate professionals 28.9 77 
Managers and proprietors in agriculture and services 13.0 76 
Textiles, printing and other skilled trades 22.0 64 
Science and technology associate professionals 19.4 61 
Skilled agricultural trades 22.4 61 
Secretarial and related occupations 18.9 58 
Leisure and other personal service occupations 17.7 54 
Elementary trades, plant and storage related occupations 297.5 48 
Customer service occupations 30.8 47 
Administrative occupations 125.2 47 
Sales occupations 181.1 45 
Culture, media and sports occupations 26.9 44 
Elementary administration and service occupations 128.0 38 
Caring personal service occupations 43.7 30 
Health and social welfare associate professionals 8.3 18 
Health professionals 0.7 4 
Teaching and research professionals 9.4 -14 
All claimants 1,412.4 58 
Source: Institute for Employment Research. Derived from JSA Claimant count data 2008-09; 
downloaded from NOMIS, https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/default.asp 
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Table 2.3 indicates that the largest rates of increase were among occupational 
groups not normally associated with a high risk of unemployment (for instance, 
skilled trades in construction and metal and electrical, managers (both corporate  
and agricultural), professionals (both scientific and technical and business and  
public sector), and business and public sector associate professionals.  
 
The picture revealed by Table 2.3 may only represent that of the immediate impact of 
recession. The first round of job losses following the current recession may well 
reflect the consequences of the financial crisis that precipitated it. There will be 
further, long-term consequences as the repercussions of the recession flow around 
the economy. One feature of the current recession is the vast sums of public money 
being injected into the economy to support the ailing financial system and to bolster 
demand. The consequences of such public spending are not yet clear but are likely 
to involve higher levels of future taxation and reductions in public spending plans. 
Public spending plans and budgets are set well in advance, so do not respond 
immediately to changes in economic conditions such as recessions. Nonetheless,  
the longer term impact of the current recession is likely to involve reductions in  
public sector employment on a scale that could match or even exceed that in the 
private sector so far. In so far as public sector employees are different in character  
to those in the private sector, the longer term impact of the recession will have a 
differential impact. While the public sector by no means has a monopoly on „good‟  
or socially responsible employment practices, it must be of concern that substantial 
public sector job losses in the future might bear heavily on an area of employment 
where vulnerable groups, such as disabled people and lone parents, are 
disproportionately represented.  
 
While Table 2.3 provides some confirmation that the current recession may be 
somewhat different in character to previous ones, it should be noted that many of the 
large percentage increases in unemployment among high-level occupations are from 
a relatively small base. It remains the case that the largest absolute increase in 
numbers of JSA claimants was among people usually working in elementary (that is 
relatively unskilled) occupations. Elementary administration and service occupations 
account for an increase of 128,000 JSA claimants while elementary trades, plant and 
storage related occupations account for 297,000 claimants. Thus most JSA claimants 
are still people who previously worked in comparatively low-skilled jobs. Part of the 
reason for this is that a recession may bring with it a „bumping down‟ process where 
remaining jobs go to over-qualified people, while those who would normally have 
taken those jobs are squeezed out (Reder, 1955). This process arises where 
employers seek to retain a skilled workforce in whom they have made an investment 
(although in extreme cases even this may not be possible). It is notable, for instance, 
that motor manufacturers such as Honda have elected to respond to the recession by 
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completely shutting down production for weeks at a time but retained their workforce 
on reduced (but generous) retention wages (up to 80 per cent of normal wage in the 
case of Honda) (Guardian, 2009a).  Such arrangements do not apply across the 
board and where the employer has no interest in retaining their workforce (perhaps 
because it is unskilled and cheap to replace when the recovery occurs), workers will 
be made redundant and will join the ranks of the unemployed. One consequence of  
a „bumping down‟ of disadvantaged people into low-skilled occupations is that pay in 
such occupations can be expected to be held down by the increasing competition for 
jobs that results at this level of the jobs market. Wage differentials might well 
increase as a consequence of a recession.  
 
If individuals become unemployed, enter or re-enter the labour force during a period 
of recession, they will face increased competition for any available jobs. Even though 
the rate of recruitment can be expected to slow down during a recession, employers 
will need to recruit workers to replace those in their workforce that quit, are dismissed 
or retire. In addition, not all businesses decline during a recession: some benefit from 
austerity and new opportunities and, as business grows, they will recruit people. 
Thus, the manner in which employers recruit will play a critical role in determining 
who is able to enter employment and who remains out of work. Employers‟ recruiting 
behaviour can be expected to change in the face of increased numbers of job 
seekers during a recession. Hiring standards, for example, may be increased and 
employers become more selective. Thurow (1976), for instance, argues that 
employers rank job-seekers into a job queue according to the cost of training. 
Employers then recruit those who impose the least cost of training and can „hit the 
ground running‟ in terms of their work. Further characteristics may be perceived by 
employers (rightly or wrongly) with additional costs to the business. These include 
the cost of accommodating the needs of disabled people or perceptions of absence 
by lone mothers. Job-seekers with such characteristics will be moved further down 
the job queue and only be hired when other, cheaper candidates have been hired. Of 
course, not all employers will become more selective during a recession. Faced with 
a ready supply of unemployed potential recruits, some employers may abandon any 
previous pre-employment selection practices in favour of selection „on the job‟ with a 
correspondingly greater emphasis on an active dismissals policy. In these cases, the 
concern is less that the changes in recruitment practice restrict access to jobs for 
some, but more that such changes create a problem of poor job retention and „churn‟ 
among some groups of job-seekers. Whichever strategy is adopted by employers, 
their behaviour is governed by the need to comply with employment and anti-
discriminatory legislation but it may be difficult to observe, let alone prevent,  
some of the more subtle and indirect forms of employer discrimination.  
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Employers have also been known to change their recruitment methods during 
recession (Hasluck, 1995; 1999). In general, such changes usually involve a 
withdrawal from the more formal, open market methods of recruitment in favour of 
internal recruitment or use of informal recruitment channels. Many large employers 
will prefer to redeploy existing redundant staff to other positions within the 
organisation. That way they avoid many recruitment costs and retain members of 
staff who could be redeployed in any future recovery and who are known quantities. 
For similar reasons, many employers reduce their use of public employment services 
– Jobcentres – during period of recession for fear of being inundated by (often 
unsuitable) applicants. Instead, employers may turn to less formal means of 
recruiting such as ex-employees, word of mouth or personal recommendation from 
an existing employee. These shifts can significantly reduce the ability of some groups 
of job-seekers to gain information about, or access to, job opportunities. For instance, 
internal vacancy lists will only be seen by existing employees or people to whom they 
choose to share that information. Similarly, the use of personal recommendation by 
existing employees will tend to reinforce existing recruitment patterns in terms of 
gender, ethnic group or even place of residence. The use of less formal methods of 
recruitment is particularly disadvantageous for anyone who is entering the labour 
market for the first time (such as school leavers) or entering after a prolonged 
absence (such as women returners) who may lack the contacts necessary to find  
the job opportunities they seek. 
 
A further cause of a differential impact from recession is withdrawal from active 
participation in the labour market. Some people seeking employment may be so 
discouraged by their poor job prospects that they no longer actively seek paid work. 
A critical issue here is the extent to which an alternative is available to such 
individuals. Young people may elect to remain in education for longer than they 
otherwise would have done. Older workers may decide to retire rather than seek  
a new job if made redundant. Where an individual is a member of a multi-person 
household, decisions about participation will be jointly made and a household 
member with little prospect of re-employment may withdraw from the job market. 
Traditionally, such withdrawals were typically made by women with working male 
partners (married or otherwise) and children, although this pattern has been 
changing in recent years with female activity rates increasing and male activity rates 
falling (Beatty and Fothergill, 2003). This is still the case. An alternative route out of 
the active labour force takes the form of a transition from active job-seeker to an 
inactive benefit claimant on the grounds of ill health or disability. In the 1980s, there 
was a dramatic movement of benefit claimants from unemployment benefits (which 
require active job-seeking) to other benefits (such as Incapacity Benefit) where there 
was no such requirement to seek work actively. Much of government policy in recent 
years, such as New Deal for Disabled People and Pathways to Work, has sought to 
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reverse that trend and attempted to reactivate people claiming „inactive benefits‟.  
The current recession threatens to undermine that approach. There will be little 
incentive for those on inactive benefits to seek work if they are convinced there is 
little prospect of obtaining a job, and advisers within Jobcentre Plus are unlikely to 
dissuade inactive benefit claimants from that position if the advisers themselves 
concur with the analysis of job prospects. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This section has considered the current UK recession by comparison with previous 
UK recessions and has examined the likely pattern of broad labour market impacts.  
It is clear from the analysis that the UK is currently in a significant recession with 
sharply reduced output and employment and rising unemployment. Nonetheless, 
despite the spectacular financial crises that precipitated it, the current recession has 
not yet reached the proportions of earlier recessions, notably that of the early 1980s. 
It remains to be seen how long the decline in output will continue or what the longer-
term consequences will be in terms of unemployment and worklessness. This is not 
to be complacent about the consequences of the recession. While there is some 
evidence to suggest that the immediate impact of the downturn has been on higher-
level occupations not previously at high risk of unemployment, there are several 
reasons for believing that the longer-term impacts – impacts that could, on the basis 
of previous experience of recessions, last for many years – will be different for 
different groups in society. There are good grounds for believing that changes in 
employers‟ recruitment practices, together with changes in household behaviour,  
will result in the longer-term consequences of the recession becoming increasingly 
concentrated among disadvantaged groups in the labour force and even lead some 
to leave the labour force altogether. The consequences of such concentrations of 
worklessness or job insecurity are profound for the individuals concerned and can 
produce „scarring effects‟ from which they never recover. The consequences for 
society are also profound, not only in terms of the foregone economic benefits,  
but also in terms of other social costs that are involved. 
 
Having now set out a broad context for a consideration of the evidence, the 
remainder of this review will consider the evidence relating to specific disadvantaged 
groups in the labour force. 
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3.  Gender  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Several recent media reports have argued that because a larger number of men  
are unemployed and a larger percentage are claiming Jobseeker‟s Allowance (JSA), 
they are therefore bearing the brunt of the current recession. Others, however,  
have countered that women, many of whom do not qualify for JSA or redundancy  
pay because of limited contributions and periods of economic inactivity, are more 
disadvantaged than men. The indicators used to examine the impact of the recession 
show that men are being hit harder than women in terms of unemployment. This 
chapter will outline the literature relating to the impact of the recession on men and 
women and will identify certain areas which need to be considered when taking into 
account the full impact (both direct and indirect) of the current recession. 
 
3.2 Measures used to examine the impact of the recession  
Employment rate: Data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2009b) show that 
the working age employment rate for the three months to April 2009 was 76.9 per 
cent for men, down 0.9 percentage points on the previous quarter, and 69.3 per cent 
for women, down 0.7 percentage points.  
 
Unemployment rate: A corresponding rise was shown in the unemployment rate 
(Figure 3.1), with the rate for men at 7.8 per cent in the three months to March 2009 
(an increase of 0.9 per cent on the previous quarter), whereas the rate for women 
was 6.1 per cent (an increase of 0.6 per cent on the previous quarter). 
 
Figure 3.1 Unemployment rate by gender, 1979-2009 
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Notes:  Percentage of men and women aged 16 and over who are unemployed; seasonally 
adjusted data. 
 
Source:  Office for National Statistics (2009a: 4-5), Figure 4.6. 
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Redundancy rate: Similarly, as reported in May 2009, the redundancy rate was  
14.1 per thousand male employees, and 8.3 per thousand female employees  
(ONS, 2009a). This gender difference is not surprising, given that women are  
less likely than men to have worked continuously, due to taking time out of the  
labour market to have children. They are also more likely to work on temporary 
contracts, often making them ineligible for redundancy payments. In spite of this, the 
redundancy rate for the three months to March 2009 showed an increase of 1.7 per 
thousand female employees, compared with 0.5 per thousand males (Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2 Redundancy rate by gender per 1,000 employees 
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Notes:  Male and female employees aged 16 and over; seasonally adjusted data. 
 
Source:  Office for National Statistics (2009a: 4-5), Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Claimant count: An examination of the claimant count shows that women are much 
less likely to claim JSA than men (latest figures for October record 6.8 per cent of 
men, compared with 3.0 per cent of women) (ONS, 2009d). Again, this is to be 
anticipated, as many women do not accrue sufficient contributions to make a claim, 
or have a working partner, so making them ineligible after six months (Dobbs, 2009). 
Nevertheless, there were 1.7 per cent more female benefit claimants in October 2009 
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than in the previous month, compared with 0.4 per cent of men, and an increase of 
68.5 per cent over the year, compared with 60.8 per cent of men (ONS, 2009d). 
 
Economic inactivity rate: In the three months to April 2009, the economic inactivity 
rate for the working age population was 16.2 per cent for men and 25.9 per cent for 
women, showing only small changes over the year in comparison with employment 
and unemployment figures (ONS, 2009b). Looking at the figures by age groups, the 
numbers of those economically inactive aged 16-17 rose by 2.2 per cent on the 
quarter for men and 3.2 per cent for women. For 18-24 year olds, the number of 
economically inactive men and women rose by 7.4 per cent and by 1.4 per cent 
respectively. Numbers of economically inactive 25-34 year olds decreased by 2.5  
per cent for men, but rose by 3.1 per cent for women. Slight increases were shown  
in the 35-49 age group for both men and women (0.8 per cent and 0.2 per cent 
respectively). In the older working age bracket (50-64), the numbers of economically 
inactive men dropped by 1.9 per cent while women rose slightly (by 0.4 per cent)  
 
Interestingly, figures reported in June 2009 show that those giving the reason for 
inactivity as „looking after family/home‟ have decreased to 2.032 million. While levels 
for women increased very slightly on the quarter (0.2 per cent), they had fallen 2.5 
per cent since last year (ONS, 2009b), perhaps reflecting an increase in stay-at-
home mothers going out to work at a time of uncertainty. For men, the figures are 
somewhat different, with a 3.2 per cent quarterly increase, and a 5.7 per cent yearly 
increase, in those looking after the family/home. At the same time, in spite of 
relatively small numbers overall, the percentage of men citing „discouragement‟ as 
the reason for economic inactivity rose by 7.8 per cent on the quarter, whereas for 
women, the „discouraged‟ figures dropped by 15.6 per cent. These figures suggest 
that the „discouraged worker‟ effect (where people leave the labour market altogether 
in times of recession due to a perceived lack of opportunities) may have more of an 
impact on men in this recession than on women (ONS, 2009a).  
 
The number of NEETs: The current recession – as the next chapter shows – also has 
a differential impact on young men and women. For instance, the share of 18 year 
olds not in education, employment or training (NEET) increased from 14.2 per cent to 
16.6 per cent between the end of 2007 and the end of 2008, but among 18-year-old 
men the increase was even greater – from 14.1 per cent to 17.7 per cent (women 
14.3 per cent to 15.3 per cent).2  
 
                                            
2  NEET data are available at 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000792/index.shtml. 
 
THE EQUALITY IMPACTS OF THE CURRENT RECESSION 
 
 26 
3.3 The impact of previous recessions on women’s employment 
In an influential book published over 20 years ago in the UK, Jill Rubery and 
colleagues (Rubery, 1988) outlined three basic hypotheses to explain the impact  
of recession on women‟s employment: 
 
i. That women present a flexible reserve or „buffer‟, to be drawn into the  
labour market in upturns and expelled in downturns (employment moves  
pro-cyclically).  
 
ii. That due to rigid job segregation, demand for female labour depends on 
demand in female-dominated sectors (employment trends are related more to 
secular trends in sectoral and occupational structures than to cyclical factors). 
 
iii. That during recessions, there is a greater demand by employers for cheaper 
forms of labour such as women (counter-cyclical trends). The authors argue 
that instead of being seen as separate and competing hypotheses, they can in 
fact be complementary. 
 
It remains to be seen whether women‟s employment (and unemployment) during  
the current recession differs significantly from previous recessions in terms of the 
explanations provided by these hypotheses, although findings suggest that these 
explanatory frameworks are still applicable. 
 
Other research in the US has focused on the gender „unemployment gap‟ during 
economic recessions (for example, Nilsen, 1984; DeBoer and Seeborg, 1987;  
Leppel and Clain, 1988). As women are more likely to be found in service sector 
jobs, which are relatively well protected during downturns, and men are more likely to 
work in sectors more sensitive to the business cycle, such as the manufacturing and 
construction sectors, it is therefore likely that women will have lower unemployment 
levels during recessions. Goodman and colleagues (1993) also argued that men‟s 
concentration in cyclical occupations contributes to men‟s larger relative job losses, 
and that in the recovery from the 1990–91 US recession, women also gained most  
of the new jobs. In spite of the general finding that women are protected from 
unemployment during a recession because of their heavier concentration in less 
cyclically sensitive industries and occupations, Monk-Turner (1991) examined the 
four US business cycles from 1969 to 1982 and found that, even though far fewer 
women are actually employed in male-dominated occupations and industries, their 
unemployment rates exceeded those for men and this difference became larger over 
time. She attributed this finding to the fact that women are the first to be dismissed 
during downturns in the business cycle.  
 
GENDER 
 
 
 
 27 
Rives and Sosin (2002) used data disaggregated by occupational categories and 
showed that, although women‟s unemployment rates are consistently higher than 
men‟s within occupations, the gender distribution across occupations favours lower 
rates for women. In recessions, the unemployment rates rise for both genders, but 
the occupational distribution shifts in favour of women‟s employment. Nevertheless, 
two studies by Bednarzik in the US (1975, 1983) found that part-time employment  
for economic reasons was higher for women, unskilled workers and employees in 
service-producing industries, suggesting that not all women are protected from the 
impact of recession, even those working in the traditionally female-dominated  
service sector.  
 
In a UK study, Dale (1987) examined the opportunities available to part-time women 
or older women re-entering the labour market after raising a family and found that 
they were relatively disadvantaged compared with men and women in continuous 
full-time employment. Internal labour markets (operating within a firm or occupation, 
and restricting entry from external labour markets) typically recruit from those leaving 
full-time education, who enter at the lower levels, or from their existing pool of 
employees. Women with childcare responsibilities are less likely to be able to 
penetrate such internal labour markets, particularly if they have a limited 
geographical location within which they can seek work. During a recession, 
employers, who are looking for ways to reduce labour costs while also retaining the 
flexibility to respond to uncertain market demands, are even more likely to restrict 
access to internal labour market opportunities (Dale, 1987: 578). 
 
Other studies from Europe have added to our knowledge of the impact of a recession 
on women, and in particular on women in more vulnerable positions within the labour 
market. Some studies have revealed that male-female wage differentials increase 
with the level of unemployment (Abrahamson and Sigelman, 1987; Langton and 
Konrad, 1998). However, Aller and Arce (2001), who examined Spanish data for 
1990 to 1994 - when the downturn particularly affected those employed in the 
manufacturing sector, especially men - found that women fared relatively well. This 
was because the service industry grew more than proportionally from 1990 to 1994 
(from 55.7 per cent to 60.3 per cent of total employment). Moreover, the participation 
of this industry in overall female employment grew from 73.8 per cent to 78.4 per 
cent. In fact, the authors note that the recession in Spain contributed to a reduction in 
the gender wage gap of almost five percentage points (from 83.9 per cent in 1990 to 
90.4 per cent in 1994). They conclude that this was mainly due to the relative 
increase in service industry employment, the activity where the gender wage gap is 
the lowest. In other words, the lessening of the gender wage gap was not due to a 
relative improvement in women‟s working conditions, but primarily to the loss of 
manufacturing employment.  
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A Swedish study (Fritzell et al., 2007) set out to examine how changes in the social 
and policy contexts affected lone mothers in comparison with coupled mothers 
between 1983 and 2001. Following the recession of the early 1990s, the employment 
rate among lone mothers in Sweden remained substantially lower than that for 
coupled mothers at 68.6 per cent between 1990 and 1996, and 67.8 per cent 
between 1997 and 2001 (no differences were shown between coupled mothers and 
lone mothers between 1983 and 1989, with an employment rate of over 80 per cent 
for each group). Nevertheless, the unemployment rate for lone mothers was more 
than twice that of coupled mothers at all time points, rising to 11.4 per cent between 
1997 and 2001. The authors suggest that when jobs are scarce, it may be more 
attractive for employers to hire coupled mothers who can share childcare with a 
partner. Furthermore, this trend continued into the upswing of the economy, 
suggesting a change in the position of lone mothers overall, giving them a weaker 
position in the labour market.  
 
Glass (2008) examined the impact of gender on access to jobs during the transition 
from state socialism to market capitalism in Eastern Europe and Russia, using  
survey data from 1993 and 2000, a time of economic restructuring and recession for 
all countries. In 1993, women with service sector experience and those with high 
levels of education enjoyed a degree of protection from job loss, but as economies 
recovered from major economic losses, women became increasingly vulnerable.  
By 2000, significant penalties existed for many women, especially those with young 
children. The author suggests two compatible explanations for this finding: as state 
supports for women‟s labour force participation eroded in each of these countries, 
women found it increasingly difficult to balance work and family, particularly those 
with young children. Secondly, when the costs of social provisions shifted to 
employers, many perceived women with young children as more expensive  
and less reliable.  
 
The recession will not only affect women‟s participation in the labour market, but 
could also have other negative repercussions which will disproportionately affect 
women. Charles and Stephens (2004) examined the association between job loss 
and relationship breakdown in the US, distinguishing between job loss due to a plant 
closure and job loss due to a lay-off. Divorce was found to be more likely in the case 
of a lay-off. Kraft (2001) found that unemployment the previous year significantly 
increased the risk of separation, in particular when household income was low. 
Previous research has shown that women are at particular risk from accumulating yet 
more debt, as they tend to suffer a greater loss of income through family break-up.3 
Nevertheless, one must not under-estimate the impact on both partners in the event 
                                            
3
  www.suffolk.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/320E5D8B-E2DE-49E8-976A-
95C87541D97F/0/EffectsoftheRecessionandThosemostatRisk.pdf 
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of a relationship breakdown, with men also at risk of reduced incomes, limited 
housing opportunities and reduced mental health. Higher suicide rates are also 
anticipated among men as a consequence of the recession (for example,  
The Press and Journal, 2009).  
 
3.4 Interactions between gender, age, disability and ethnicity 
Williams (1985) examined the early 1980s recession in the US and concluded that, 
overall, the negative effect was relatively greater for men than for women, and there 
was higher unemployment for White workers rather than Black workers and others, 
and for older (over 59) than younger groups. There was little difference in the 
average unemployment rate over the period between White men and women, 
whereas non-White women experienced greater unemployment than non-White men. 
The increase in unemployment over the period was greater for White men than for 
White women. The greatest increase was for older women who experienced a growth 
in unemployment of 185 per cent. In a study undertaken to analyse the relative 
impact of the 1990-91 recession in the US, Brown and Pagán (1998) found that men 
experienced a larger decline than women in the relative share of full-time 
employment, and Mexican-American and other Hispanic women actually increased 
their shares. The authors claim that during more recent economic recessions, 
secondary family workers are not discouraged from dropping out of the labour force 
altogether, but are in fact more likely to enter or stay in the labour force to 
compensate for reduced family income. These new members of the labour force are 
disproportionately women with relatively low levels of human capital (Lundberg, 
1988; Pagán and Cárdenas, 1997).  
 
In the UK, Arnott (1987) showed that in 1979, a period of relatively low 
unemployment, the unemployment rate for White women was 5.7 per cent, compared 
with 10.8 per cent for Black women; for men the rates were 4.4 per cent (White men) 
and 6.0 per cent (Black men). In 1985, a time of high unemployment generally, the 
rate had increased to 10 per cent for White women and 19 per cent for Black women, 
11 per cent for White men and 20 per cent for Black men. This suggests few gender 
differences in unemployment during times of recession, in comparison with large 
ethnicity differences. For older workers, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1992) found that, 
in 1986, age became less important as a characteristic associated with long-term 
male unemployment, whereas for women aged 50 to 59, age increased in 
importance as unemployment also increased, as in the US (Williams, 1985). The 
unemployment differential between older women and prime-age women increased 
from 3.4 percentage points in 1979 to 11.3 percentage points in 1986 (Pissarides  
and Wadsworth, 1992: 74).  
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Burström and colleagues (2003) conducted a study into the labour market 
participation of men and women with long-standing disability in Sweden and Britain 
from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, a time when both countries suffered 
recessions. Although professional men with chronic illness were disadvantaged in 
comparison with similar healthy men, the differences were not great, whereas larger 
differences between professional women with and without chronic illness were 
apparent. For unskilled British women with chronic illness, employment rates in the 
1990s were less than half those of similar healthy women and much less than half 
those of professional women with chronic illness. Unskilled men in Britain were at a 
similar disadvantage, whereas such social inequalities were much smaller and less 
consistent in Sweden. The authors found no support for the hypothesis of beneficial 
effects of deregulated labour markets. Although the numbers of men and women 
unable to work because of long-term ill health have increased in several European 
countries (Nickell and Quintana, 2002, cited in Burström et al., 2003), British women 
are more vulnerable to poverty than their Swedish counterparts - or than British men 
in the same social class (Ginn et al., 2001). British women are more likely to be in 
lower-paid jobs or to have interrupted earnings, providing them with fewer 
opportunities to build the period of employment needed to qualify for sickness, 
unemployment or retirement pensions (Ginn et al., 2001, cited in Burström  
et al., 2003).  
 
These findings support the argument proposed by Rubery and Tarling (1988) that 
women in all countries share a relatively disadvantaged position in the labour market 
which is often reinforced by unequal access to social security and also by their 
continuing responsibility for childcare and domestic work. This disadvantage can be 
somewhat modified in regulated labour markets, where effective frameworks for 
improved terms and conditions of employment are implemented for all workers, 
including those in more marginal groups. Within the UK and the US, the ongoing  
de-regulation of the labour markets has led to the „downgrading‟ of terms and 
conditions of employment, particularly affecting much of the employment undertaken 
primarily by women. As an example, part-time work, introduced perhaps to 
economise on working hours, is often associated with reductions in hourly pay rates 
(Rubery and Tarling, 1988). Although more women have gained qualifications since 
previous recessions, so allowing an „escape-route‟ for some (Rubery and Tarling, 
1988), the expansion of low-paid female employment has also continued. Indeed,  
in a recent book, Rubery argues that there is still an urgent need to: 
 
....promote and reflect an outdated and discriminatory model of women as 
economic dependents and to take action to avoid women being trapped in 
low-paid and insecure parts of the labour market.  
(Rubery, 2008: 309)  
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3.5 The current recession 
There have been some, including Brendan Barber of the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC), who have argued that the current recession in Britain is an „equal 
opportunities recession‟, whereby job losses in sectors where men predominate, 
such as manufacturing and construction, are balanced by job losses in retail and 
hospitality, where more women work. Anecdotal evidence for this abounds. The lay-
off of the new servant class – nannies and child minders – is often cited. Members of 
high-earning professional households lose their jobs and they can no longer afford 
such primarily female employees and they have the time to carry out the relevant 
tasks themselves. So, too, do stories of private schools closing as parents, affected 
by the recession, are no longer able to meet fees. Again, women tend to bear the 
brunt of the job losses. High-visibility cutbacks in the retail sector – for example  
the case of Woolworth‟s – also involve large numbers of women losing their  
jobs (Financial Times, 2009b). Similar findings have been reported for the US 
(Financial Times, 2009c). 
 
An examination of trends over the last year shows that prime-age unemployment 
rates have risen faster for men than for women. Also the redundancy rate has 
increased faster for men than for women. Moreover, as yet, there has been no 
indication of female employment rates dropping off. Indeed, the female employment 
rate has held up better than male employment rates. There are other labour market 
indicators, too, that suggest the impact of the recession has been greater for men 
than for women. As might be expected, there has been an increase in the number  
of people taking temporary jobs because they cannot find permanent ones, and of 
people taking part-time jobs because they cannot find full-time ones, but these 
increases are to be found among men, not among women (ONS, 2009a).  
 
Male job loss, of course, impacts upon women in so far as they are in households 
which depend upon two incomes. Male earnings are, typically, higher than female 
earnings. Earnings in the sectors that have shown themselves most vulnerable to  
the recession are higher than those that are less vulnerable. 
 
The relative protection enjoyed by women as a consequence of their being 
predominantly employed in the service sector might prove to be temporary. It is likely 
to weaken if the current recession is deep and/or long lasting. Moreover, women are 
also disproportionately employed in the public sector. They have benefited from the 
secular growth of the latter over the past decade. However, if a longer-term response 
to the current recession is a clampdown on public expenditure, women are likely to 
bear a disproportionate burden of cutbacks. These cutbacks are likely to in the areas 
of social and other ancillary services or in general administration – the areas in which 
women in particular are to be found (TUC, 2009c; Rake and Rotheroe, 2009). 
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A Financial Times article, reporting on feedback from a number of major European 
employers, notes that some have argued that, in difficult times, employers will no 
longer be able to afford the „luxury‟ of pursing „diversity strategies‟ and that this will 
place a halt on the gains made by women and other groups in the corporate world 
(Financial Times, 2008). In this respect, it is also worth noting that the number of 
equal pay claims lodged by female workers has fallen sharply since the beginning of 
the recession. Sex discrimination claims have also dipped significantly. On top of 
this, a recent report released by the Government Equalities Office (2009) shows that 
nearly one in four men think that in difficult economic times it „makes more sense for 
people on maternity leave to be made redundant first‟.  
 
As far as the psychological costs of recession are concerned, there is a widespread 
consensus that men suffer more from job loss than women. A number of studies 
show that men‟s health and their happiness are more likely to be negatively affected 
by the threat of redundancy or by unemployment. Men, it is suggested, have fewer 
'portfolios'. They define themselves through their work in a way that women, who 
have social roles in the home and in their neighbourhood, do not (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), 2008; Daily Mail, 2009). Whether 
these findings will be substantiated by the current recession remains to be answered. 
 
A closer look at men and women‟s employment during the current recession reveals 
deep contrasts with previous ones in many ways. By 2004, more than 70 per cent of 
women were working outside the home, compared with only 42 per cent in 1971 (UK 
Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES), 2009). Women now make up 45 
per cent of the workforce, up from 38 per cent in 1971, with little difference in 
workforce participation between married and non-married women (Scott et al., 2008). 
At the same time, many more women work in higher-level occupations: by the year 
2000, although still under-represented when compared with men, women comprised 
over 30 per cent of all higher-level managers, and 40 per cent of all professionals 
(Dench et al., 2002). Overall, there are now 1.5 million more women in employment 
since the last recession in the early 1990s, although more than 43 per cent of women 
in the UK work part-time (defined as less than 30 hours per week; LFS data, 2008), 
primarily in lower-level occupations which do not incur a career 'penalty' (Crompton  
et al., 2003). 
 
ONS figures show that the number of people in full-time employment was 21.61 
million in the three months to April 2009, down 224,000 from the previous quarter.  
Of this total, 13.80 million were men and 7.80 million were women. For full-time 
employees only, the quarterly figures showed a decrease for men of 1.2 per cent  
and 1.1 per cent for women. The number of people in part-time employment was 
7.50 million in the three months to April 2009, down 46,000 from the three months  
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to January 2009. Of this total, 1.84 million were men and 5.66 million were women 
(ONS, 2009b). For part-time employees only, the quarterly figures showed a drop of 
1.1 per cent for men and a 0.8 per cent drop for women. Data from the TUC (May 
2009) show that the majority of involuntary part-time workers are female (451,000 
women, compared with 378,000 men). It should be taken into account that around  
80 per cent of the part-time workforce are women and, indeed, one in five (21.2 per 
cent) men working part-time said that they were doing so because they could not 
secure full-time unemployment, compared with 9.6 per cent of part-time women 
(ONS, 2009b). The TUC report also warns that people moving to part-time work often 
face a double pay penalty. Not only are they are unable to work enough hours, but 
they are also likely to earn less per hour. As shown by the TUC, women working part-
time earn 37 per cent less per hour than men working full-time, while men working 
part-time earn 27 per cent less than their full-time male equivalents (TUC, 2009c). 
 
Job losses by sector: In addition to the comment by Brendan Barber noted above, in 
the US, the then Joint Economic Committee Vice-Chair (now Chair), Representative, 
Carolyn Maloney, stated that: 
 
...women have been striving for equality with men in jobs and wages; 
unfortunately what we‟ve achieved is equality in losing jobs during 
recessions. 
 (Schumer and Maloney, 2008) 
 
In the US, the trend in job losses began during the 2001 recession when women  
lost a larger share of jobs than men in manufacturing and trade, transportation and 
utilities, supporting the evidence reported by Monk-Turner from previous recessions 
(1991). Women lost about the same share of jobs as men in other high job loss 
industries. After that recession, women‟s employment never returned to its pre-
recession peak (Gurchiek, 2008), although this did not result in women having  
higher overall unemployment rates compared with men.  
 
ONS figures reported in June 2009 (ONS, 2009b) show that the number of people  
in public sector employment was 6.02 million in March 2009 (up 15,000 from the 
previous quarter), while the number of people in private sector employment was 
23.09 million (down 286,000). Manufacturing jobs decreased by 78,000 and 
agriculture and construction jobs by 28,000. At the same time, service sector jobs 
decreased by 2,000. All jobs combined decreased by 108,000 over the previous 
quarter. A report by the ONS (2009a) shows the breakdown of workforce jobs by sex 
(Figure 3.3). The distribution of gender across occupations (and the predominance of 
men in more cyclical occupations) supports those who argue that men are likely to be 
hit more by the current recession than women, as seen in previous recessions. 
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Figure 3.3 Workforce jobs by gender, percentage shares, December 2008 
 
 
Notes:  1.  Workforce jobs figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. For example, if 
 a person holds two jobs, each job will be counted in the Workforce Jobs total. 
 Workforce jobs figures come from a variety of sources, and where possible, from 
 the employer rather than the individual. Employee Jobs (which is the largest 
 component of workforce jobs) come from quarterly surveys of employers carried 
 out by ONS and administrative sources. 
 
 2.  Standard Industrial Classification 2003. 
 
  3.  Public administration, education and health includes both public and private  
   sectors. 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (2009a: 4-5), Figure 4.2. 
 
 
In spite of the relatively good news concerning the public sector to date, recent 
reports are anticipating a substantial rise in public sector budget cuts (for example, 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 2009), with as many as 350,000 
people being made redundant in the next five years. As the majority of public sector 
workers are female (see Figure 3.3), this could represent a second wave of job cuts 
in which women are more severely affected than men. 
 
Even those women with good qualifications and long-standing attachment to the 
labour market are finding that they are affected by the recession. For example, the 
press have reported a new phenomenon: „professional mummies‟ or „prommies‟ who, 
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due to dwindling business and City lay-offs, now find themselves being stay-at-home 
mothers (Sunday Times, 2009). While waiting for the economy to recover may be 
acceptable for some, the report argues that for the majority „being a “prommie” will 
mean poverty, frustration and an increasingly daunting gap between being a woman 
and the workplace‟ (Sunday Times, 2009). An earlier report in the Financial Times 
(2008) argued that economic turmoil could see a generational change in senior 
management, providing an opportunity for women to rise through the ranks in 
corporations. In spite of this, there were also warnings that gender diversity would  
fall down the agenda as other imperatives took over: 
 
The problem with diversity issues is that - although they are seen as 
important by most corporations - they are never seen as the most 
important on the corporate agenda. In a period of economic pressure they 
tend to get pushed down the priority list.  
(Financial Times, 2008) 
 
Indeed, other recent research shows that an exodus of women from the City 
threatens to reverse progress in achieving parity in the corporate world (The  
Times, 2009). 
 
In an online survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (2009), 60 per cent of the 
1,059 respondents (91 per cent of them women, predominantly working in the 
banking, finance and professional services sector in London and the south of 
England) said that the recession would make it more difficult for women to get ahead. 
The PWC research claims that there was speculation among senior women that they 
were being targeted by employers who were attempting to avoid the costs of 
maternity leave or flexible working. Nevertheless, women are in fact choosing to 
leave lucrative careers by taking voluntary redundancy, the survey shows. Sarah 
Churchman of PWC stated that: 
 
Many women are using [the recession] as an opportunity to exit the 
corporate world, particularly in the City. But whether they are being 
targeted or choosing to leave, either way it represents a serious loss to the 
corporate world.  
 
Highly qualified women seem disillusioned with their prospects, believing  
that reductions in development and learning budgets will create long-term  
career damage. 
 
Income: In the US, blue-collar jobs which are vanishing are relatively well paid. For 
example, construction workers earn on average $840 a week, against the average 
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US wage of $616 a week, whereas health and education workers, who are 
predominantly women, earn about $620 a week and the average weekly pay for a 
retail job is $385. In the UK, latest figures from the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings for 2008 show that those working in manufacturing (one of the sectors 
incurring the greatest job losses and undertaken predominantly by men) earn a 
median salary of £487 per week, compared with sales and customer service workers 
at £287 per week (traditionally „women‟s jobs‟, although increasingly undertaken by 
men). This latter group includes occupations generally acknowledged to be low-paid, 
such as „retail cashiers and check-out operators‟ (Dobbs, 2009). Retail sales appear 
to be holding up, with internet sales healthy, in spite of the downturn, although shop 
workers are unlikely to escape job losses. At the same time, distribution, hotels and 
restaurant jobs were down 0.6 per cent in the three months to March 2009 and down 
2.8 per cent on the year (ONS, 2009b).  
 
3.6 Effects on vulnerable women 
 
Vulnerable workers 
In contrast to the „equality‟ debate surrounding the current recession, the Fawcett 
Society (Rake and Rotheroe, 2009) suggests that women have entered this 
recession on an unequal economic footing, making them particularly vulnerable to 
the impact of the downturn: women are more likely to live in poverty, especially in old 
age, have fewer financial assets, are more likely to manage a household budget, are 
more likely to experience domestic violence, and, as mothers and carers, need to 
make complex decisions about their family and work life. A recent International 
Labour Office (ILO) report on Global employment trends for women claims that 
„vulnerable employment is expected to rise in 2009 for both men and women,  
with the impact relatively more severe for men in all scenarios at the global level‟ 
(ILO, 2009). The report adds that: 
 
...by the end of 2008, working poverty, vulnerable employment and 
unemployment were beginning to rise as the effects of the economic 
slowdown spread. With the deepening of the recession in 2009...we can 
expect that for many of those who manage to keep a job, earnings and 
other conditions of employment will deteriorate. 
(ILO, 2009: 6)  
 
Rake and Rotheroe (2009) argue that women are more likely than men to undertake 
temporary and part-time jobs, which are often the first to go in a recession.  
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Maternity leave 
Women on maternity leave may also be disproportionately vulnerable to job losses. 
Indeed, recent research released by the Government Equalities Office (2009) shows 
that 24 per cent of men think that in difficult economic times it „makes more sense for 
people on maternity leave to be made redundant first‟. A recent report by Maternity 
Alliance (part of a new campaign, the Alliance Against Pregnancy Discrimination, 
which also includes Citizens Advice, Working Families, Maternity Action, the  
Fawcett Society and Gingerbread) has highlighted a steep rise in the number of 
women claiming that they have been victims of pregnancy-related discrimination 
in the workplace.  
 
Lone mothers: Twenty two per cent of families are currently headed by a lone 
mother, rising from seven per cent in 1971 (ONS, 2008). In the three months to  
June 1998, the unemployment rate for lone parents in the UK was 15.7 per cent, 
decreasing to 9.1 per cent in the three months to June 2005. Since then, the 
unemployment rate for lone parents has risen to 11.8 per cent, the highest rate 
among the family groups. On the other hand, married and cohabiting mothers  
have the lowest unemployment rate, at 3.1 per cent. Most recent figures produced  
by the ONS (2009b) show that in April, there was an increase of 23 per cent on the 
previous month in the number of lone parents claiming JSA to a total of 25,965, and 
of these, 15,360 had children in the older age bracket (12-15 years), representing a 
40 per cent rise, compared with 6,600 of those with a child under six, a rise of only 
three per cent on the previous month.4 
  
Female breadwinners 
Data from the Women and Equality Unit for 2006, cited in Rake and Rotheroe (2009), 
show that in 21 per cent of UK families, women‟s incomes account for half of the  
total family income. More and more women in the UK have also become the sole 
breadwinners in households, supporting their partners and children (Financial Times, 
2009a). Nevertheless, women are paid less than men across all occupational groups, 
with the 2008 gender pay gap for median full-time hourly earnings across all 
occupational sectors in the UK standing at 12.8 per cent, up from 12.5 per cent in 
2007. For mean full-time hourly earnings excluding overtime, the gender pay 
increased from 17.0 per cent in 2007 to 17.1 per cent in 2008 (ONS, 2008). Previous 
research has shown that women who earn more than men (or earn a high salary 
relative to their male partner) are more likely to receive help from their partners with 
childcare and domestic tasks than women who either do not work or work part-time 
                                            
4  These figures are experimental statistics and may be subject to change with the release of 
DWP Child Benefit Data (ONS, 2009b). 
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(Harkness, 2008; Crompton and Lyonette, 2008), and this phenomenon appears to 
cut across occupational classes. In spite of this, most women still take on or organise 
the majority of housework, even when working full-time (Bianchi et al., 2000). Women 
are also more likely to move in and out of the workforce, taking part-time jobs so they 
can look after children or relatives, and amassing fewer benefits. As a result, many 
households now relying on a woman‟s income are struggling, with consequences  
for all family members.  
 
Threats to flexible workers 
A recent Observer article (2009a) claims that the current recession threatens 
women‟s employment in the UK like never before. The report goes on to support 
measures taken to ensure that family-friendly working and childcare do not suffer  
in the recession: 
 
Flexibility… can help both employers, seeking to trim costs, and 
employees, who want to keep their jobs... Making family-friendly working 
and childcare strategic priorities will not only help parents through the 
recession but also boost consumption and growth.  
 
For example, BT‟s Work Anywhere scheme (in which employees can control their 
hours and location of their working day) found an increase in productivity, employee 
retention, morale and satisfaction, as well as reduced absenteeism (Equal 
Opportunities Commission, 2007). In spite of this, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) has warned that increased flexible working rights can hamper 
businesses during the recession. John Cridland, the CBI‟s deputy director general, 
was reported as stating:  
 
Now is not the time to be placing extra burdens on British business, and 
people increasingly see this. We already have one of the most generous 
flexible working systems in Europe, and the Government is already 
committed to giving more parents the right to request flexible working (to 
parents of children under 16). Any plans that would hamper our 
companies as they compete in the global economy should concern us all. 
(The Independent, 2008b)  
 
It should be noted that, unlike many other European countries, granting flexible 
working options to employees is not a legal requirement, and parents are not legally 
entitled to part-time work, even though requests have usually been granted (OECD, 
2007; Hegewisch, 2009). Accordingly, UK employers can potentially refuse any 
requests for flexible working during the recession. 
GENDER 
 
 
 
 39 
3.7 Regional differences 
The available data suggest that so far the recession has had a greater impact on 
men in employment than women. Looking at each of the three calendar quarters 
during which the UK economy has been in recession (from the third quarter of 2008) 
and comparing each of them with the same period one year before, men‟s 
employment rates have fallen faster than women‟s (South East England 
Development Agency, 2009). National statistics for the year to September 2008  
show that the three areas with the highest inactivity rates for males were Liverpool 
(29.4 per cent), followed by Caerphilly and Durham (ONS, 2009c). The three areas 
with the highest inactivity rates for females were the London boroughs of Newham 
(47.4 per cent) and Tower Hamlets (44.3 per cent), followed by Burnley, Lancashire 
(42.6 per cent). Correspondingly, the three areas with the lowest rates of 
employment for men were Cannock Chase, Staffordshire (65.7 per cent), Hyndburn, 
Lancashire (64.1 per cent) and Great Yarmouth, Norfolk (61.5 per cent). The areas 
with lowest female employment rates were Burnley (54.3 per cent), Newham  
(48.4 per cent) and Tower Hamlets (47.5 per cent).  
 
3.8 Other impacts of the recession on women and men 
Equal pay and sex discrimination claims: A recent report by the Financial Times 
(2009b) found that the number of equal pay claims lodged by female workers has 
fallen sharply since the beginning of the recession (just under 42,500 equal pay 
cases were accepted by employment tribunals in the 11 months between April 2008 
and February 2009). Sex discrimination claims have also dipped significantly, with 
about 1,600 cases per month between April 2008 and February 2009, compared with 
2,250 per month in 2007-08. The numbers of claims lodged in other discrimination 
jurisdictions (including race, age, sexual orientation and disability) have remained 
fairly steady in spite of the downturn, according to data compiled by the law firm 
Beachcroft. The success rates of such claims have also remained low, with only 
about three per cent of women winning their cases at trial. A Beachcroft lawyer said 
that female workers who may be feeling vulnerable about their jobs could be less 
likely to raise complaints about perceived harassment or discrimination at work 
(Financial Times, 2009b). 
 
Reduced divorce settlements 
Family solicitors are also reporting a large increase in attempts by high-earning  
men to cut the cost of divorce settlements because of a rapid decline in their  
future earning power in the recession (Telegraph, 2009). While media reports  
have focused on high-profile cases, it seems likely that this trend will begin to filter 
down to lower-earning families, with the corresponding long-term impact on both 
partners and children. 
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Family disruption 
Harriet Harman, Minister for Women and Equality, recently revealed that, in a poll  
of public attitudes in the recession, one-third of women say their lives have already 
been affected by the economic downturn (Daily Mail, 2009). Harman said the poll 
demonstrated that more women than men report an increase in arguments in the 
home as a result of this recession. Harman‟s claims regarding the greater impact of 
the recession on women have been disputed in recent media articles. In the Daily 
Mail (2009), sociologist Brendan Burchell stated that men handle losing their job 
worse than women and are more vulnerable, because of the male „macho‟ belief  
that they have to be the breadwinners. „Men, unlike women, have few positive ways 
of defining themselves outside of the workplace between when they leave school  
and when they retire,‟ he said. Conservative MPs further criticised Ms Harman's 
position. Beckenham MP Jacqui Lait said: „Good times and bad times affect people 
equally.‟ Shipley MP Philip Davies said: „Harriet Harman seems to see everything  
in terms of gender. The obvious implication is that more should be done for women 
than for men.‟ 
 
Domestic violence 
In spite of this criticism, the 30-page government booklet „Real Help Now for Women‟ 
was issued in March 2009 (HM Government, 2009), offering advice to women on 
how to deal with recession-related domestic violence and discrimination from 
employers. This reflects concern that women will be affected by the recession in 
different ways from men. The document is based on the premise that „women, 
especially those who are pregnant or work part-time, can feel particularly vulnerable 
during economic downturns‟ and provides a summary of available benefits, as well as 
details of support groups. January 2009 figures issued by the Metropolitan Police 
suggested that there has been a slight increase in domestic violence in the past year, 
and that the police were looking at how stress relating to job losses might create 
tension in families. The attorney general, Lady Scotland, has also warned that 
domestic violence will rise with increased financial worries (Guardian, 2009c). 
„Economic downturns can be difficult times for family relationships. Worries about 
finances can create additional tension and in some cases, where couples have 
already decided to part, problems over selling the family home can deepen tensions‟, 
the government booklet states (reported in Guardian, 2009c). 
 
Reduced maternity leave 
Additional implications of the recession on women may include cutbacks on maternity 
leave and early re-entry into the labour market after childbirth. A recent article in The 
Scotsman (2009) states that a poll of 1,148 adults revealed that 70 per cent of 
mothers were re-entering the job market earlier than originally intended because of 
money concerns. Over half said they would return to work six to 12 months sooner 
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than they expected, some immediately. A further 33 per cent felt „an urgent need‟  
to start contributing to the family‟s finances and aimed to return to work as soon  
as possible, according to a YouGov survey conducted for Avon Cosmetics (The 
Scotsman, 2009). Twenty per cent of the mothers who were previously committed to 
bringing up their children full-time cited a shortfall in the family budget as the reason 
for the change, and 27 per cent expressed fears about the impact the recession 
would have on their family‟s income. One in ten women said that they were 
concerned that their husbands were likely to be made redundant over the next  
year. Given the findings relating to employers targeting women on maternity  
leave for redundancy, it may also be the case that women are feeling the need to 
return to work as quickly as possible. Anna Segatti of Avon UK said that: „The main 
obstacles women foresee focus on finding flexible work, with over half the mums  
we spoke to worried about managing the school run, kids‟ sick days and, of course, 
school holiday schedules.‟ 
 
3.9 The future of women’s and men’s employment post-recession 
The UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) (2009) reports that the 
increase in the proportion of women who are working over previous decades may 
well have peaked (see also section 8.3) as men will increasingly move in on female 
domains as they are squeezed out of traditional jobs like manufacturing. Indeed, men 
are already working in many more parts of the service sector, particularly in customer 
services (the majority of personal service jobs such as caring services are still 
undertaken by women, and projections suggest that this will continue). A report in  
the Financial Times (2009c) on the economic crisis in the US reports that women 
have lost jobs, but at a less calamitous rate, in the current crisis. One reason is that 
women hold three quarters of the jobs in education and healthcare, sectors that have 
expanded slightly this year. The impetus for change could come if large numbers  
of men moved into female-dominated jobs, the report argues. Due to the relative 
security of many such jobs, the prospect of lower wages and poorer benefits may not 
deter increasing numbers of men from looking for such work. It remains to be seen 
whether or not the status of such jobs will improve in the long-term with the influx of 
male workers in both the UK and the US or whether men will see these jobs as 
stepping-stones to greater opportunities in the future. Women previously favoured 
these service sector jobs because many could be done part-time, but „significant 
increases‟ in male part-time work are also predicted (see Table 7.3). At the same 
time, administrative and secretarial jobs, predominantly undertaken by women, are 
expected to decrease substantially, displaced by advances in computer technology 
(UKCES, 2009).  
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3.10 Conclusion 
In many ways, this recession is very different from previous economic downturns. 
More women, and particularly mothers, have entered the labour force (although 
many work part-time), there are more highly qualified women now than in previous 
recessions, and there are various supports for working families which have only 
relatively recently been put in place. On the other hand, there are many similarities 
with earlier economic recessions: a greater number of men than women are currently 
unemployed and are claiming benefits, although women are less likely to be 
registered as unemployed and are also less likely to be able to claim benefits due to 
previous periods of economic inactivity, often for childcare and other caring reasons. 
Nevertheless, the rate of job loss appears to be greater for men than for women. 
 
Where women are in employment they earn less than men, are more likely to be 
working in lower-status jobs, and continue to bear the major responsibility for 
domestic work and childcare, meaning that they have reduced flexibility in an 
increasingly competitive job market. This may make them more vulnerable to job 
losses or reduced hours as the current recession develops, though this is dependent 
upon the extent to which women‟s partners are out of work and take responsibility  
for domestic work and childcare. 
 
The recession may well alter the distribution of work between men and women, as 
men seek work in those sectors which have disproportionately employed women. 
The growth in male part-time employment, for instance, has been observed over 
recent years and is projected to continue into the future. Hence there may be some 
equalising of the job security/insecurity between genders. There are some additional 
(indirect) consequences of the current recession which may affect women more than 
men, such as increased domestic violence, increased relationship breakdown and 
debt, and associated concerns over child wellbeing. Therefore, when considering  
the impact of the recession, notably its particularly abject outcome for men‟s 
employment, there is also a need to consider the indirect effects which can be 
particularly damaging for women.  
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4. Age 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Discussion of „disadvantaged groups‟ in the labour market has a long history.5 What 
has changed over time is the list of groups that have been so categorised. Ethnic 
minorities and foreigners, disabled people, women, and older and young people  
have long been recognised as likely to experience inferior labour market outcomes 
as measured by the level of their non-employment and the conditions of their 
employment. More recently, groups such as those with low levels of skills and those 
living in certain deprived areas have also been a matter of concern, both among 
policymakers and those more generally interested in the study of determinants of 
social and economic performance. 
 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the extent to which age is seen to determine 
employment chances and employment conditions. However, within the age 
dimension, the gender dimension is also important. Thus, reference will be made to 
differences between men and women. Attention will be directed primarily at younger 
people and at older people. These are often compared with „prime-age‟ people, 
although the prime-age group is often, implicitly, thought of in terms of prime-age 
males.6 All disadvantaged groups perform less well than the latter.7 
 
A characteristic of disadvantaged groups is that they serve as „buffer groups‟ or as 
part of the labour force reserve (Casey and Lazko, 1988). They are considered by 
employers, rightly or wrongly, as being less productive and more costly to employ. 
Young people are seen to lack experience, socialisation in work, and reliability. Older 
people are regarded as inflexible, as having outdated skills and being unable to learn 
new ones, and are thought of as physically less fit. As a consequence, and all other 
things being equal, young and old people, like members of other disadvantaged 
groups who are held to have similar or other negative attributes, are among the first 
to be dismissed if there is a need to reduce workforces and among the last to be 
                                            
5
  The term „problem group‟ has been current in European analysis at least since the later 
1970s. 
 
6  The term „prime age‟ is used differently by different analysts, but most would agree that it 
includes those between later twenties and mid forties. Some use the age group 25-54. 
 
7
  The Department for Work and Pensions constructs a series showing the „employment 
gap‟ (the difference between group-specific employment rates and the overall employment 
rate) for lone parents, disabled people, ethnic minorities and people aged between 50 and 
Statutory Pension Age. See, for example, the UK government‟s report to the European 
Commission on progress under the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs (HM Treasury, 
2007). 
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hired if there is a need to increase workforces. Their vulnerability also results in them 
occupying less favourable jobs should they be employed, since more attractive 
candidates will obtain and retain the more attractive positions. 
 
This chapter looks at two disadvantaged groups – both determined by age. It 
considers older people then younger people, and looks at the impact that the current 
recession might have on their labour market chances. 
 
4.2 Older workers and employment 
There are formal and informal institutions that intervene to shield or promote the 
position of disadvantaged groups. Anti-discrimination legislation is one of these. 
While sex- and race-based discrimination have been illegal for a considerable time, 
age discrimination legislation is relatively new to the UK and many of the implications 
of the law have yet to be properly tested. In particular, whether employers are 
permitted to operate mandatory retirement rules once employees have reached 65 is 
still the subject of review.8  
 
Older employees can be protected by more or less informal procedures. Last-in-first-
out (LIFO) redundancy rules protect older workers in so far as age is related to length 
of service. Older workers, in so far as they have seniority, also possess experience 
and this might be valued and so protect them. On the other hand, those with high 
seniority might also be eligible for enhanced compensation, including some form of 
early pension, if they accept dismissal. They might be more willing to volunteer to go 
when volunteers are being called for, especially if they fear that more generous offers 
might not be repeated and they find themselves selected later and offered less 
favourable terms. Into the bargain, they are susceptible to social pressures, based 
around arguments that they have „had their turn‟ and should „make way for young 
people‟ or those with greater responsibilities (Casey, 1992). While efforts to 
encourage direct replacement of older workers with young people or other 
unemployed people are no longer a part of UK government policy, as they were in 
the later 1970s and early 1980s, many employers will seek to manage workforce 
rationalisations by appealing for volunteers. Where trade unions and employee 
                                            
8
  The matter was taken to the European Court of Justice, where it was decided that the UK 
legislation in question did not, per se, contravene the 2000 European Equality Directive, 
although it did make clear that employers making use of their right would have to show 
they had good employment and social policy reasons for wishing to do so. 
 
AGE 
 
 
 
 45 
representatives are involved in any consultation process, they are likely to insist  
upon it.9 
 
Older people in employment enjoy a degree of protection. As a consequence, their 
rate of job-loss tends to be lower than that of young people, particularly those who 
are newly hired and have little protection from any last-in-first-out convention that 
might operate.10 On the other hand, once they do lose their jobs, they have especially 
great difficulties in re-finding work. While employers might make allowance for their 
own, existing older employees, whose experience and loyalty they might reward, or 
whose deficiencies they might be prepared to discount, they do not feel similar 
obligations to older job applicants whose real or supposed positive qualities they do 
not know and whose real or supposed negative qualities they fear. 
 
Young people, although they are highly vulnerable to job loss, tend to be more 
successful at re-entering work. They might be more flexible about what they are 
willing to accept, but they might also be subject to greater pressure to seek work. The 
recent White Paper on welfare reform (for which legislation is at time of writing before 
Parliament) placed great stress on obligations for enhancing employability. It made 
clear that young people, core-age job seekers and other benefit recipients who were 
not working would be required to accept counselling, training and work-preparedness 
assistance. Older people (those aged 50 and above), by contrast, were subject to 
much more light treatment, being invited only to one special interview (Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2008, paragraphs 5.54, 5.55). Moreover, unemployed 
people aged over 60 are still referred to enhanced benefits – pension credit – and 
are, effectively not even required to engage in active job search. 
 
                                            
9  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the UK government operated a so-called „Job Release‟ 
scheme that permitted employers to cease work up to three years before Statutory 
Pension Age and draw a special allowance if their employer agreed to replace them with 
an unemployed person. Whatever changes of opinion the government has had in the 
interim, and despite its stress on the importance of longer working to protect the enhanced 
labour supply or to ensure the sustainability of the public pensions system, it still sees 
„early retirement‟ as one of the means by which savings in civil service staff proposed by 
the 2004 Gershon Review might be achieved. The government‟s Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills „business links‟ website suggests the offer of early 
retirement as a way of avoiding compulsory redundancies (see 
http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?r.s=sl&r.lc=en&type=RESOURCES&ite
mId=1073792399). 
 
10  LIFO might be indirectly discriminatory under the terms of UK age discrimination 
legislation, if it is the sole basis for selection. However, employers might well be able to 
plead just cause, if they can show that it is a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim – for example, by showing that the LIFO principle will reward their most 
loyal employees. 
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A simple representation of age-specific job loss and re-engagement chances is  
given in Figure 4.1, while analyses that provide data on age-specific entry into 
unemployment include Nickell (1980) and those that provide data on age-specific 
exits include Böheim and Taylor (2000). Age-specific unemployment rates are  
shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.1 Relationship between age and unemployment 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Claimant count stock by younger and older age groups 
 
Source:  DWP Claimant Count Series by Age via Nomis.  
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Before the onset of the current recession, conventional wisdom was that the labour 
force would continue to grow over the next decade and a half. It was, however, also 
recognised that an important contributor to its growth is the inclusion within it of a 
greater number of older people. The assumption behind the projections was both  
that older people would be willing to work and that they would have jobs. For these 
twin objectives to be met, there will have to be a change in attitudes, practices and 
policies. These changes will have to be made by employers, by older people and 
bodies representing them, and by government and government agencies. In so far as 
they are directly involved in looking into the longer term, major stakeholders are 
aware of the challenge of labour force ageing but, those who are closer to the coal 
face are not. Individual employers often have rather short time perspectives - the rate 
of return they set for investments suggests these to be little more than five years or 
so, while many are concerned merely with how they might come through the next  
12 months. Few are able to think about possible labour shortages and the need to 
change recruitment, work organisation, training and retirement practices. Trade 
unions are also often concerned with fighting fire and responding to redundancies 
and growing levels of unemployment. Individuals also, tend to have a short time 
horizon, and this is one reason why many people are thought to be under-saving  
for retirement and why many older workers accept early retirement packages they 
later find to be less than adequate Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 1995).  
 
One of the ways in which short- and long-term imperatives collide most starkly can  
be seen with respect to attitudes to older workers. At times when labour is in short 
supply, older workers‟ qualities are stressed and they are seen as offering a solution. 
Even then, however, older workers are seen only as one of many solutions. Although 
a government inquiry of the early 1950s (National Advisory Committee, 1953) 
suggested their use as one of the ways in which actual and forecast labour shortages 
might be met, these shortages were actually met by drawing more married women 
into the labour force and by bringing in citizens from the Commonwealth countries.  
In the last few years, there has been reliance on immigrants from other European 
countries, particularly those from the former socialist states. 
 
On the other hand, when faced by labour surplus, older workers are often the first to 
be released or encouraged to leave. In the 1970s and 1980s, governments in many 
countries actively encouraged early retirement, offering subsidies to employers and 
amending rules for receipt of pension and other benefits to create a new group of  
„the early retired‟. Individual employers took their own initiatives, using their own 
corporate benefit systems and sometimes adapting them to synchronise with publicly 
financed systems and to shift a share of the costs to the latter. Trade unions were 
active participants. There was a common perception that „the old have had their turn 
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and should make way for the young‟. Early retirement became a „socially acceptable‟ 
way of managing workforce reductions and workforce restructuring (OECD, 1995). 
Even today, many of the public policies that facilitated early retirement have been 
reined in or even abolished. This is even though it has been recognised that, at a 
macro level, „work-sharing‟ is counter-productive and that the costs of early 
retirement slow down growth and reduce employment, and the media is full of 
references to „pension crises‟. Most reports of major company cutbacks contain 
reference to attempts to minimise job loss by recourse to early retirement. Older 
employees often jump at the opportunity, fearing worse to come – that they will lose 
their jobs anyway and if they do not take the offer made, next time there will be no 
offer and no compensation. Even government departments make use of early 
retirement to facilitate restructuring and efficiency drives – most recently as part of 
the Gershon process (National Audit Office, 2007).11  
 
In practice, older workers, like certain other „disadvantaged groups‟, have tended to 
act as a buffer-stock on the labour market. Their employment level follows the overall 
cycle but reacts more intensively to it. This can be seen in the work undertaken to 
provide labour force projections that looks for the determinants of labour force 
participation rates by age groups and by sex. The overall level of demand in the 
economy is an important determinant for many groups, but particularly for men aged 
55-64. It is not only to the macro-level that attention should be paid. Even in a 
growing economy, enterprises will be restructuring, contracting and closing down. 
Where this occurs, older employees are likely to be vulnerable. 
 
4.3 The impact of the current recession on older people’s employment 
Many efforts have been made to estimate the determinants of labour force 
participation or employment by age and gender. Some of these have been motivated 
by an interest in the impact of changes in benefit regimes – in particular, of increased 
ease of access to invalidity benefits or pension benefits. Access to such benefits is 
likely to be an important determinant of whether older people work. Others have been 
concerned with looking at the impact of tightening up access to benefits and how, in 
particular, younger and prime-age people respond to this. Efforts directed to looking 
at changes in women‟s employment have often shown a „secular‟ increase in labour 
force participation such that, at each age, each cohort shows a higher level of 
working than does the one preceding it. Behind this secular change are changes in 
                                            
11  The author remembers how, in 1984 in Germany, the Minister for Labour and Social 
Affairs, having successfully steered the relevant legislation through Parliament, appealed 
to older workers to take advantage of the new early retirement opportunities „in the 
interests of the unemployed and of younger people‟. But a few days later, the same 
minister, this time in his capacity as Minister of Affairs rather than as Minister of Labour, 
was appealing to Germans to work longer „in order to protect the long-term sustainability 
of the public pension system‟. 
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attitudes but also changes in the availability of childcare services. Such secular 
increases explain higher levels of employment or activity both among prime-age 
women and among older women. 
 
Efforts to estimate the determinants of labour force participation also include 
attempts to measure the impact of overall labour market demand on the activity or 
employment rates of specific groups. It is often suggested that women‟s employment 
and activity is more cyclical than that of men, or at least that of prime-age men. 
Younger people‟s employment or activity is also more sensitive than that of prime-
age people. Older people‟s employment or activity is also more cyclical than that of 
prime-age people.12  
 
Whether economic activity rates or employment rates are being investigated is of 
some importance. Certain groups who cease employment might not be counted as 
unemployed in the strict sense. Benefit systems might or might not 
encourage/require the job search that is sufficient to allow a person to be counted as 
unemployed. Receipt of certain benefits can mean the person concerned has no 
obligation to seek work and is, indeed, deemed unavailable for work. People of 
working age who have engaged in a long but fruitless job search might, effectively, 
withdraw from the labour market. They might be in receipt of unemployment benefits 
but, to the extent that they fulfil the condition of being „discouraged workers‟, they  
are not deemed part of the labour supply. As a consequence, for some groups, 
employment rates do not move smoothly in tandem with activity rates. Overall rises  
in unemployment might mean yet higher rates of unemployment for members of 
disadvantaged groups, but to the extent that these people might exit the labour 
market completely, it might not.  
                                            
12
  The most up-to-date exercise in the UK is that carried out by the ONS in 2005 (Madouros, 
2006). The purpose of the exercise was to help project the size and make-up of the labour 
force in the medium term – until 2020. An exercise to assist with short-term forecasting – 
for the next two years – was developed by the Bank of England in 2001 (Cutler and 
Turnbull, 2001). 
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Table 4.1  Relative responsiveness of labour force participation to economic 
performance 
 
 age groups 
 16-17 
student 
16-17 
 non-
student 
18-24 
student 
18-24  
non-
student 
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 
men 13.3* 11.9* 4.7* 3.5 2.4 1.0 1.4 2.6 1.6  4.2 2.2  
women 12.9* 14.4* 7.4* 5.7* 2.2 4.6 3.6 2.5      
men   2.2  1.7 1.3 1.5    1.4 1.9  
women   0.7 1.3  0.7 1.4       
men up down Up down down down down down down down Down down up 
women up down Up down up up up up up up  up up 
Notes: * Reported coefficients not statistically significant. Blank cells means variable not used in model. 
Source: Madouros (2005); own calculations (long-term responsiveness calculated using Koyck asumptions). 
 
 
Some indicators of the responsiveness of older and younger people‟s labour  
force participation to overall labour demand – as measured by the „output gap‟  
or the extent to which the economy was operating at below or above trend –  
have been captured in exercises used to project future labour force size. Relative 
responsiveness, using the coefficients generated by the time-series models used,  
is shown in Table 4.2. The results are consistent with the more general statements 
made above (see Table 4.1 above).  
 
It is to be noted that, for certain groups there is a long-run as well as a short-run 
impact of deviations from trend output. The long-run impact tends to be greater  
than the short-run impact, and the long-run impact, in so far as it is important, is 
particularly so for older men – those who tend to drop out of the labour force entirely 
following job loss.  
 
It would, however, be inappropriate to use the coefficients generated from such 
models to make predictions about how labour force participation would be affected  
by the current recession. Although time-series modelling is considered to be helpful 
in showing the impacts of changes in each one of the determining variables (here  
the level of economic activity) on the dependent variable (here the labour force 
participation rate), it does so by generating averages based upon the period  
under observation. This has important implications. First, the time period used  
for the estimates presented in Table 4.1 was 1984 to 2005 – giving a total of 22 
observations. The first few years were ones of rapid growth, with the economy 
moving from operating well below potential to operating well above it; the next few 
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years were ones of sharp decline, with the economy moving back to operating well 
below potential. However, over the succeeding period, which made up over half of 
the years, there was much greater stability and so much smaller changes in the value 
of the determining variable (see Figure 4.3).13 
 
Figure 4.3 Output gap and older men’s labour force participation 
 
 
 
 
One of the dependent variables of primary interest, the labour force participation of 
older people, behaves altogether differently. As Figure 4.3 shows, in the first period  
it declined more or less continuously; in the second, it was stable or even increased 
slightly, but relative to the independent variable, it showed much less change. 
Moreover, closer investigation shows that there appears to be a structural break in 
the series – in other words, relationships that hold in one part of the period are 
different to those that appear in a subsequent part of the period.14 At least with 
respect to older men, the break appears to occur around 1994 – at about the time 
when the variance in the determining variable diminished substantially. 
 
                                            
13  In the period 1984-94, the mean value of the variable measuring the output gap was -0.3 
and the standard deviation (the measure of variation) was 3. In the period 1995-2005, it 
was 0 and with a standard deviation of 1. 
 
14  Such structural breaks are revealed by a „Chow-test‟ (see, for example, Patterson, 2000). 
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Estimations of an identical model over the shorter first period would have produced 
different and substantially larger indicators of responsiveness to overall economic 
performance than those for the period as a whole. Examples are given in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Coefficient on output gap for older men 
 
 1984-2005 1984-1993 
Men 60-64 1.78 
(1.23) 
2.59** 
(0.76) 
Notes:  The model regressed labour force participation on the log of time and the output-
gap lagged by one period, the dependent variable lagged by one period, a dummy 
for invalidity benefit changes made in 1995 and an interaction of the log of time and 
the invalidity benefit change dummy. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** = 
significant at 95%. 
 
Second, even if responsiveness of labour force participation to overall economic 
performance was visible from analysing the first period, it is not justifiable to use the 
estimates obtained to make precise inferences about how the current recession will 
affect labour force participation. Although there was a short period of downturn, at  
the beginning of the 1990s, this period of downturn was by no means as severe as 
that currently being experienced. Thus there was no equivalent to the shock to the 
economic system, such as is now being experienced, that could be used to make 
statistically based projections about the impact of the current shock.15 As is shown in 
Table 4.3, the rate of economic growth is expected to drop from close to three per 
cent in 2007 to nearly minus four per cent in 2009 and to stay slightly negative even 
in 2010 (OECD, 2009). The most substantial period of turmoil in the years 1984 to 
2005 was in the years 1988 to 1991. Then the growth rate dropped from nearly five 
per cent to over minus one per cent and recovered slightly in the year thereafter.  
 
Table 4.3 Comparisons of past and projected economic downturns 
 
year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992  
growth rate (%) 4.9 2.4 0.8 -1.3 0.1  
year 2006 2007 2008* 2009** 2010**  
growth rate (%) 2.8 3.0 0.7 -3.7 -0.2  
Notes:  *provisional, ** projections 
 
Source:  OECD statistics data base and OECD (2009); own calculations 
 
 
                                            
15  This is an example of „Knightian uncertainty‟ (Knight, 1921). There are insufficient 
precedents to be able to estimate the probability of this or that outcome. 
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Accordingly, at best, one can make the generalised predictions that disadvantaged 
groups are likely to suffer more severely than others. Young people, especially new 
entrants to the labour market but also students seeking part-time work, and older 
people, are likely to suffer most.  
 
It is to be noted from Table 4.1 that, until now, people over the normal retirement age 
are acknowledged to have experienced a secular upward trend in their activity rates. 
Indeed, it has often been commented upon that these people constitute one of the 
groups whose labour force participation has been growing fastest. This is shown in 
Figure 4.4, where the growth in their employment is compared with the overall growth 
in employment and where the impact of behavioural changes, as opposed to mere 
changes in the number of people over retirement age, is also illustrated. 
 
Again, the relationships generated by the entire period from 1984 can be compared 
with those generated by sub-periods. With respect to men aged 65-69, it seems as  
if the secular upward trend that is apparent for the whole period is generated from  
the experience of the second half. It is not apparent if only the first half is analysed.  
If the second half, however, is examined in its own right, labour force participation  
of post-pension age people does seem to be driven by the level of economic activity. 
Moreover, and as Figure 4.4 shows, it was in the second half of the period that their 
participation grew most rapidly. The implication of this finding is that post-retirement 
age workers might bear a disproportionate burden of the current recession. Those 
who have jobs are likely to lose them. Employers might well not be prepared to keep 
people on who have reached retirement age and post-retirement age people who 
seek work will be less likely to find it. As the Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development (2008) noted: 
 
...one alternative to making redundancies would be to enforce the 
Government‟s “default retirement age” policy, which allows organisations 
to retire workers at the age of 65 without having to give a reason for  
doing so.  
 
The same report also notes that: 
 
...eighteen per cent of employers plan to enforce this more regularly, 
whereas the majority (64%) do not; which suggests that older workers 
might become disproportionately affected by such redundancy 
programmes. 
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Figure 4.4 Index of older people’s employment rates 
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Notes:  SPA is Statutory Pension Age (65 for men, 60 for women) 
 
 
Table 4.4 Coefficient on output gap for 65-69-year-old people, 1984-2005 
 
 men women 
output-gap 3.04** 
(1.36) 
not significant so dropped 
participation rate of 60-64 year 
olds five years previously 
0.50 
(0.27)* 
not significant so dropped 
time 0.05 
(0.00)*** 
positive *** 
Notes: The model for men regressed labour force participation on time, the output-gap 
lagged by one period and the labour force participation of men aged 60-64 
lagged by five periods. Standard errors are in parentheses. * = significant at 90%; 
** = significant at 95%, *** = significant at 99%. 
 
 
4.4 The impact of the current recession on young people’s employment 
Models of the determinants of young people‟s economic activity over the past two 
decades have shown that, like women‟s economic activity, it appears to be driven by 
a secular upward trend (see Table 4.1). Relevant here is the expansion of further- 
and higher-education opportunities. All other things being equal, this might lead to 
lower levels of activity or employment among such people. On the other hand, and to 
the extent that students increasingly have to finance their own studies, an expansion 
of educational participation will not always mean an equivalent decline in 
AGE 
 
 
 
 55 
employment, even if much of that employment is part-time or occasional. Conditions 
for receipt of benefits for young people have also been tightened, such that those 
under 18 are normally excluded from unemployment compensation and are expected 
to participate in some kind of work preparation or education. 
 
Special programmes and subsequently subsidised apprenticeships designed to keep 
young people off the unemployment register and to enhance their „employability‟ 
have been pursued since the 1970s. Nevertheless, there has been a persistent, long-
standing concern about the flow of young people without Level 2 qualifications and 
those who are not in employment, education or training (NEET). Despite growth in 
the economy, there is a group of young people who have failed to share in the benefit 
of this and, given that qualifications tend to be obtained early on in the life cycle, are 
likely to remain disadvantaged over their life course. 
 
There are some who argue that job-changing is a characteristic of youth and that, 
even if entry into the labour market is more or less difficult at any one time, at a 
certain point more secure employment is achieved and occupational biographies 
become more or less „normal‟ (Daniel, 1981). A more recent study of the impact of 
unemployment on subsequent earnings for British men found that the incidence of 
unemployment had only a temporary effect on earning but that the duration of 
unemployment had a much more lasting effect. It found that wage penalties were 
lowest for young men and the low paid – those most at risk of unemployment (see 
Gregory and Jukes, 2001). Others have been less sanguine. A study of people born 
in 1958 found a large and significant wage penalty, consequent upon unemployment 
in youth. Early unemployment led to wages that were between 13 per cent and 21 
per cent lower by age 42. The wage penalty would, however, be much less severe if 
unemployment were not repeated (see Gregg and Tominey, 2005). 
 
There are others who argue that the experience of unemployment at this early stage 
of working life can have a long-term impact. Those who experience it are „scarred‟. 
Bell and Blanchflower (2009) claim that:  
 
...unemployment while young, especially of long duration, causes 
permanent scars rather than temporary blemishes. For the young a spell 
of unemployment does not end with that spell; it raises the probability of 
being unemployed in later years and has a wage penalty. These effects 
are much larger than for older people. (Bell and Blanchflower, 2009: 16) 
 
„Labour market scarring‟ might affect those who are made redundant by a major plant 
closure. A number of studies of „displaced workers‟ in the US have been made which 
compare people who lost their jobs as a result of large-scale lay-offs with other job 
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losers (Flaim and Sehgal, 1985). In the UK, the study of those made redundant as a 
consequence of the closure of the Rover car plant at Longbridge suggests that while 
many job losers did return to work, many of these did so only in jobs that were 
inferior to those they previously held (Bailey et al., 2008). In addition, scarring might 
affect those who are members of a particular birth cohort that is larger than usual and 
who have to face more than usual competition for a limited number of entry-level 
jobs. One early study at the impact of cohort size upon earnings and employment 
looked at the fall in the graduate premium experienced by college graduates of the 
baby-boom generation in the US (Freeman, 1971). Later work, looking not only at 
college graduates but at people of all qualification levels, found that the relatively low 
wages and high unemployment of the „unlucky cohorts‟ tended to converge to the 
levels that might have been expected had the cohorts been more „normal‟ in size. 
The convergence, however, took a decade or so to be realised (Bloom et al., 1987). 
 
Scarring might, however, also affect members of a cohort who entered the labour 
market at a time when demand was weak. In Japan, where recruitment of school and 
college leavers is the primary means by which primary-sector organisations bring in 
employees, the decade and a half of stagnation the country has experienced has 
resulted in a major rise in youth unemployment. It has also seen the growth of a new 
group of labour market actors – so-called „freeters‟. These are young people who are 
often relatively well qualified but who hold at best temporary jobs and/or work on a 
more or less formal self-employed basis.16 In the eyes of some, they are seen as a 
manifestation of societal degeneration, while even more sympathetic commentators 
express concerns about their falling outside the protection of labour law and social 
protection systems. 
 
In the UK, the group who have attracted concern in the same way as have „freeters‟ 
in Japan are NEETs – those young people who are not in employment, education or 
training. NEETs have not been seen as a product of economic downturn – indeed, 
they were „discovered‟ in 2000 at a time of overall economic buoyancy.17 The NEET 
age group of primary interest has been people aged 16-18, although in some cases 
reference is made to all those aged under 25. Since the mid 1990s, the NEET rate 
among 16-18 year olds has hovered around 10 per cent. Regional variations suggest 
                                            
16
  The term „freeter‟ is a combination of two non-Japanese words – „free‟ from the English 
and „Arbeiter‟ (worker) from the German. On some estimates, there as many as 2.5m 
under 35 year olds who can be classified as „freeters‟ – some one in 10 of the age group 
who are working (see, Honda, 2005; Reiko, 2006). 
 
17  The term NEET seems to have appeared first at the end of the 1990s. 
 
AGE 
 
 
 
 57 
that its level might be connected to the state of the local labour market,18 but NEET 
status is also much higher among those with few or no qualifications. 
 
Figure 4.5 NEET rate: 16-18 year olds in England 
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Notes: Data downloaded from: 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000849/SFR12_2009Ratesv2.xls Table 
A13. 
 
Source:  Statistical First Release Participation in Education Training and Employment by 
16-18 year olds in England: 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000849/SFR12_2009v2.pdf  
 
 
When specific age groups are considered, however, the picture is different. 
Comparing end 2007 with end 2008 (so like with like) the share of 16-18 year olds 
who were NEETs went up from 9.7 per cent to 10.3 per cent, but the share of  
18 year olds who were NEETs increased from 14.2 per cent to 16.6 per cent.  
Among 18 year old men, the increase was even greater – from 14.1 per cent to  
17.7 per cent (women 14.3 per cent to 15.3 per cent).19  
 
The deterioration of the youth labour market might encourage some young people 
who otherwise would have gone into employment to stay in the education system 
instead. The association of new (post 1992) universities has claimed an 
                                            
18  NEET rates by region within England correlate with unemployment rates positively.  
The correlation coefficient is 0.62.  
 
19
  NEET data are available at 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000792/index.shtml. 
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„unprecedented‟ rise in applications to such institutions, and it attributes this rise 
directly to the „recession putting pressure on the jobs market‟. Rises in applications 
of, depending to the institution concerned, between six per cent and 37 per cent are 
being reported.20 An overall increase in applications for university places by UK 
residents of over eight per cent has been registered by UCAS. Among applicants 
aged 21 and over, the increase has been twice as much. So, too, has it been among 
people applying for foundation degrees – people whose existing qualifications  
might not have gained them entry into a normal degree course and who might  
under other circumstances have sought to go into work on leaving school or college 
(UCAS, 2009). 
 
Table 4.5 Applications to university by UK residents 
 
20 years and under 
2009 365,296 
2008 343,047 
% change 6.5% 
21 to 24 years 
2009 44,610 
2008 38,653 
% change 15.4% 
25 years and over 
2009 47,131 
2008 40,157 
% change 17.4% 
all ages 
2009 457,037 
2008 421,857 
% change 8.3% 
applications for foundation 
degrees* 
2009 36,255 
2008 30,846 
% change 17.5% 
Notes: * All places of residence. 
Source:  UCAS, own calculations. 
 
 
People completing university this year are also likely to experience considerably 
greater difficulties in finding work than those graduating in the recent past. According 
to the Association of Graduate Recruiters (AGR), the number of graduate vacancies 
in the UK is likely to drop in 2009 for the first time since 2003. Overall, the 
association expects a decrease of 5.4 per cent „with most employers blaming the 
                                            
20
  The data on new university applications are from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/8012362.stm.  
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economic downturn for the cuts‟. Moreover, this drop „follows an unexpected last-
minute drop in recruitment levels in 2008‟. Not only were vacancies down, the pay 
that was being offered to graduate recruits has also been frozen. The median starting 
salary remained at the same level as in 2008. Some employers, notably in banking 
and financial services, indicated they would be „cutting graduate salaries – by up to 
eight per cent‟. The poor labour market that new graduates will face is, in the words 
of the AGR, „a particular blow‟, because they will be the first to have contributed 
tuition fees for the full three years of their degree courses (AGR, 2009). 
 
A poll for the National Union of Students (NUS) indicates that 80 per cent of current 
students are „concerned‟ or „very concerned‟ about graduate employment levels and 
their likely future job prospects (NUS, 2009). The proportion being „very concerned‟ 
rises strongly by year of study, standing at only 19 per cent for first years, 28 per cent 
for second years but as much as 51 per cent for third years, most of whom will have 
completed in summer 2009. Third-year students, in particular, suggested that, as a 
result of the recession, they were very much more likely to consider postgraduate 
study.21 This, of course might mean they are merely postponing entry into a labour 
market that is still likely to be highly unfavourable even one year later.  
 
It is too early to tell whether the recovery will follow the same trajectory as did Japan 
during its „post-bubble‟ period. In many respects, this depends upon the duration of 
the current recession and the strength of the recovery, but a number of points can  
be made: 
 
 even during the period of rapid economic growth, there remained a group of 
young people who failed to obtain the employability skills which would help 
them gain access and facilitate progress through the labour market; 
 
 where people fail to make the initial transition between the education system 
and work in a timely fashion there may be limited opportunities to catch up  
at a later date; and 
 
 the impact of the recession is such that it will be the less skilled and qualified 
who will struggle to find work, and there may be an increase in bumping down, 
where people who are qualified are required to undertake tasks for which they 
are overqualified. 
                                            
21
  The survey was carried out by Opinion Research in March and included just over 500 
undergraduate students. Details are available at: 
http://resource.nusonline.co.uk/media/resource/HU0213NUSRecessionandHEfundingSum
maryReportDATA.pdf. 
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Much of the concern of policymakers has been not with older people but with 
younger people. The spring 2009 Budget, as widely expected, contained selective 
measures to assist them. In particular, all people under the age of 25 who have been 
unemployed for 12 months are to be guaranteed a job, training or work placement  
in order to ensure that „no young people are left behind due to long-term 
unemployment‟ (HM Treasury, 2009).  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed that the recession is having, and is likely to continue to 
have, a differential impact by age. Of interest is what happens to people at each end 
of the age distribution. 
 
Young people are clearly struggling to get into employment. Employers have 
endeavoured to retain as many of their existing employees as possible during the 
current recession but the impact of this is to reduce recruitment levels such that there 
are relatively few job openings for people entering the labour market. There have 
been a number of initiatives which have been designed to ease the transition from 
school to work among young people: 
 
 The expansion of the further- and higher-education sectors so that more people 
stay on in post-compulsory education. 
 
 The expansion of work-based learning through Apprenticeships. 
 
 The September Guarantee, implemented in 2007 for 16 year olds and for  
17 year olds in 2008, which guarantees young people exiting compulsory 
education the right to participate in further learning of some type. 
 
Depending upon the speed with which the economy recovers, these measures tide 
many young people over the period when the level of unemployment is high while 
improving their skills base, and thereby avoid the emergence of youth unemployment 
on a scale observed over the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
In relation to older people, the research of Smeaton and Vegeris (2009) has 
catalogued the relative deprivation experienced by many people aged over 50 years 
during a period of relative prosperity. The position of older people in the labour 
market is ultimately dependent upon the extent to which older people are pushed out 
of employment (for example, through redundancy policies) or encouraged to enter 
economic inactivity (for example, through early retirement policies). It seems likely  
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that the economic position of older people is unlikely to improve with respect to their 
levels of employment or income during a recessionary period. 
 
In general, the situation of younger and older people in the labour market appears to 
be one of relative weakness: for young people because of the difficulties they have 
entering the labour market; and for older people because their economic position, on 
average, was relatively weak compared with the prime-age group when the recession 
commenced. 
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5. Disability 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The impact of the economic cycle, particularly downturns in the economy, on the 
labour market performance and welfare of disabled people is the focus of this 
chapter. While many disability groups have voiced their concerns since the beginning 
of the current recession, there is not a great deal of evidence to show that disabled 
people are experiencing a disproportionately negative outcome. According to the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission and the Department for Work and Pensions 
(EHRC/DWP, 2009), over the 12 months to June 2009, the employment rate of 
disabled people fell slightly to 47.7 per cent. This is a smaller decrease than the 
overall decrease. Similarly, the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
unemployment rate increased for disabled people by a smaller percentage than  
it did for the overall population, but unemployment remains higher within the  
disabled population than within the non-disabled workforce.  
 
In examining the possible impacts of the current recession on disabled people,  
this chapter considers the employment levels and the sectoral and occupational 
distributions of employment for disabled people. If the recession is expected to 
impact on those sectors and occupations in which disabled people tend to be 
concentrated then it may be that disabled people will indeed be significantly and 
perhaps disproportionately affected by the downturn. There are also a number of 
other factors to consider, including movements out of and into the labour market, and 
the current legislative and policy contexts, which may impact on the overall effects of 
recession on the disabled population.  
 
This chapter looks at the implications of the current recession for disabled people 
(however defined) against the background of the government‟s efforts to increase  
the employment of disabled people or people with health problems. These include 
efforts to reduce the number of people claiming Incapacity Benefits or becoming 
incapacitated, such as the Fit For Work pilots, and the Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapy (IAPT) programme.  
 
The implications of a recession where employment levels are driven down  
and unemployment levels are driven up for disabled people are likely to be 
determined by: 
 
 the degree to which disabled people are more likely to suffer job loss – because 
the employer regards disabled workers as less productive - or face more 
difficulty finding work; 
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 the degree to which disabled people are more likely to suffer job loss because 
they are concentrated in sectors of the economy more likely to suffer job losses; 
 
 the extent to which the recession results in an increase in disability or disability 
benefit recipients (as a consequence, for example, of the psychological distress 
resulting from a fear of job loss or actual job loss); and 
 
 the efficacy of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA), and other government 
initiatives to assist disabled people or those with health problems to retain or 
obtain employment. 
 
It is impossible to provide a definitive assessment of the extent to which these types 
of impact are taking hold, but it is possible to infer something from an analysis of the 
labour market experience of disabled people relative to people who are not disabled 
over the recent past.  
 
5.2 Defining disability 
The population of disabled people is not a simple one to define. People may be  
born with a disability or they may develop a disability in later life, often while at work. 
Some disabilities are not permanent and with improvements in medical technology, 
some long-standing disabilities may be cured. Disabled people do not comprise  
a homogenous group because there are varying degrees of severity experienced. 
Some disabilities may be completely debilitating while others may be more easily 
accommodated and managed on a daily basis. The widely varying and dynamic 
nature of the disabled population results in a number of complications for  
longitudinal analysis of this group and its labour market performance. Over  
time, the official definitions of disability have changed thus adding to a certain 
discontinuity in assessing the changes in disabled people‟s economic activities  
over the economic cycle.  
 
Disability covers a wide range of impairments and work-limiting conditions, some of 
which may not be recognised by the employer either at the point of recruitment or 
when in employment (Berthoud, 2006). For the purposes of this report, the main 
definition of disability is drawn out of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. Disability 
is self-reported by the respondent in the LFS in response to a question which asks if 
they have a work-limiting disability or are disabled according to the DDA. Disability in 
the DDA (2005) is defined as where a person has a physical or mental impairment 
which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities. The DDA also allows this basic definition to be modified 
for people who have mental impairments and progressive conditions, so that it sets 
out when people are to be treated as disabled. People with HIV, cancer and multiple 
THE EQUALITY IMPACTS OF THE CURRENT RECESSION 
 
 64 
sclerosis are deemed to be covered by the DDA effectively from the point of 
diagnosis, rather than from the point when the condition has some adverse effect  
on their ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.22 Generally, the evidence 
suggests that there is a high degree of awareness among employers and this has 
been increasing over recent years (Simm et al., 2007).  
 
Approximately 20 per cent of the working-age population in Great Britain are disabled 
(LFS, September-December, 2006), a percentage which has changed over time  
(see Figure 5.1). Trends in impairment show increasing numbers of adults reporting 
mental illness and behavioural disorders while physical impairments are found to be 
decreasing (Cabinet Office, 2005). 
 
Figure 5.1 Percentage of the working age population reporting a disability, 
 1998-2008 
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Source:  Labour Force Survey, 1998Q1 to 2008Q4. 
 
 
5.3 The labour market performance of disabled people 
The performance of disabled people in the labour market differs from that of the  
non-disabled. Depending upon the extent of an individual‟s disability, their chances  
of obtaining a job, other things being equal, may be less than that of a non-disabled 
                                            
22
  http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/provisions-dda.pdf 
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person, especially so where there may be an additional cost incurred by  
the employer in providing employment to the disabled person. As Hasluck  
(2008: 1) notes:  
 
Employers might also associate disability with greater uncertainty 
regarding the potential productivity of a disabled person, with greater 
potential costs of accommodating the person into the workforce or with 
differences in absence rates. Finally, legislation places on employers 
duties that do not apply to the non-disabled workforce, while employment 
decisions can be further influenced by the values, organisational or social, 
of employers.  
 
In general, evidence from across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) suggests that disabled people are disadvantaged in the labour 
market. Over the OECD as a whole, the employment rate of disabled people is just 
over 40 per cent (2005) - around half the rate for non-disabled people – and, in 
general, people with health problems have not benefited from the growth in 
employment opportunities over the past decade (OECD, 2009). The relatively low 
employment rate in turn contributes to the relatively low earnings and relatively high 
incidence of poverty among disabled people and, as a consequence of the demands 
this places upon disability benefits, drives up the cost to the state. OECD countries 
spend on average around 1.2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on 
disability benefits. In the UK, there have been a range of active labour market 
measures to encourage disabled people back into economic activity. These are 
aimed in part to reduce the costs to the Exchequer, but also to stimulate labour 
supply, given the conditions of excess demand which prevailed in the labour market 
until relatively recently.  
 
Disability has been found to affect the type of employment undertaken by workers. 
Part-time work has been found to offer more attractive features to disabled workers 
(Jones, 2007) and the rate of self-employment has also been found to be higher 
among disabled workers (Boylan and Burchardt, 2002). A higher concentration of 
disabled workers has also been found in low-skilled jobs such as administrative, 
secretarial and personal services (Meager et al., 1998; Blackaby et al., 1999;  
Smith and Twomey, 2002). Disabled people in employment are more likely than their 
non-disabled counterparts to work in manual and lower-skilled jobs (Meager et al., 
1998). In relation to people with learning difficulties, for instance, the types of jobs 
undertaken by people with learning disabilities are sometimes referred to as „The 
Three Fs‟: food, filth and folding (The Independent, 2008a). The Survey of Adults with 
Learning Difficulties in England found that of those indicating that they were in paid 
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employment 19 per cent worked in a shop or warehouse, 18 per cent as a gardener 
or labourer, and 15 per cent in catering or waiting on tables. 
 
While the size of the disabled working age population has increased over the past  
20 years, the labour market outcomes of such people have deteriorated (Bell and 
Smith, 2004). Activity rates are lower for disabled people compared with non-
disabled people while unemployment rates are higher among disabled people.  
About half of all disabled people of working age are in work compared with about  
80 per cent of non-disabled people (Regan and Stanley, 2003). Employment rates 
are found to vary significantly by type of disability. Among those with a learning 
disability, for example, the employment rate is 26 per cent. 
 
The economic activity rates of disabled people – as defined by the DDA (2005) – are 
shown in Figure 5.2. Activity rates have not altered much over the past 10 years and 
have remained at more or less half the rate of non-disabled people.  
 
Figure 5.2 Activity rates for disabled and non-disabled men and women, 
1998-2008 
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Source:  Labour Force Survey, 1998Q1 to 2008Q4. 
 
 
Table 5.1 provides a snapshot of the labour market situation of disabled people at  
the start of this recession and five years earlier. It shows that people who are DDA 
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disabled and have a work-limiting disability have significantly lower activity rates than 
the non-disabled. Compared with non-disabled people, this group also exhibits higher 
proportions of part-time employment and self-employment. Given the propensity for 
part-time workers to suffer more than full-time workers in times of recession, this 
observation suggests that disabled workers may be at more risk of job loss or other 
adverse outcomes due to the relatively high proportion of part-time work undertaken 
by disabled people.  
 
The unemployment rate is also considerably higher among disabled people 
compared with non-disabled people. While the activity rates of men and women with 
both a work-limiting disability and DDA disability have increased between 2003 and 
2008 (from 38.9 per cent to 40.0 per cent for men and 35.0 per cent to 37.6 per cent 
for women), the unemployment rates increased by relatively more (from 11.1 per cent 
to 15.4 per cent for men and from 7.9 per cent to 10.6 per cent for women). Among 
the non-disabled population, much smaller relative changes in the unemployment 
rate have been observed.  
 
Table 5.1 Employment position of disabled people 
 
 Per cent:  
  DDA disabled & 
work-limiting 
disability 
DDA  
disabled 
Work-limiting 
disability 
Not disabled 
Male 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 
Activity rate 38.9 40.0 89.8 90.4 80.5 80.3 90.4 89.6 
Unemployment rate 11.1 15.4 4.4 3.9 10.4 12.1 4.9 5.7 
         
% full-time 65.8 62.0 77.9 75.8 73.2 71.0 76.8 76.0 
% part-time 12.6 15.2 5.4 7.8 8.9 12.0 7.0 7.6 
% self-employed 21.6 22.8 16.7 16.4 17.9 17.0 16.2 16.4 
         
Female 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 
Activity rate 35.0 37.6 78.8 68.5 66.9 68.5 78.8 79.2 
Unemployment rate 7.9 10.6 4.2 4.8 8.1 9.3 4.2 5.0 
         
% full-time 43.7 44.9 56.2 57.7 47.6 51.9 54.4 57.0 
% part-time 47.0 45.5 38.1 35.9 44.2 40.4 38.6 35.8 
% self-employed 9.2 9.6 5.7 6.3 8.2 7.7 7.0 7.2 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, 2003 and 2008. 
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The relatively weak labour market position in which many disabled people find 
themselves results in relatively low levels of remuneration and income with average 
pay for disabled people lower than that received by non-disabled people. Meager  
et al. (1998) indicated that the average take home pay of disabled employees was 
£196 per week while the average for non-disabled employees was £212 per week  
(in 1997-98). The survey of Adults with Learning Difficulties in England (2003-04)23 
revealed that 45 per cent of those people with a learning disability in paid 
employment earned less than £100 a week and 81 per cent earned less than £200  
a week (Emerson et al., 2005). 
 
5.4 The labour market position of disabled people aged 25-49 
There is an age effect related to disability with much of the increase in disability 
benefit recipients in the OECD due to the claims made by older workers. To provide 
an indication of the impact of disability on employment regardless of the age 
dimension, the following commentary refers to prime-age individuals (that is, those 
aged 25-49 years of age).  
 
As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, women, disabled and non-disabled, typically have 
higher shares of part-time employment when compared with men. Between 2003  
and 2008, the share of men‟s employment that is part-time increased while for 
women this share decreased slightly, except for women who are DDA disabled  
and have a work-limiting disability. Among non-disabled workers, three per cent of 
men and 34 per cent of women worked part-time in 2008. These shares were higher 
for the disabled counterparts. In 2008, 12 per cent of working DDA disabled men  
with a work-limiting disability were part-time employees. In the same year,  
44 per cent of working women with both a work-limiting disability and DDA  
disabled worked part-time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
23  The survey was conducted by Lancaster University, BMRB Social Research and Central 
England People First Research Team. They surveyed 2,898 people aged 16 years and 
older with learning difficulties. The survey report is available on 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digi
talasset/dh_4119944.pdf 
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Table 5.2 Economic activity by disability status for men aged 25-49 
 
 Per cent: 
  DDA disabled & 
work-limiting 
disability 
DDA disabled Work-limiting 
disability 
Not disabled 
 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 
Activity rate 48.9 47.5 96.8 95.9 89.0 88.9 96.6 96.8 
Unemployment rate 11.1 16.3 4.0 3.7 8.7 7.7 3.5 3.7 
% full-time 71.5 66.6 82.3 81.2 78.0 77.2 81.3 80.1 
% part-time 9.6 12.0 3.0 3.3 5.4 7.5 2.6 3.2 
% self-employed 18.9 21.3 14.7 15.5 16.5 15.3 16.2 16.7 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, 2003 and 2008. 
 
 
Table 5.3 Economic activity by disability status for women aged 25-49 
 
Per cent: 
  DDA disabled & 
work-limiting 
disability 
DDA disabled Work-limiting 
disability 
Not disabled 
 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 
Activity rate 38.7 40.9 80.2 82.5 69.1 71.7 81.6 82.8 
Unemployment rate 7.2 10.3 3.9 4.3 6.7 8.5 3.2 3.8 
% full-time 47.6 46.7 58.5 59.5 49.2 53.8 55.2 58.0 
% part-time 43.4 44.1 36.1 34.1 43.0 38.7 37.1 34.1 
% self-employed 8.9 9.2 5.4 6.3 7.8 7.5 7.8 7.9 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, 2003 and 2008. 
 
 
Between 2003 and 2008, the rates of economic activity for disabled men in the prime 
age group have decreased, according to data from the LFS. Among those with a 
work-limiting disability and who are classified as disabled by the DDA, the activity 
rate fell from 49 per cent in 2003 to 48 per cent in 2008. The activity rate for this 
group is significantly lower than that for men who are either DDA disabled or have  
a work-limiting disability, but not both. For those classified as disabled by the DDA 
(without a work-limiting disability), the activity rate fell from 97 per cent in 2003 to  
96 per cent in 2008. Over the same period, the activity rate of non-disabled men 
increased marginally. With the exception of those who are only DDA disabled and  
do not have a work-limiting disability, the activity rates of those who are considered 
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disabled are lower than those for the non-disabled. This is especially so for those 
with both a work-limiting disability and classified as disabled by the DDA.  
 
The activity rates for women, disabled and non-disabled, increased between 2003 
and 2008. For non-disabled women, the activity rate increased from 82 per cent to  
83 per cent over the five-year period. The activity rate for women who are both DDA 
disabled and have a work-limiting disability increased from 39 per cent to 41 per cent. 
The activity rate for women without a work-limiting disability but who are DDA 
disabled increased from 80 per cent in 2003 to 83 per cent in 2008. For those with  
a work-limiting disability who are not DDA disabled, the activity rate grew from  
69 per cent to 72 per cent.  
 
The unemployment rate (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3) has also worsened between 2003 
and 2008 for both non-disabled men and DDA disabled men with a work-limiting 
disability. The unemployment rate has grown for women whether disabled or non-
disabled. For non-disabled men and women, the unemployment rate was lower than 
that for the disabled groups in both 2003 and 2008. Among the non-disabled, the 
unemployment rate increased from 3.5 per cent to 3.7 per cent for men and from  
3.2 to 3.8 per cent for women. The unemployment rate for men with both work-
limiting disability and who are DDA disabled increased from 11 per cent in 2003  
to 16 per cent in 2008. Similarly, the rate for this group of women increased from 
seven per cent to 10 per cent over the period.  
 
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.4 show the distribution of employment (full-time, part-time, 
and self-employment) by occupation for men in 2008. The greatest proportion of 
those individuals that are DDA disabled and have a work-limiting disability work in 
skilled trades occupations (20 per cent) followed by managers and senior officials  
(15 per cent) and elementary occupations (15 per cent). A different pattern emerges 
for those who are DDA disabled but do not indicate a work-limiting disability. For this 
group, 23 per cent work as managers and senior officials, 17 per cent are in skilled 
trades occupations and 14 per cent work in associate professional and technical 
occupations. Of those with a work-limiting disability and who are also DDA disabled, 
the greatest proportions work in skilled trades occupations (17 per cent), as 
managers and senior officials (17 per cent), and in associate professional and 
technical occupations (15 per cent). Compared with the three disabled groups, 
among men who are not disabled, a greater proportion work in professional 
occupations (15 per cent) and associate professional and technical occupations  
(15 per cent) while a lower percentage work in personal service occupations  
(two per cent), sales and customer service occupations (three per cent), as transport 
and machine operatives (11 per cent), in elementary occupations (nine per cent), and 
in administrative, clerical and secretarial occupations (four per cent).  
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Figure 5.3 Occupational distribution of employment for men, 2008 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey, 2008. 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, 2008. 
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Table 5.4 Occupational distribution of employment by disability status for 
 men aged 25-49 
 
 Per cent: 
  DDA disabled & 
work-limiting 
disability 
DDA disabled Work-limiting 
disability 
Not disabled 
  2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 
Managers & senior 
officials 
14.0 15.5 22.7 23.2 15.5 17.1 21.6 22.2 
Professional occupations 8.7 9.5 12.6 13.7 11.2 9.9 15.0 15.3 
Associate professional & 
technical occupations 
13.9 12.6 14.8 13.8 14.7 15.4 15.2 15.3 
Administrative, clerical & 
secretarial occupations 
6.8 4.7 5.1 3.8 4.6 4.0 4.2 3.8 
Skilled trades occupations 20.7 20.5 18.2 17.1 21.1 17.4 19.1 17.9 
Personal service 
occupations 
3.1 3.2 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.5 1.9 2.1 
Sales & customer service 
occupations 
3.2 5.6 2.9 3.3 2.3 3.9 2.5 3.0 
Transport & machine 
operatives 
15.4 13.4 12.3 12.2 13.9 14.4 11.8 11.0 
Elementary occupations 14.2 15.1 9.0 10.0 13.5 14.4 8.6 9.3 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, 2003 and 2008. 
 
 
Among women (Figure 5.4 and Table 5.5), a greater proportion of non-disabled 
compared with those with a disability (DDA disabled and/or work-limiting disability) 
work as managers and senior officials and in professional occupations. Greater 
percentages of the disabled groups compared with non-disabled work in  
personal service occupations, sales and customer service occupations  
and elementary occupations. 
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Figure 5.4 Occupational distribution of employment for women, 2008 
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Table 5.5 Occupational distribution of employment by disability status for 
 women aged 25-49 
 
 Per cent: 
  DDA disabled & 
work-limiting 
disability 
DDA disabled Work-limiting 
disability 
Not disabled 
  2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 
Managers & senior 
officials 10.1 10.1 12.2 12.0 9.4 12.4 12.3 14.2 
Professional occupations 9.3 9.6 11.9 11.2 9.2 8.9 13.2 14.2 
Associate professional & 
technical occupations 15.5 15.6 14.9 18.3 17.5 20.3 17.2 18.7 
Administrative, clerical & 
secretarial occupations 20.6 20.4 20.3 20.8 21.5 18.5 21.4 18.7 
Skilled trades occupations 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.4 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.7 
Personal service 
occupations 13.3 16.3 14.6 17.4 15.1 16.7 13.7 14.6 
Sales & customer service 
occupations 11.7 11.7 11.6 8.0 9.1 9.6 9.2 7.9 
Transport & machine 
operatives 4.1 1.9 2.3 1.9 3.2 1.8 2.3 1.9 
Elementary occupations 13.3 12.3 10.6 9.0 12.7 9.7 8.9 8.3 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, 2003 and 2008. 
 
 
5.5 Previous recessions and evidence of the impact on disabled people 
The relationship between disability and employment is a complex one. First of all, 
disability covers a wide range of impairments and work-limiting conditions, some of 
which may not be recognised by the employer either at the point of recruitment or 
when in employment (Berthoud, 2006; Roberts et al., 2004; Goldstone and Meager, 
2002). For example, a large component of long-term incapacity for work stems from 
mental health issues (Waddell and Burton, 2004). Second, the OECD refers to a 
medicalisation of a labour market problem with reference to the use of disability 
benefits (OECD, 2009). That is, the preference of policymakers to accept an 
increased number of people on disability benefits – and it is worth noting that in many 
countries receipt of a disability benefit tends to be permanent – in return for lower 
levels of unemployment. 
 
The impact of recession, or other parts of the business cycle, on the economic 
activity of disabled people has not been exhaustively studied in the literature. One 
reason for this is that the disabled working age population is perhaps one of the least 
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stable groups to consider. It is particularly difficult to compare the outcomes for 
disabled people over different cycles due to changes in the definition of disability, 
changes in legislation and policy relating to disabled people and changes in the 
behaviour of individuals in reporting disability. The DDA was implemented in 1996. 
This Act brought about perhaps the most significant changes for disabled people  
in the labour market. As no comparable legislation was in place during previous 
recessions, this confounds the problem of trying to compare the genuine recession 
effects on disabled people in this recession to previous recessions. The definition  
of disability according to the DDA also limits comparison as the LFS has contained  
a consistent measure of such disability only since 1998. Finally, the overall trend  
in health self-reporting indicates that people have become more open to reporting 
disability, especially mental and psychological conditions, since previous  
economic downturns. 
 
Nevertheless, disabled people, however defined or measured, on average possess  
a set of characteristics which, other things being equal, makes them vulnerable  
to a downturn in the labour market: 
 
 they tend to be concentrated in relatively low-skill, low-waged jobs which are 
vulnerable to the economic cycle; 
 
 disabled workers tend to be older; and 
 
 on average, employers regard disabled workers as being less productive 
(Hasluck, 2008). 
 
On the plus side, the DDA and various active labour market measures provide a 
safeguard to disabled people. As noted in the introduction, the cost of disability 
allowances can pose a substantial cost to the Exchequer, but equally the costs of 
assisting disabled people back into the labour market can be expensive given that 
the most effective measures are those that provide a high degree of customised 
support (Rangarajan et al., 2008). The impact of the recession on public expenditure 
– which is something of an unknown at the time of writing when the recession has yet 
to end – may have implications for various programmes. 
 
A recession may also increase the instance of disability and long-term ill health. 
Prolonged periods of unemployment can result in both mental and physical health 
problems, though there is a problem of separating cause and effect in those studies 
which attempt to show a relationship between unemployment and health. A recent 
study from the University of Cambridge has indicated people under threat of losing 
their jobs may experience worse long-term declines in mental health than those who 
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are actually made redundant. The study also found a gender dimension relating to 
such effects as men showed more signs of anxiety, stress and depression than 
women (as reported in Daily Mail, 2009).    
 
When jobs are scarce, as in a recession, the disadvantaged groups in the labour 
market face the highest risk. Evidence from the US has indicated that following the 
recession in the early 1990s, the employment rate of disabled people was slow to 
regain its pre-recession level and the gap in the employment rate between disabled 
and non-disabled people has increased (Burkhauser et al., 2001). After accounting 
for changes in the composition of the disabled population in terms of age, race, 
education and household size, Burkhauser et al. found that if the composition of  
the US disabled population had been the same in 1999 as in 1980, the economic 
outcomes for disabled people would have been even worse than the data for the  
later observations revealed. More recent data for the UK show that the gap in 
unemployment rates between the long-term disabled and other people diminished 
between 1998 and 2005, but then began to diverge again (Leaker, 2009). While both 
groups have experienced increased unemployment from mid-2008, the increase for 
disabled people does not seem to be faster. 
 
Haveman and Wolfe (1990) looked at US data from 1962 to 1984 to examine the 
impact of the economic cycle on earnings. They found that from 1962 to the mid-
1970s, the real earnings of disabled workers increased rapidly but after the mid-
1970s, these earnings plummeted. In the 1981-82 recession, the real earnings of 
disabled people were at a low of $9,500 per year. By 1984, earnings had begun to 
recover except for those disabled people who were not White, had low qualifications 
and were younger. Non-White disabled males were found to have the worst labour 
market experience over the period of 1962 to 1984. The ratio of earnings for disabled 
people relative to non-disabled was found to fall (except for the youngest people)  
as a result of the 1981-82 recession and budget cuts relating to disability transfer 
programmes. In the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009) has reported that 
disabled people are being more affected than the average by job losses in the 
current recession. The Department of Labour found a 14 per cent unemployment  
rate among disabled people – almost double of that for non-disabled.  
 
A systematic review of the costs and benefits faced by employers recruiting disabled 
people suggests that, on balance, the costs outweigh the benefits (Hasluck, 2008). 
The principal caveat is that the population of disabled people is a heterogeneous  
one and many disabilities covered by the DDA may not be evident to the employer. 
Moreover, available evidence suggests that the costs of accommodating the needs of 
disabled people in the workplace are relatively small, though this is a biased result in 
so far as it relates solely to those employers which employ disabled people (Simm et 
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al., 2007). While qualitative evidence suggests that there are benefits to be derived 
from employing disabled people, the quantitative evidence points to employers 
regarding disabled people, on average, as being less productive than non-disabled 
people. Drawing on the work of Thurow (1976), Hasluck (2008: 10) suggests that  
in a labour market where jobs are rationed: 
 
...via a labour queue employers are likely to rank workers by their net 
value, with workers perceived as having a low net value (including 
disabled people) placed at the end of the queue and entering employment 
when jobs are plentiful but squeezed out of employment when jobs are in 
short supply.  
 
There is fear that one consequence of the recession will be to slow the equal pay 
movement thus setting back the position of disabled people relative to non-disabled 
people in the long run. Companies may see avoiding equalisation of pay between 
disabled and non-disabled employees as one way of responding to recessionary 
pressures. While the gap in pay has narrowed over the past few decades, stagnation 
of equal pay and work measures in response to the recession would have longer-
lasting negative effects for disabled workers.  
 
In previous recessions, there has been evidence of people declaring a 
disability/illness in order to avoid unemployment (see Yelin, 1997, for example). 
Instead of becoming unemployed, they enter the inactive population while receiving 
incapacity or disability benefits. Such actions helped to decrease the apparent 
unemployment rate but disguised the actual numbers of people negatively affected 
by recession. Policy today is very much directed at ensuring the opposite occurs – 
that is, the emphasis is upon moving people from inactivity into activity and into 
employment. Over recent years there has been some progress in reducing the 
number of Incapacity Benefits (including disability allowances) (see Figure 5.5). 
Between October and December 2008, the gap in employment rates between 
disabled and non-disabled people decreased but the employment rate for disabled 
people was still much lower than that of non-disabled people (West Midlands 
Regional Observatory, 2009). The other effect is that unemployment causes ill health 
which in turn pushes them to the margins of economy (for example, Bartley, 1994; 
Kessler et al., 1987; Novo et al., 2000). Unemployed men and women were found to 
be more than twice as likely to have a limiting chronic illness than employed men and 
women in an analysis of 1991-92 British data (Arber, 1996). Studies of factory 
closure, which are thought to minimise the effects of health selection relating to 
unemployment, have discovered higher levels of medically diagnosed health 
problems (Beale and Nethercott, 1987; Iversen and Sabroe, 1988; Mattiasson et al., 
1990). The actual causal relationship between ill health or disability and 
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unemployment or economic activity is not straightforward or simple to ascertain as 
there may be other factors, such as personal characteristics and lifestyle choices, 
which play an important role. 
 
Figure 5.5  Number of Incapacity Benefit claimants  
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Notes: Caseload data. 
 
Source:  WPLS, November 1999 to July 2008. 
 
 
The recession may also result in constrained government spending on programmes 
that help disabled people to find work and support them when they are in work  
(such as New Deal for Disabled People, Fit for Work pilots, etc.). The government 
has made a number of recent announcements regarding such programmes, in  
which it has vowed to maintain or enhance such spending despite the downturn. The 
government has reasoned that disabled people (and other minorities) require further 
support in a recession in order to protect them from disproportionate negative effects 
of the economic downturn. 
 
5.6 The impact of the current recession on disabled people 
How is this recession different from previous downturns in terms of the impact on 
disabled people? One of the main differences relevant here is the implementation of 
the DDA in 1996. This Act has afforded disabled people more coherent and uniform 
employment rights and protection. It is no longer the case that employers can view 
disabled employees as easy targets for workforce cuts arising during a recession. 
The Disability Discrimination Act, 2005 (DDA):  
 
● prohibits discrimination against disabled people by treating them less favourably 
than non-disabled people for a reason related to the disabled person‟s disability; 
and 
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● requires employers to make reasonable changes to working arrangements  
or to physical features of the workplace when these changes could prevent a 
disabled worker from being placed at a substantial disadvantage in comparison 
to non-disabled people. 
 
The mediating effect of the DDA on the labour market implications of the recession 
on disabled people is difficult to estimate with certainty. Jones (2009) assessed the 
impact of the DDA on employment in England. As recognised in the US regarding the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), it is plausible that while legislation such as the 
DDA may reduce employment barriers for disabled people, it may also negatively 
impact on employment due to the additional costs that compliance places on 
employers. Evidence of such a negative effect arising from the ADA in the US has 
been found (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; DeLeire, 2000). Isolating the impacts of 
such legislation in order to identify the causal effect on employment is difficult due to 
changes in the composition of the disabled population, the impact of benefit income, 
and the effects of the economic cycle on all workers, both disabled and non-disabled 
(Jones, 2009: 351). In England, Jones has found that the average probability of 
employment is almost 60 per cent for disabled people while it is more than 75 per 
cent for the non-disabled. The trend in employment was similar between disabled 
and non-disabled people before 1999 while the gap in the employment rates of these 
two groups widened between 1999 and 2000 due to a fall in the employment rate of 
disabled people. Jones finds that the employment growth rate is greater for disabled 
people after 2000. Jones also makes a counterintuitive finding that disabled people 
fare worse in terms of employment in times of economic growth. Jones‟s findings are 
consistent with those of Bell and Heitmueller (2005).  
 
It is not possible to estimate the exact impact of the DDA on conditions for disabled 
people resulting from the current economic climate. The overall outcome for this 
group is very likely to differ from what it would be in the absence of such legislation.  
It is likely that the DDA will go some way to help insulate disabled people from 
disproportionate effects of the recession. At the same time, the costs imposed on 
employers by adhering to the DDA and employing disabled people may distort 
employers‟ actions in the recession as their main priority becomes cost containment 
in order to survive. 
 
A number of programmes that support disabled people into and in work are also 
likely to help disabled people be successful through the recession. Jobcentre Plus 
offers a number of services for people with various disabilities who are seeking 
employment. The Job Introduction Scheme (JIS) offers a financial incentive to 
employers in order to help disabled people find employment. Often based within  
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Jobcentre Plus offices, Disability Employment Advisors provide specialist support  
on employment issues. WorkPath consists of three programmes to help disabled 
people overcome barriers to employment: Access to Work, which provides advice 
and support to people whose disability affects the way they work as well as support 
for the employer; Work Preparation, which usually involves unpaid work experience 
with a local employer; and WORKSTEP which was formerly known as „supported 
employment‟. WORKSTEP aims to enable a disabled person to obtain and keep 
a job.  
 
The current regulations regarding benefit claims related to unemployment, inactivity 
and disability or illness are likely to influence the behaviour of disabled people in the 
face of recession. In previous recessions, a high volume of out-of-work people were 
moved onto disability benefits with the aim of keeping unemployment rates under 
control. In the current benefits system, a mass move from unemployment to inactivity 
due to disability is not as likely as it once was; however, in the face of potential mass 
unemployment, this may be considered a policy option.  
 
The onset of recession may encourage those who are sick to continue working  
rather than their absentee record being a possible cause of them being selected  
for redundancy. 
 
The shape of the current recession in terms of the sectors and occupations that are 
hit hardest will also determine the overall impact on disabled people. As discussed, 
disabled people tend to be over-represented in lower-level occupations and under-
represented in higher occupations. High proportions of disabled people also work in 
services. These occupations and the services sectors are typically more negatively 
impacted by economic downturn. Thus disabled people are likely to be faced with 
negative outcomes due to their labour market characteristics in this regard.  
 
As the overall increase in unemployment during the current recession thus far has 
been greater than that experienced by disabled people, the post-recession result 
may be to narrow the gap between disabled and non-disabled unemployment rates. 
Given that disabled people entered this recession already at a disadvantage relative 
to the non-disabled, the hope is that if the gap does not narrow then at least it may 
not widen as has happened in other times of economic downturn (TUC, 2009). 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
How disabled people fare during the current recession will be determined by the 
actions of employers (that is, their relative willingness to hire and fire disabled 
people). A number of factors suggest that disabled people, other things being equal, 
are likely to be relatively vulnerable to the recession. These include: 
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 Their economic activity rates are relatively low and have improved little over  
the recent past, although there is evidence that various policy initiatives are 
beginning to reduce the number of people claiming Incapacity Benefit. If, during 
a period of buoyant economic growth, activity rates have not responded to 
increased employment opportunities, it seems unlikely that they will rise during 
a period when the economy is contracting. 
 
 Disabled people occupy a relatively disadvantaged place in the labour market in 
that they are disproportionately employed in low-skill, low-waged work of a type 
that is vulnerable to any economic downturn. 
 
 While surveys show that those employers which employ disabled people have a 
positive view of their contribution to the business (Simm et al., 2007), overall 
employers tend to regard disabled people as being less productive than their 
non-disabled counterparts. As such, they impose additional costs on the 
employer. This places disabled people at a labour market disadvantage.
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6. Ethnicity  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the evidence of ethnic minority group disadvantage in 
the labour market and the way in which the current recession is affecting people from 
ethnic minority groups. The question of whether this is different to their experience of 
earlier recessions is also considered. 
 
In the UK context, the ethnic minority groups of policy interest to the government are 
effectively people from non-White ethnic groups, who have their origins in (post 
Second World War) migration from former Commonwealth countries, and 
increasingly other parts of the developing world as international migration has 
accelerated. Monitoring of the ethnic origins of the population has lagged behind the 
changing structure of the population (initially focusing on the situation of migrants) 
and has been undertaken on the basis of questions incorporated into the national 
Census of Population (from 1991) and other large social surveys (from the late  
1970s onwards). These classify individuals into a small number of categories  
which encompass geographical origin in the world, „race‟, skin colour and (perhaps) 
language. The ethnic group questions used are not based on any theory of ethnic 
origins, but derive from commonly recognised divisions of the population and evolve 
over time as the ethnic composition of the population and sensitivities to ethnic 
terminology change. 
 
The main data source on which this chapter is based is the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). The ethnic group classification used by the LFS is derived from that used by 
the Census of Population, and was changed after both the 1991 and 2001 Censuses. 
A temporally stable set of ethnic groups has been derived for this project to enable 
analysis to be conducted for the entire period from 1992 to 2008. Because, however, 
some of these ethnic groups are small, it is often not possible to derive statistically 
robust estimates from sample survey data. Thus, the discussion will focus on a 
smaller number of ethnic categories. These are: ethnic minority groups as a whole; 
Black and Black British people; Indian people; Pakistani and Bangladeshi people; 
and people from „Other‟ ethnic groups (including Chinese people). All are compared 
with White people as a whole (comprising the White British, White Irish and Other 
White ethnic categories), representing the ethnic majority population of the UK 
(hence White minorities are not considered here). 
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6.2 The labour market performance of people from ethnic minority groups 
A report by the Strategy Unit (2003) into the disadvantage of ethnic minority groups 
in the labour market highlighted four important dimensions of disadvantage:  
 
 lower employment and higher unemployment rates; 
 
 lower average earnings levels; 
 
 poorer occupational attainment/progression in the workplace; and 
 
 higher levels of self-employment. 
 
The report noted that while ethnic minority groups tended to be disadvantaged on all 
four dimensions, there was considerable diversity between minority groups and not 
all experienced the same degree of disadvantage. 
 
Figures 6.1 to 6.9 present differentials in annual average economic activity rates, 
employment rates and unemployment rates for men and women of working age  
(16 to 59 or 64) over the period 1992 to 2008. The White economic activity rate 
(Figure 6.1) remained constant at around 80 per cent over this period but the minority 
rate first declined in the early 1990s then increased. From the mid-1990s onwards, 
economic activity rates for most minority groups have converged slowly with the 
White rate, though that for Black people has been more variable and shown less 
evidence of convergence. The Indian rate is approaching the White rate most closely. 
The White male economic activity rate has declined slightly while that for ethnic 
minority groups has increased (Figure 6.2). In contrast, economic activity rates  
for women from all ethnic groups increased over the period 1992 to 2008, but  
that for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women remained well below those of other  
ethnic groups (Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.1 Economic activity rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
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Source:  IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
 
 
Figure 6.2  Male economic activity rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
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Figure 6.3  Female economic activity rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
 
 
The employment rate for White people was increasing until the early 21st century, 
but this increase now appears to have stopped (Figure 6.4). For men, there is a  
clear pattern of quite rapid convergence over time as employment rates for each 
minority group have increased (following declines in the early 1990s) (Figure 6.5). 
The Indian male employment rate is now very close to that of White men. There  
is a lesser degree of convergence for women (Figure 6.6) because the employment 
rate for White women continued to increase while female ethnic minority employment 
rates also increased. The employment rate for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women 
has increased substantially, but they remain much less likely than other women  
to be in work. 
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Figure 6.4  Employment rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
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Source:  IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
 
 
Figure 6.5  Male employment rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
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Figure 6.6    Female employment rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
 
Source:  IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
 
Unemployment rates for all ethnic groups have declined substantially (by half) over 
the period 1992 to 2008, with a smaller decline for women than men (Figure 6.7). 
White unemployment rates declined after 1993, but started to increase slightly  
from 2005 onwards. However, the rank order of ethnic minority unemployment rates 
was largely maintained, with Pakistani and Bangladeshi experiencing the highest 
rates, followed by Black people and Indian, and Other people having the lowest 
unemployment rates. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women had the highest and most 
volatile unemployment rate and this appeared to have increased the most during the 
economic slowdown of 2005-07. 
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Figure 6.7 Unemployment rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
 
 
Figure 6.8  Male unemployment rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
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Figure 6.9  Female unemployment rates by ethnic group, 1992-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  IER analysis of Labour Force Survey data for 1992 to 2008. 
 
 
This period has also seen considerable change in the pattern of employment by 
ethnic group (discussed in detail elsewhere in this report). The most dynamic feature 
of employment change for the population as a whole since 1971 has been the growth 
of women‟s employment, driven by the rapid increase in part-time employment. 
However, women from ethnic minority groups are more likely than White women to 
work full-time, and a relatively high percentage of Bangladeshi and Pakistani men 
work part-time, indicating that men from these ethnic groups are more likely to find 
work in less secure occupations in the „secondary labour market‟ (Mason, 2003). This 
is reflected in differentials in wage rates by ethnic group. In 2004, ethnic minority 
workers earned an average of £7.50 per hour, compared with £8.00 per hour for 
workers from White backgrounds. This gap has been increasing since 1998. Within 
the overall average for ethnic minorities, earnings were highest for Indian and lowest 
for Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers. White male employees earn more on 
average than Black male employees, although the reverse is true for their female 
counterparts, with Black women earning more than White women. Overall, ethnic 
minority women earned about £0.70 per hour more than White women, because a 
larger proportion of White women tend to work part-time. 
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Table 6.1 Median earnings per hour by ethnic group for employees aged 18 
and over, 1998-2004, UK  
 
Ethnic group £ per hour 
1998 2000 2002 2004 
White 6.29 6.76 7.51 8.00 
Ethnic minorities  5.95 6.36 7.13 7.50 
Black 5.83 7.04 7.41 7.33 
Indian 6.11 6.57 7.00 8.41 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 5.24 4.94 5.80 6.25 
Other 6.54 6.00 7.75 7.60 
Source:  Low Pay Commission, 2005. 
 
 
While part of the disadvantage of ethnic minority groups can be accounted for by 
individual characteristics and geographical location, survey evidence over the last  
40 years has revealed that workers from ethnic minorities experience discrimination 
in employment. This has diminished over time, but the fourth Policy Studies Institute 
(PSI) Survey (conducted in 1994) found that 18 per cent of people from ethnic 
minority groups thought that an employer would refuse a person a job on racial  
or religious grounds (Modood et al., 1997). The Citizenship Survey produced  
by Communities and Local Government has included questions about people‟s 
perceptions of discrimination which has revealed that perceived discrimination has 
declined further. Data from the survey for April to December 2008 found that eight 
per cent of people from ethnic minority groups in England and Wales felt that they 
had been refused a job for reasons of race (compared with two per cent of White 
people). Moreover, seven per cent of people from ethnic minority backgrounds felt 
they had experienced discrimination on the grounds of their race when seeking 
promotion (compared with one per cent of White people). This represented a slow 
decline since 2003 (Lloyd, 2009). However, a study of attitudes and job search 
behaviours of senior managers from under-represented groups undertaken during 
2007 and 2008 for the Department for Work and Pensions found that racial 
discrimination had been a barrier to career progression for a third of Asian and  
20 per cent of black managers (compared with just under 10 per cent of those  
from mixed ethnic backgrounds and fewer than one per cent of White managers 
(Hooker et al., 2008). 
 
6.3 Previous recessions and evidence of the impact on ethnic minority 
groups 
Research by a number of authors into the long-term patterns of disadvantage  
by ethnic group has noted that the labour market situation of migrants in the early 
post-war decades was relatively favourable. The difference in employment rates 
between White and ethnic minority groups was quite small until the early 1980s 
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(Clark and Drinkwater, 2007) and Brown (1984) found that West Indian and Asian  
male unemployment rates were similar to those for White men at under three per 
cent. As the ethnic minority group population increased due to births and continued 
international migration and the British economic crisis intensified with the radical 
contraction of the manufacturing industry, their situation deteriorated. The share of 
ethnic minority groups in the unemployment total increased from 2.7 per cent in  
1973 to 4.1 per cent in 1982. Unemployment rates for people from ethnic minority 
groups increased from 4.7 per cent for males and 6.3 per cent for females in  
1970 to 14.1 per cent and 12.6 per cent respectively in 1998 (Leslie et al., 2002: 1042).  
 
Leslie et al. (2002) suggest that rising unemployment between 1974 and 1982 had a 
greater effect on ethnic minorities than on the White population, with the White/ethnic 
minority unemployment rate differential increasing from 1.1 per cent in 1970 to 9.2 per 
cent in 1998 for men and from 2.6 per cent to 9.1 per cent for women over the same 
period. Stafford and Duffy (2009) quote numerous other studies which demonstrate  
the deterioration of the labour market position of ethnic minority groups over the 1980s 
and 1990s. Leslie et al. (2002) suggest that there was a „ratchet‟ effect for minority 
unemployment rates. Unemployment rates increased faster for minority than White  
people as the economy moved into recession but tended to recover more slowly  
during the recovery. 
 
Most of the studies quoted above focused on aggregate measures of employment 
and unemployment. A series of surveys were undertaken by the PSI between 1968 
and 1994, examining the situation of minority groups in the labour market in more 
detail (Daniel, 1968; Smith, 1976; Brown, 1984; Modood et al., 1997). These 
demonstrated that ethnic minority groups were clustered in a limited range of 
industries and occupations, mainly in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs.  
 
Berthoud (2000)‟s analysis of LFS data for 1985 to 1995 revealed that unemployment 
for Caribbean and African men was more sensitive to the business cycle than that for 
White men, but that unemployment for Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men was 
relatively insensitive. Heath and Li (2007) also found that unemployment for African 
men was sensitive to the business cycle. They also demonstrated the strength of  
the generational effect; the UK-born children of people from ethnic minority groups 
tended to do better than their migrant parents, but the disadvantage of their parents 
did not diminish over time. They also suggested that average ethnic minority 
unemployment was increased by successive waves of new migrants (for example, 
due to the higher unemployment of new migrants with poor language skills and little 
appreciation of the requirements of UK employers). 
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There is evidence that the relative situation of ethnic minority groups has improved during 
periods of economic growth. For example, Robinson (1990) found that over the period of 
rapid economic growth between 1987 and 1989, the gap in unemployment rates between 
ethnic minority groups and White people narrowed by 0.2 percentage points. Moreover 
the 2001 Census of Population revealed that employment and unemployment rates 
improved over the period 1991-2001 for Indian and Chinese people. However, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black people still experienced much lower employment 
and much higher unemployment rates than White people. 
 
6.4 The impact of the current recession on ethnic minority groups 
Since the Labour government came to power in 1997, there has been a much more 
active labour market policy aimed at reducing the labour market disadvantage of 
people from ethnic minorities. During 2001-03, the Prime Minister‟s Strategy Unit 
undertook a major study of the experience of ethnic minorities in the labour market 
and the factors responsible for their disadvantage. In its final report, it proposed that 
the UK government adopt the target that „in 10 years‟ time, ethnic minority groups 
living in Britain should no longer face disproportionate barriers to accessing and 
realising opportunities for achievement in the labour market‟ (Strategy Unit, 2003). In 
response, The 2002 Spending Review (SR02) adopted a Public Service Agreement 
(PSA) target to reduce the difference in employment rates between White people and 
people from ethnic minority groups by 2006. The Ethnic Minority Employment Task 
Force was set up to drive forward government action to tackle the barriers to ethnic 
minority employment through improving educational attainment, equal opportunities 
policies, reforming employment programmes and tackling specific barriers. The 
Department for Work and Pensions was given responsibility for ensuring this target 
was met and the Jobcentre Plus employment service implemented an Ethnic Minority 
Outreach strategy, while government policies such as City Strategies incorporated 
the aim of improving employment opportunities for ethnic minority groups. The 
White/ethnic minority gap in employment rates was reduced from 16.9 to 15.6 
percentage points between spring 2003 and spring 2005 (which was sufficient to 
meet the SR02 PSA target). The rate at which this gap has narrowed has since 
slowed (House of Commons, 2008). Kent (2009) showed that in July to September 
2008, around three-quarters of working age White people, but only three-fifths of 
people from ethnic minorities, were in employment. 
 
Claimant count unemployment data have been available classified by ethnic group 
since 2005. Figure 6.10 presents the trend in unemployment since January 2006 by 
broad ethnic group. The fall in unemployment in 2007 was faster for White people 
than for people from ethnic minority groups, but the rise in unemployment in late 
2008 and early 2009 was faster for White people. Unemployment declined most  
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after January 2006 for the Other ethnic groups, but tended to remain high for people 
of Mixed parentage. 
 
During 2008, the share of ethnic minority groups in the total claimant count fell as 
unemployment rose, but unemployment increased fastest for South Asians and 
slowest for those from „Other‟ ethnic groups. While the gap in unemployment  
rates between White and ethnic minority groups fell by 0.5 per cent during 2008,  
the minority rate remained double that for White people. 
 
A Trades Union Congress (TUC) report (2009b) confirmed that, nationally, people 
from ethnic minority groups had fared relatively well during the current recession.  
The authors comment that an important factor underlying this is the continued 
concentration of people from ethnic minority groups in London and South East 
England, which have been less badly affected by the recession than other regions 
(though job losses in the financial services industry in London will have impacted 
upon people from South Asian and South-East Asian ethnic groups). However, a 
report for the West Midlands Regional Observatory (2009) found that Black-
Caribbean unemployment rates rose sharply in the West Midlands. A report by 
Nottingham City Council (2009) estimated that unemployment rates for Black people 
in December 2008 were double those for White people. It also noted that Black 
unemployment increased faster than White unemployment between December 2007 
and December 2008. However, unemployment rates for Asian people were well 
below those of White people. 
 
The TUC (2009b) reported that ethnic minority group employment fell by 15.0  
per cent in manufacturing, but increased by 18.9 per cent in health and social  
work between the end of 2007 and the end of 2008. The employment rate gap 
decreased to 14.6 per cent, because the White employment rate fell while the 
minority rate increased. 
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Figure 6.10 Claimant unemployment by ethnic group, 2006-09 
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Source:  ONS claimant count of the unemployed, via NOMIS. 
 
 
In 2008, despite the progress noted above, the gap in employment rate between 
White people and ethnic minority groups was 15.2 percentage points, though the gap 
in economic activity rates was slightly narrower, at 11.9 per cent (Table 6.2). The gap 
in economic activity and employment rates was much larger for women than men; 
with the female ethnic minority employment rate 20.7 percentage points lower than 
that for White women (Table 6.2). The ethnic minority unemployment rate was still 
well over twice the White unemployment rate. The White/ethnic minority differential is 
similar for both men and women. Economic activity and employment rates for Black 
people were above the minority average, but the Black unemployment rate was 
nearly three times that for White people.  
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Table 6.2 Working age labour market rates by ethnic group, 2008 
 
 Thousands Per cent 
Ethnic group Economically 
active 
In 
employment 
Unemployed Economic 
activity rate 
Employment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
White 26,230 24,829 1,402 80.7 76.4 5.3 
Ethnic minorities 1,932 1,715 217 69.2 61.5 11.2 
Black 793 680 113 72.2 61.9 14.2 
Black-Caribbean 301 260 42 77.3 66.6 13.8 
Black-African 354 307 47 68.9 59.9 13.2 
Black-Other (non-
mixed) 35 30 6 72.6 61.2 15.7 
Black-Other (mixed) 103 84 19 70.0 57.0 18.6 
Indian 663 613 51 76.2 70.4 7.6 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 455 392 63 55.0 47.4 13.9 
Pakistani 328 284 43 54.6 47.4 13.2 
Bangladeshi 127 107 20 56.1 47.3 15.5 
Other 956 865 92 68.9 62.3 9.6 
Other-Asian 244 221 23 70.2 63.6 9.4 
Chinese 147 137 10 67.0 62.3 7.0 
Other 565 506 59 68.9 61.7 10.4 
All ethnic groups 29,098 27,378 1,720 79.4 74.7 5.9 
Notes: Data are for 16-64 (men) and 16-59 (women). 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey (average for 2008). 
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Table 6.3 Working age labour market rates by ethnic group and gender 
 
Ethnic group Economic activity rate Employment rate Unemployment 
rate 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
White 84.3 76.3 79.5 72.6 5.8 4.8 
Ethnic minorities 79.0 58.3 70.1 51.9 11.2 10.9 
Black 78.8 66.3 65.6 58.7 16.7 11.5 
Black-Caribbean 80.5 74.5 67.3 66.0 16.3 11.5 
Black-African 78.7 59.9 67.4 52.9 14.4 11.7 
Black-Other (non-mixed) 79.5 67.6 65.8 57.8 17.2 14.4 
Black-Other (mixed) 74.4 65.9 54.6 59.0 26.6 10.4 
Indian 84.5 67.0 78.3 61.6 7.4 8.0 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 77.3 31.9 68.2 25.9 11.8 19.1 
Pakistani 77.3 31.1 68.9 25.1 10.8 19.4 
Bangladeshi 77.3 34.1 66.2 27.8 14.3 18.4 
Other 76.4 61.8 69.2 55.8 9.4 9.7 
Other-Asian 80.4 60.8 72.3 55.6 10.0 8.6 
Chinese 71.5 63.3 67.1 58.5 6.2 7.6 
Other 76.0 61.8 68.5 55.1 9.9 10.8 
All ethnic groups 83.8 74.2 78.5 70.2 6.3 5.4 
Source:  Labour Force Survey (average for 2008). 
 
 
The economic activity and employment rates of Indian people and Black-Caribbean 
people were closest to those of White people. However, only just over half of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi people were economically active and under half were in 
employment. Variations in employment rates were wider for women than men. While 
two-thirds of Black-Caribbean women (and men) were in employment, only a quarter 
of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women were in work.  
 
Among ethnic minority groups, Chinese men and women displayed unemployment 
rates closest to those of White people. Black men were more likely to be unemployed 
than Black women, while Pakistani and Bangladeshi women were more likely to be 
unemployed than men from the same ethnic groups. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 People from ethnic minorities groups remain disadvantaged in the labour 
market, despite considerable progress during a long period of economic 
prosperity. 
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 The relative position of ethnic minorities deteriorated considerably as a 
consequence of the economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s  
which led to a massive loss of manufacturing employment. 
 
 The position of some ethnic minority groups is now approaching equality with 
that of White people, but the average of all people from ethnic minorities 
remains well below the White employment rate and above the White 
unemployment rate. 
 
 Nationally, ethnic minority groups have been less adversely affected than White 
people by the current recession. However, there is evidence that Black ethnic 
groups may be faring particularly badly. 
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7. Projections of employment 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides projections of employment for Great Britain disaggregated by 
gender, age, ethnic group and disability. The projections are based on a forecast by 
Cambridge Econometrics (CE) for the UK economy – and its nations and regions – 
from February 2009. The forecast is produced by CE‟s Multisectoral Dynamic Model 
(CE 2009). The employment projections by gender, age, ethnic group and disability 
have been produced by Institute of Employment Rights (IER) by apportioning the 
changing shares of total employment, occupational and sectoral employment for 
each of these groups based on historical data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
The projections provide a structured view of the future, but it must be emphasised 
that there are substantial uncertainties about the speed with which the recovery from 
the current recession will take place because this is very much dependent upon 
developments in the world economy. The projections are based on the assumption 
that the economy will return to its long-run growth path over the medium term (to 
2020). For further details of the IER projections, see Wilson et al. (2008). 
 
7.2 Caveats to the projections 
One of the rationales for producing forecasts is to provide some indication to 
policymakers and other labour market participants about likely developments in  
an uncertain world. The uncertainties facing the UK economy and labour market 
have been immense during the second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009. The 
projections in this report were based on a macroeconomic assessment prepared in 
February 2009. Since that time there has been considerable change in the world 
economy with several economies exiting recession. The global financial crisis of 
2008 is unprecedented in recent times, with a virtual meltdown in some aspects of 
the financial system, and government interventions across the world intended to 
shore up the banking system and to restore confidence to financial markets.  
 
As the economy has entered recession, there are concerns that there may be a 
period of prolonged slowdown in the economy with most commentators suggesting a 
recovery is unlikely until 2010-11. In such circumstances, producing labour market 
projections is particularly difficult because it is technically difficult to produce robust 
forecasts when economic conditions are changing so rapidly. In a relatively short 
space of time, concerns about accelerating levels of inflation (in early 2008) have 
given way to worries about deflation as demand declines. Looking to the future, some 
commentators are concerned about the long-term consequences of deflation, while 
others see a number of latent inflationary pressures which may become manifest in 
the period to 2020. 
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The forecast assumes that, following the recession, the economy will return to its 
long-run trend, so it may underestimate the short-run impact of a tightening credit 
supply and the sharp decline in domestic demand. It is apparent that the downturn, at 
least in its early stages, is being felt particularly hard in London and the South East 
given their focus for the financial services industry. The focus of the results, however, 
is upon the medium term. Changing patterns of employment by sector and 
occupation are largely dominated by longer-term trends rather than the cyclical 
position of the economy. The results from the current set of projections can, 
therefore, still be used as a guide to likely future developments in the structure of 
employment, even though the overall impact of the current recession on employment 
levels over the next two to three years may be underestimated.  
 
Of course, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that there may be a more 
negative impact on the longer-term trends in employment patterns, especially in parts 
of the banking and financial system. For most other sectors, the results present a 
plausible picture of future developments, assuming that the economy turns the corner 
during 2010-11. Past experience suggests that, no matter how severe the shock, 
economies do recover and the longer-term trends are generally quite soon re-
established. Sharp recessions often hasten the structural changes going on the 
economy, resulting in the more rapid decline of struggling sectors and the generation 
of new ones. The increasingly inter-connected nature of the global economy may 
help to hasten this process. Analysis of previous recessions suggests that, while the 
impact on employment levels can be quite severe as the downturn accelerates, the 
effect on patterns of labour demand by occupation and qualification are much less 
sensitive, and that the underlying trends in such shares are quite robust. 
 
The impact of the recession of the early 1990s on employment levels by occupation 
resulted in strong cyclical downturns for many occupations. But trends in the shares 
of particular occupations in total employment showed a much less dramatic pattern of 
change. If the current recession has a similar impact, then the underlying, longer-
term trends that are built into the projections can be expected to provide a useful 
guide to longer-term developments in the demand for labour. 
 
7.3 The economy and employment over the medium term 
The economy declined by 1.5 per cent in 2008 Q4, by 2.4 per cent in 2009 Q1, a 
larger fall than expected by the Bank of England at the time, and by 0.8 per cent in 
2009 Q2 (Bank of England, 2009a, 2009b). The factors which are likely to slow the 
pace of recovery include: 
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 a protracted contraction in world demand (for instance, recession appears to 
have been particularly deep in some of the UK‟s main trading partners though 
they are now exiting recession); 
 
 increases in household saving including consuming less and paying off debts; 
and 
 
 the limited availability of credit to companies and households such that even 
credit-worthy organisations face difficulties securing credit. 
 
More positively, the financial stimulus package introduced by the UK government and 
others may help promote growth. On balance, the Bank of England‟s view is one of 
relatively slow economic recovery, but it also emphasises the high uncertainty 
attached to what is expected to happen next in the economy. Because employment 
tends to lag behind output trends – see Chapter 2 - this suggests, other things being 
equal, that the labour market is about to experience a period of prolonged 
employment decline and unemployment growth. 
 
CE‟s forecast for the UK economy indicates that the economy will continue to 
contract during 2009 and remain subdued during 2010. Over 2009, the outlook is  
one of households reining in their spending, falls in house prices and tight credit 
supply. Uncertainty in the market will see investment levels fall by 7.75 per cent. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to contract by around 3.25 per cent 
during 2009 and will continue to fall during 2010 before resuming growth in 2011. 
 
Employment continued to rise during the 12 months to June 2008. During the second 
half of 2008 around 140,000 jobs were lost and unemployment levels began to rise. 
During 2009, employment is forecast to fall by around 2.25 per cent in large part due 
to the decline in those sectors particularly affected by the credit crunch (financial and 
business services). The lagged effects of the recession are reflected in a weak labour 
market over the medium term. Overall, the 2005-10 period is expected to reveal 
employment growth of -0.4 per cent a year before returning to growth of 0.4 per cent 
a year over the 2010-15 period and 0.5 per cent a year for 2015-0. This compares 
with an annual average growth rate of 1.0 per cent over the 2000-05 period. The 
relatively weak employment growth forecast for the period to 2015 and between 2015 
and 2020 will result in unemployment levels rising: to an average of 2.1 million for the 
2010-15 period, and 1.9 million for the 2015-20 period, compared with 0.9 million for 
the 2000-05 period, and 1.3 million for the 2005-10 period. 
 
The impact of the recession is unlikely to be felt evenly across the UK. CE‟s forecasts 
for the nations and regions of the UK point to the following: 
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 The short-term indicators suggest that London will see the greatest contraction 
in employment (by -2.2 per cent in 2010 compared with -1.7 in the UK), but over 
the longer term it will have one of the strongest growth rates (0.7 per cent a 
year growth in the period 2010-20 compared with 0.5 per cent in the UK). 
 
 The short-term indicators also show a relatively strong employment decline in 
Wales in 2010 (-2.1 per cent a year) with a below average increase of 0.4 per 
cent over the 2010-20 period. 
 
 Employment growth in Scotland is expected to be -1.8 per cent in 2010 and  
is forecast to be relatively weak over the longer-term at 0.2 per cent between 
2010 and 2020. 
 
In general, the economies of London and southern England are likely to benefit over 
the longer-term from the recovery of the financial services sector, their concentration 
of high-value production industries, and improvements to the transport infrastructure. 
Elsewhere in England, the Midlands will suffer from its dependence upon 
manufacturing and its relatively weak financial and business services base, and in 
the North there is still a strong dependence upon low-value service industries, which 
subdues value-added output growth over the medium term. Over the longer term, the 
economies of both Wales and Scotland are projected to grow at a rate lower than  
the average for Great Britain. In Scotland, employment will benefit from the growth  
of the non-financial business services industry but the decline of employment in 
manufacturing and transport/communications will result in relatively weak overall 
employment growth. Earnings levels in Scotland will remain below the UK average. 
The performance of the Welsh economy is expected to be weak between 2010  
and 2015 because of its dependence for employment upon industries with low 
productivity growth. There is likely to be a growing dependence upon the public 
sector for employment.  
 
In summary, the CE forecast for the national economy projects a fall in gross value 
added (GVA) of 3.2 per cent this year and by a further 0.6 per cent during 2010 with 
modest growth expected to resume in 2011 (see Table 7.1). 
 
THE EQUALITY IMPACTS OF THE CURRENT RECESSION 
 
 102 
Table 7.1 Macroeconomic indicators 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20 
Gross value 
added at basic 
prices (% p.a.) 
3.0 0.7 -3.2 -0.6 2.4 0.5 2.5 2.5 
Employment 
(millions) 
31.4 31.6 30.9 30.4 30.3 31.1 30.6 31.4 
Unemployment 
(millions) 
0.9 0.9 1.6 2.1 0.9 1.3 2.1 1.9 
Source:  Cambridge Econometrics (2009). 
 
 
7.4 Projections of employment 
 
Employment growth over the medium term 
Before providing an assessment of employment change by gender, age, ethnicity 
and disability, a brief description is provided of how employment is projected to 
develop between now and 2020. By 2020, employment levels are expected to regain 
their pre-recession level (see Table 7.2). It is apparent that the growth rate over the 
forecast period is below that recorded over the 1990s. During the recovery period, 
2013-20, employment is projected to grow by 0.5 per cent a year compared with  
1.2 per cent a year between 1993 and 2001. Reflecting this long-run trend, part-time 
employment is expected to grow at a faster rate than full-time employment, but this  
is not necessarily reflected in a faster rate of growth in female employment. In the 
future, men are expected to take a larger share of part-time jobs.  
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Table 7.2 Employment outlook to 2020 
 
Thousands 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Total employment 26,441 29,053 30,738 29,751 30,898 
      
Male employment 13,961 15,506 16,319 15,798 16,516 
Female employment 12,481 13,457 14,419 13,953 14,381 
      
Full-time 16,032 17,777 18,212 17,450 17,854 
Part-time 6,729 7,752 8,431 8,384 9,004 
Self-employed 3,680 3,523 4,095 3,918 4,039 
      
Unemployment rate (%)        9.5 3.1 2.8 6.6 5.3 
      
AAGR (%)  1993-2001 2001-08 2008-13 2013-20 
Total employment  1.2 0.8 -0.7 0.5 
      
Male employment  1.3 0.7 -0.6 0.6 
Female employment  1.0 0.9 -0.7 0.4 
      
Full-time  1.3 0.3 -0.9 0.3 
Part-time  1.8 1.2 -0.1 1.0 
Self-employed  -0.5 2.2 -0.9 0.4 
 
Unemployment rate  
  
-13.0 
 
-1.6 
 
18.9 
 
-3.2 
Notes: AAGR = annual average percentage growth. 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
There are uncertainties about the depth of the current recession compared with 
previous ones and its likely impact on unemployment levels. The unemployment rate 
in both 2013 and 2020 is projected to be lower than that recorded in the aftermath of 
the 1990-91 recession. The reasons for this are manifold: people exiting the labour 
force rather than entering unemployment; return migration, and the use of extended 
periods of leave by some employers. If the recession is bottoming out during the 
second quarter of 2009, as some pundits are predicting, then there is the possibility 
that the impact of the recession on unemployment may not be as abject as that 
witnessed following the 1980-81 and 1990-91 recessions. 
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Figure 7.1 shows the long-run trend in employment levels from 1981, together with 
the projected trend to 2020, for men and women respectively. Figure 7.2 shows the 
trend for full-time and part-time employment. The charts show that fall in employment 
is not expected to be as deep as in 1990-91 for both men and women, and that the 
growth in part-time employment is likely to be relatively strong in the period to 2020 
as it recovers to its long-run growth trend. 
 
Figure 7.1 Employment trends for men and women, 1992-2020 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.2 Employment trends for full-time and part-time employment, 
1981-2020 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Even if one takes a more pessimistic view of the recovery, as suggested in Figure 
7.3, the fall in employment is not as deep as that observed for either of the two 
previous recessions. Figure 7.3 shows the projected levels of employment levels to 
2020 under different assumptions. Under Scenario A, perhaps the most optimistic, 
the lowest level of employment is reached in 2011 and is equal to that given in the 
base projections: 29.5 million. This represents a decline of 1.36 per cent per year 
from 2008 to 2011. After hitting this low, this scenario assumes that employment  
will grow at the same rate as it did in the recovery following the 1990 recession.  
With employment growth of 1.13 per cent per annum, the level of employment would 
be expected to reach its 2008 level by 2015.  
 
In Scenario B, the decline in employment is assumed to equal that witnessed 
between 1990 and 1993. With an annual decrease of 2.37 per cent, employment 
would reach its lowest point, 28.6 million, in 2011. This scenario then assumes the 
same growth in employment in the recovery phase as used in the base projections, 
0.51 per cent per year. Under this scenario, the pre-recession level of employment 
would be just surpassed in 2026. 
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Finally, under Scenario C, the lowest level of employment for this cycle would result 
from the same rate of decline as witnessed between 1990 and 1993: 2.37 per cent. 
The same rate of employment growth as seen in this earlier recession is also 
assumed to be true in this scenario so that employment would re-establish its  
2008 level around 2018. 
 
Given the uncertainties attached to the current recession, the scenarios outlined 
above give a range of possibilities. The baseline projection from the CE / IER is 
derived from a set of equations which replicate the probable behaviour of the British 
economy. The other scenarios, which are more mechanically derived, simply show 
how the recovery period will differ if the labour market behaves as it did after 
previous recessions. But it needs to be taken into account that policymakers have 
learnt much from previous recessions so there is every reason to believe that the 
more pessimistic outlooks presented in Figure 7.3 will be avoided. 
 
Figure 7.3 Employment levels assuming different rates of recovery 
 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Sectoral employment prospects 
The pattern of sectoral change in the baseline forecast is much the same as that 
reported in Working Futures (Wilson et al., 2008). An examination of long-term 
sectoral change in the labour market reveals that recessions do not bring about 
structural change but they can accelerate the rate of change. Hence, the current 
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recession is likely to hasten the fall in both primary and utilities and manufacturing 
employment over the short-term before the economy returns to its long-term trend in 
sectoral change. 
 
The sectoral trend in employment change is shown in Figure 7.4. It reflects the long-
run trend in sectoral change with the decline in relative importance of the primary  
and manufacturing sectors, and the increase in the share of employment accounted 
for by business and financial services, and non-marketed services. Although the 
recession has led to the loss of many jobs in the financial services sector – especially 
in London – the medium-term trend is for the broader business and financial services 
sector to account for a higher share of employment in the future. Similarly, non-
marketed services – which includes education, health and social services, and public 
administration – is also projected to account for an increased share of employment in 
the period to 2020. It should be noted that factored into the baseline projection is a 
slowdown in the growth of public expenditure which is likely to have an impact on 
employment in this sector. 
 
Figure 7.4 Sectoral trends in employment 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Commission. 
 
 
Figure 7.5 shows the change in employment levels by sector over the forecast 
period. In the earlier period covered by the projections, the outlook is fairly 
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pessimistic with employment levels falling across all sectors except in non-marketed 
services. The later period covered by the projections shows employment growth 
across all sectors except primary and utilities and manufacturing. 
 
Figure 7.5 Change in employment by sector  
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Notes: Data are shown in thousands. 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Occupational employment prospects 
Occupational change derives from changes in the sectoral composition of 
employment. The general pattern of occupational change – reported in the Working 
Futures series, Wilson et al. (2006; 2008) – is that of continued growth in higher-level 
occupations (managers, professionals and associate professionals) and lesser-
skilled occupations (sales and personal services). This has sometimes been referred 
to as the polarisation of the labour market with strong growth in relatively low and 
highly skilled jobs. Figure 7.6 shows the projected occupational change based on  
the latest forecast for the UK economy and confirms the long-run change observed  
in the occupational structure of employment reported in the Working Futures series 
of publications. 
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Figure 7.6  Occupational change to 2020 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Figure 7.7 shows the change in the levels of employment by occupational group  
over the period covered by the projections. It reveals that over the earlier part of the 
period covered by the projections, the higher-level occupations along with sales and 
personal service occupations will show a modest increase in the numbers employed, 
whereas all the other occupational groups will show a fall in employment levels. 
Between 2013 and 2020, the same pattern is observed but the growth among higher-
level occupations and sales and personal services is much stronger, and the fall in 
employment in the other occupational groups is attenuated to some extent. 
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Figure 7.7 Changes in employment by occupation  
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Notes: Data are shown in thousands. 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
The trend in employment change described above is similar to that provided in the 
Working Futures series of projections, except that it reveals a more pessimistic 
picture than that set out in the last Working Futures report in 2007, Wilson et al. 
(2008). While the economy is predicted to resume its long-term growth path by 2020, 
there is a sharper dip in employment over the period to around 2015-16 such that 
employment growth over the 2008-20 will be sluggish by comparison with the recent 
past. The extent to which this affects different groups in the labour market is 
considered in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
7.5 Projections of employment by gender 
The uncertainties attached to the projections of overall employment are amplified 
when looking at particular sub-groups in the labour market. The projections of 
employment by gender are derived as part of the econometric modelling 
underpinning the CE / IER model.  
 
Employment growth over the medium term 
The following projections compare the future employment of men and women, 
providing a picture of how employment has developed since 1993 and how it is likely 
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to develop between now and 2020 (see Table 7.3). The projections show a similar 
drop in the growth rate of total employment for both men and women over the 2008 
to 2013 period, but the growth rate for men is likely to be higher than for women 
during the 2013 to 2020 period. In fact, women‟s share of total employment is 
expected to be lower in 2020 than it was in 1993 (46.5 per cent, compared with  
47.2 per cent). The growth rate for full-time employment between 2013 and 2020  
is expected to be identical for men and women at 0.3 per cent, but the greatest 
projected change is in part-time work. Men are predicted to more than double their 
share of part-time employment from 8.0 per cent in 1993 to 16.5 per cent in 2020, 
with a slight decrease in the share of both full-time employment and self-
employment. Women, on the other hand, are expected to decrease their share of 
part-time employment (even though it is still significantly higher than men‟s share), 
while slightly increasing their share of self-employment.  
 
Figure 7.8 demonstrates change in the employment of men and women over the 
period from 1981 to the present recession and how employment is likely to change 
between now and 2020. The gap between male and female employment levels  
was most marked from 1981 until it began to narrow dramatically with the entry of 
increasing numbers of women into the workforce. Both men and women suffered  
a drop in employment after the 1990-91 recession, although the effect was most 
marked for men. Since then, the trend for both male and female employment has 
remained similar, although male employment has maintained its higher share 
throughout the period and is expected to continue. A similar dip is predicted in 
employment levels for both men and women during the present recession, with  
pre-recession levels of employment (for men) not expected until around 2018.  
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Table 7.3 Male and female employment 
 
Thousands 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Total employment 26,441 29,053 30,738 29,751 30,898 
   Male 13,961 15,506 16,319 15,798 16,516 
  Female 12,481 13,457 14,419 13,953 14,381 
Full-time  Male 10,214 11,197 11,316 10,812 11,056 
  Female 5,818 6,581 6,896 6,638 6,798 
Part-time  Male 1,116 1,785 2,122 2,279 2,723 
  Female 5,613 5,967 6,309 6,105 6,281 
Self-employed Male 2,630 2,524 2,881 2,708 2,738 
  Female 1,050 1,000 1,214 1,210 1,301 
      
AAGR (%)  1993-2001 2001-08 2008-13 2013-20 
Total employment  1.2 0.8 -0.7 0.5 
 Male  1.3 0.7 -0.6 0.6 
 Female  1.0 0.9 -0.7 0.4 
Full-time Male  1.2 0.2 -0.9 0.3 
 Female  1.6 0.7 -0.8 0.3 
Part-time Male  6.0 2.5 1.4 2.6 
 Female  0.8 0.8 -0.7 0.4 
Self-employed Male  -0.5 1.9 -1.2 0.2 
 Female  -0.6 2.8 -0.1 1.0 
      
Share of employment      1993             2001           2008              2013              2020 
Total employment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Male 52.8 53.4 53.1 53.1 53.5 
 Female 47.2 46.6 46.9 46.9 46.5 
Full-time Male 73.2 72.2 69.3 68.4 66.9 
 Female 46.6 48.6 47.8 47.6 47.3 
Part-time Male 8.0 11.5 13.0 14.4 16.5 
 Female 45.0 44.0 43.8 43.8 43.7 
Self-employed Male 18.8 16.3 17.7 17.1 16.6 
 Female 8.4 7.4 8.4 8.7 9.0 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.8  Employment by gender, 1981-2020 
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Source: LFS 1981 – 2008, IER and CE Projections 2009-2020. 
 
 
Assuming different views about how the recovery will develop, a number of scenarios 
have been developed as follows: 
 
 Baseline – baseline estimates produced by the IER model. 
 
 Scenario A – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is the 
same as that in the baseline projections but growth after the bottom is equal to 
that after the 1990s recession. 
 
 Scenario B – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is equal 
to the drop in the 1990s recession with the growth rate after recession equal to 
that in the baseline. 
 
 Scenario C – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is equal 
to the drop in the 1990s recession with the growth rate after the recession equal 
to that after the 1990s recession. 
 
Figure 7.9a and b below show the scenarios vary for men and women. Scenarios A 
and C both show a relatively high fall in employment for men over the short term, but 
a relatively fast recovery compared with the baseline projections under Scenario C. 
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Under both scenarios, employment levels in 2020 will be lower than for the baseline 
projection. For women, the effect of Scenarios A, B and C is for a fall in employment 
of the same magnitude as the baseline forecast and a relatively quicker recovery so 
that pre-recession levels of employment are achieved more quickly 
 
Figure 7.9 Men’s and women’s employment under different scenarios 
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(b) Women 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Sectoral employment prospects 
The sectoral pattern of employment change for men and women is demonstrated  
in Figure 7.10a and b. The manufacturing sector, a large employer of men, is likely 
to be worst hit and the projections demonstrate that it is unlikely to recover after the 
present recession, with the share of total male employment in 2020 expected to  
be almost half of that in 1993. Similarly, the primary/utilities sector is expected to 
continue its declining share of male employment between now and 2020, whereas 
the construction sector is projected to drop slightly after the current recession and 
then to rise again after 2013. Other sectors also show either a slow and steady rise  
in employment shares for men (distribution, transport; non-marketed services) or a 
more dramatic rise (the business and other services sector is expected to increase  
its share of male employment from just over 20 per cent in 1993 to over 30 per cent 
in 2020).  
 
Women‟s employment by sector shows some similarities to men‟s, with the 
manufacturing sector expected to decrease dramatically (although far fewer women 
than men are employed in this sector). The primary/utilities and construction sectors, 
also employing only a small proportion of women, are expected either to decrease 
their share or to remain flat between now and 2020. Unlike the male sectoral 
patterns, distribution/transport is likely to reduce its share of female employment 
slightly, whereas the business and other services sector is likely to dip slightly and 
then increase to around 27 per cent in 2020. Non-marketed services, however, are 
expected to continue to employ the largest share of women, increasing to almost  
40 per cent by 2020. Projections by age groups demonstrate that the non-marketed 
service sector is also highly differentiated by age, suggesting that older women are 
increasingly likely to be employed in this sector.  
 
Figure 7.11 shows the level of sectoral change for men and women respectively over 
the 2008-20 period and reveals the relative importance of business and financial 
services and non-marketed services for the growth in women‟s employment. 
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Figure 7.10 Male and female sectoral employment 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.11 Changes in male and female sectoral employment 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Occupational employment prospects  
Figure 7.12a and b demonstrate changes in the occupational composition of 
employment by gender between 1993 and 2008, and also shows projected changes 
over the medium term. 
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Figure 7.12 Male and female occupational employment 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
PROJECTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 119 
Figure 7.12 shows that there are huge differences by gender in occupational 
patterns. However, broad trends show a continuous rise in higher-level occupations 
between 1993 and 2008, with projections showing that these occupations will 
continue to employ increasing numbers of both men and women in the future. 
Administrative and secretarial occupations, employing over 25 per cent of women  
in 1993 and declining steadily since then, are expected to decrease their share of 
female employment even further to around 17 per cent by 2020. The figures for men 
in the same sector show a similar drop, although the numbers of men employed in 
these occupations are much lower than for women. Other dramatic drops are 
predicted in elementary occupations for both men and women, although the 
decrease for women has been, and will continue to be, more rapid. For men, the 
skilled trades occupations show the greatest decrease from 1993 until the present 
recession, a decline which is expected to continue in the medium term. Process, 
plant and machine operatives are expected to continue their decline in both male and 
female employment, although due to the greater numbers of men working in these 
occupations, it is expected that women are less likely to be affected. Both personal 
services and sales and customer services have been rising steadily since 1993 for 
both men and women, although women are much more likely than men to work in 
personal service occupations, a trend which is expected to continue, whereas more 
men are expected to work in customer service occupations than previously. 
 
Figure 7.13 shows the change in men and women‟s employment over the forecast 
period. It reveals the relative importance of sales and personal services occupations 
for the future of women‟s employment.  
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Figure 7.13 Changes in male and female occupational employment 
 
(a) Men 
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400 
Managers and Senior Officials
Professional Occupations
Associate Professional & Technical Occupations
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations
Skilled Trades Occupations
Personal Service Occupations
Sales and Customer Service Occupations
Process, Plant & Machine Operatives
Elementary Occupations
2013-2020 2008-2013
 
 
(b) Women 
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400 
Managers and Senior Officials
Professional Occupations
Associate Professional & Technical Occupations
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations
Skilled Trades Occupations
Personal Service Occupations
Sales and Customer Service Occupations
Process, Plant & Machine Operatives
Elementary Occupations
2013-2020 2008-2013
 
Source:   Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
The employment projections suggest that after a similar dip in employment levels for 
both men and women during the current recession, levels will again begin to rise by 
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2011 and continue to increase steadily in the medium term. The projections suggest 
that the impact will be more similar for male and female employment than was the 
case during previous recessions. Nevertheless, the projections indicate that male 
employment will reach pre-recession levels by around 2017, but women may not 
regain as large a share of employment as before at least up to 2020. Chapter 3  
also revealed both short- and medium-term effects of the recession by gender,  
and suggested that: 
 
 the indirect effects of the current recession are more likely to affect women than 
men in the short term: increased domestic violence, increased relationship 
breakdown and debt, as well as reduced diversity and family-friendly working 
initiatives, and  
 
 the public sector will be affected by a second wave of job cuts as this recession 
progresses, which could affect a significant proportion of older women. 
 
The employment projections suggest that the erosion of administrative and 
secretarial occupations, as well as a decrease in elementary occupations over the 
medium term, will only be counter-balanced if more women move into higher-level 
occupations. The projections also reveal a relatively dramatic increase in male part-
time work in the medium term, with men entering traditionally female jobs which were 
taken on to facilitate the combined effects of work and caring responsibilities. As 
many higher-level occupations entail long hours and reduced opportunities for  
part-time working, overall employment opportunities for many women may be  
limited in the medium term. 
 
7.6 Projections of employment by age group 
The projections of employment by age have been produced by apportioning the 
numbers of people in each category and should be treated as indicative. 
 
Employment growth over the medium term 
The projections of employment compare three groups of people of working age: 
younger people (aged 16-24 years of age); prime age (25-49 years), and the older 
age group (50-60/65 years). Information is also provided about those in the post-
retirement age group. The overall employment picture of how employment is likely to 
develop between now and 2020 is presented in Table 7.4. This reveals that most age 
groups are expected to show a similar rate of change over the 2013 to 2020 period 
which, for the older age groups, represents a marked slowdown in employment 
growth compared with the 2001-08 period. This reflects the assumption that, to some 
extent, older workers may have been seen as a reserve army of labour when there 
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was an excess demand for labour over most of the 2000s, but as labour demand 
slackens, the demand for older workers, other things being equal, might well fall. 
 
Table 7.4 Employment outlook by age 
 
Thousands 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Total employment 26,441 29,053 30,738 29,751 30,898 
   16-24 3,949 3,846 3,837 3,747 3,940 
  25-49 16,028 17,313 17,757 17,136 17,720 
  50-64/59 5,106 6,305 6,915 6,670 6,898 
  65+/60+ 1,358 1,588 2,229 2,199 2,339 
Full-time 16-24 2,871 2,546 2,462 2,359 2,434 
  25-49 10.337 11,487 11,481 11,000 11,255 
  50-64/59 2,690 3,581 3,968 3,800 3,888 
  65+/60+ 134 163 302 2,900 297 
Part-time 16-24 869 1,188 1,211 1,230 1,364 
  25-49 3,322 3,752 3,915 1,875 4,132 
  50-64/59 1,519 1,619 1,709 1,689 1,798 
  65+/60+ 1,019 1,194 1,597 1,589 1,710 
Self-employed 16-24 208 112 165 157 152 
  25-49 2,369 2,075 2,361 2,260 2,332 
  50-64/59 898 1,106 1,238 1,180 1,212 
  65+/60+ 206 230 331 320 333 
      
AAGR (%)  1993-2001 2001-08 2008-13 2013-20 
Total employment  1.2 0.8 -0.7 0.5 
  16-24  -0.3 0.0 -0.5 0.7 
  25-49  1.0 0.4 -0.7 0.5 
  50-64/59  2.7 1.3 -0.7 0.5 
  65+/60+  2.0 5.0 -0.3 0.9 
Full-time 16-24  -1.5 -0.5 -0.8 0.3 
  25-49  1.3 0.0 -0.9 0.3 
  50-64/59  3.6 1.5 -0.9 0.3 
  65+/60+  2.5 9.2 -0.8 0.3 
Part-time 16-24  4.0 0.3 0.3 1.5 
  25-49  1.5 0.6 -0.2 0.9 
  50-64/59  0.8 0.8 -0.2 0.9 
  65+/60+  2.0 4.2 -0.1 1.0 
Self-employed 16-24  -7.4 5.6 -0.9 0.4 
  25-49  -1.6 1.9 -0.9 0.4 
  50-64/59  2.6 1.6 -1.0 0.4 
  65+/60+  1.4 5.3 -0.7 0.6 
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Table 7.4 Employment outlook by age (continued) 
Share of employment 1993     2001 2008       2013      2020 
Total employment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   16-24 14.9 13.2 12.5 12.6 12.8 
  25-49 60.6 59.6 57.8 57.6 57.4 
  50-64/69 19.3 21.7 22.5 22.4 22.3 
  65+/60+ 5.1 5.5 7.3 7.4 7.6 
Full-time 16-24 17.9 14.3 13.5 13.5 13.5 
  25-49 64.5 64.6 63.0 63.0 63.0 
  50-64/69 16.8 20.1 21.8 21.8 21.8 
  65+/60+ 0.8 0.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Full-time 16-24 12.9 15.3 14.4 14.7 15.1 
  25-49 49.4 48.4 46.4 46.2 45.9 
  50-64/69 22.6 20.9 20.3 20.1 20.0 
  65+/60+ 15.1 15.4 18.9 19.0 19.0 
Self-employed 16-24 5.6 3.2 4.0 4.0 4.0 
  25-49 64.4 58.9 57.7 57.7 57.7 
  50-64/69 24.4 31.4 30.2 30.1 30.0 
  65+/60+ 5.6 6.5 8.3 8.2 8.2 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission. 
 
Figure 7.14 Employment by age group, 1992-2020 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.15 Employment by age group and gender, 1992-2020 
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(b) Women 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.16 provides some alternative assessments of how employment patterns 
may develop over the medium term. As these series begin in 1992, observing the  
full drop in employment in the recession of the early 1990s is difficult and so the 
assumptions underlying each scenario vary between some age groups. Assuming 
different views about how the recovery will develop, a number of scenarios have 
developed as follows: 
 
 Baseline – baseline estimates produced by the IER model. 
 
 Scenario A – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is the 
same as that in the baseline projections, but growth after the bottom is equal to 
that after the 1990s recession. 
 
 Scenario B – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of recession is equal to 
the drop in the 1990s recession for the 16-24 and 65+/60+ age groups but is 
equal to twice the baseline drop for the 25-49 and 50-64/59 age groups. The 
growth rate after recession is equal to that in baseline projections.  
 
 Scenario C – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is equal 
to the drops used in Scenario B with the growth rate after recession equal to 
that after the 1990s recession. 
 
In the figures for each age group, the growth rate of employment in the scenarios 
reverts to the growth rate that underlies the baseline projections once the pre-
recession level of employment has been re-established.  
 
For the youngest and oldest age groups, there is not much difference between the 
different scenarios, but for the prime-age group, the alternative assumptions about 
the recovery suggest very different outcomes. For the prime-age group, if the 
recession proves to be as deep as in 1990-91, but the recovery follows the same 
path as the baseline projection (Scenario B), then even by 2020, employment will not 
have recovered its pre-recession level. If the recession proves to be as deep as 
1990-91 and a sharp recovery follows – as in Scenario C – then employment will 
recover its pre-recession level sooner than in the example of the baseline projection.  
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Figure 7.16 Alternative medium-term trends: age 
(a) 16-24 year olds 
3,000 
3,500 
4,000 
4,500 
5,000 
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
s
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Baseline
15,000
16,000
17,000
18,000
19,000
20,000
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
s
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Baseline
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
s
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Baseline
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
2,400
2,600
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
s
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Baseline
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
(b) 24-49 year olds 
(c) 50-64/59 year olds 
 
(d) 65+/60+ year olds 
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Sectoral employment prospects 
The sectoral pattern of employment change is shown in Figure 7.17. There is a 
general pattern of change across all age groups reflecting the decline in employment 
in agriculture and manufacturing and the growth in services. There is evidence that 
the recession will hasten the decline of the manufacturing sector as a source of 
employment, much as previous recessions have done. This is particularly important 
for the prime age and older age group because of the relatively high proportion of 
people in these age groups who are employed in that sector. There also appears to 
be a relationship between employment in non-marketed services and age, with older 
people more likely to be in employed in this sector. Given expected changes in the 
growth of public spending, and signs already of redundancies taking place in the 
public sector, whatever measures are taken to reduce the current level of 
government borrowing may have a direct impact on the employment of older people, 
if it results in public sector jobs being reduced at a faster rate than in the baseline 
projection. 
 
Figure 7.18 shows the scale of change in the sectoral composition of employment 
over the medium term. It shows how across all sectors, except non-marketed 
services, employment across all age groups is expected to decline over the 2008-13 
period. This will continue for manufacturing and primary/utilities in the 2013-2020 
period, but other sectors will bounce back, including a pick-up in non-marketed 
services employment growth. 
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Figure 7.17 Sectoral employment by age 
(a) 16-24 year olds  
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
(b) 24-49 year olds 
(c) 50-64/59 year olds 
 
(d) 65+/60+ year olds 
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Figure 7.18 Changes in employment by sector and age 
 
 
 Notes: Data are shown in thousands. 
 
 Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality  
  and Human Rights Commission. 
 
(b) 24-49 year olds 
 
(c) 50-64/59 year olds 
 
(d) 65+/60+ year olds 
 
(a) 16-24 year olds 
THE EQUALITY IMPACTS OF THE CURRENT RECESSION 
 
 130 
Occupational employment prospects  
Figure 7.19 shows how the occupational composition of employment for different  
age groups has developed over the 1990s and 2000s, and how it is projected to 
change over the medium term. Occupational patterns vary significantly by age. The 
projections by occupation show a continuation of occupational trends seen over the 
past with growth in high-level occupations, personal service and sales occupations. 
The growth in personal service and sales occupations is especially important for 
younger people where a relatively high percentage is currently employed, and will be 
increasingly employed over the medium term. For the prime-age group, there is a 
relatively greater importance of higher-level occupations (managers, professionals 
and associate professionals). Among the older age group, higher-level occupations 
are important, but there is also a relatively high percentage of people employed in 
personal service occupations and the importance of sales occupations is less 
important both currently and over the medium term. 
 
Figure 7.20 shows the change in occupational employment for each age group over 
the medium term. Between 2008 and 2013, there are several occupations where  
the number of people will fall quite sharply: elementary occupations; administrative 
and secretarial, and skilled trades. These will continue to show employment decline 
over the later period. For younger people, it is the fall in employment in elementary 
occupations which is greatest, but this will be compensated for over the 2013-20 
period by an increase in demand for people to work in sales occupations. Among the 
prime-age group, there is also a fall in elementary occupation employment but also 
heavy losses in skilled trades and administrative and secretarial occupations. These 
falls in employment are compensated by an increase in the demand for people to 
work in higher-level occupations, personal service and sales occupations where 
strong growth is expected in the 2013-20 period. The profile of older workers‟ 
occupational change is similar to that of prime-aged workers, but their recovery  
in employment is much more dependent upon personal service occupations in  
the later period. 
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Figure 7.19 Occupational employment by age 
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Notes: Data are shown in thousands. 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
(b) 24-49 year olds 
(c) 50-64/59 year olds 
 
(d) 65+/60+ year olds 
 
(a) 16-24 year olds  
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Figure 7.20 Changes in employment by occupation by age group  
 
 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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The baseline projections suggest that the employment levels for all age groups  
will recover their pre-recession employment levels by around 2016. There are, as 
Chapter 4 revealed, many uncertainties attached to future employment trends by 
age, especially over the short term, though a return to the trend is expected over the 
medium term. The short-term uncertainties relate to: 
 
 the employment of young people at a time when employers may be curtailing or 
reducing their intake of trainees. The projection demonstrates that the 
employment of young people is particularly dependent upon the distribution, 
transport, etc sector – which includes retail, wholesale, hospitality – and sales 
occupations. These are sectors and occupations which are particularly sensitive 
to the recession in so far as they are dependent upon household spending, and 
 
 the employment of older people, which appears to be relatively concentrated in 
non-marketed services (which includes the public sector) and personal service 
occupations. The sectoral/occupational mix of employment for this age group 
may result in it being sensitive to changes to public expenditure. 
 
A further factor which is difficult to take into account is the uncertainty attached to 
pensions and retirement ages. If pensions policy raises the retirement age, then this 
will increase labour supply further over the medium term, which may have an impact 
on employers‟ hiring practices. This is because if people stay on at work for longer, 
employers will therefore need to recruit fewer people, other things being equal. 
 
7.7 Projections of employment by disability status 
The projections of employment of disabled people have been produced by 
apportioning the number of people who will fall into each category of disability and 
should be treated as indicative. 
 
Medium-term employment prospects 
The projections of employment for disabled people considers three groups: 
 
i.  Those people who report that they have a work-limiting disability (WL) and  
are classified as disabled according to the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 
(DDA and WL). 
 
ii.  Those people who are classified as disabled according to the DDA but who  
do not report a work-limiting disability (DDA only). 
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iii.  Those people who report that they have a work-limiting disability but are not 
DDA disabled (WL only). 
 
A comparison is also provided with people who are not disabled. 
 
The projections are based on the proportion of people who report a disability in the 
LFS. Due to the relatively small size of the sample of people who report a disability  
of one kind or another, a degree of caution is required in the interpretation of the 
projections. A further caveat relates to policy. The recent past – as Chapter 5 on 
disabled people demonstrated – has been focused on providing incentives for people 
who qualify for Incapacity Benefit to enter employment. The projections are based on 
the current policy position.  
 
Table 7.5 shows the projected change in employment of disabled people to the year 
2020. It reveals that the employment of disabled people will decline a little more 
slowly in the period to 2013 and thereafter increase a little more quickly to 2020,  
but the differences with the non-disabled group are negligibly small. 
 
A longer-term perspective of disabled people‟s employment is provided in Figure 
7.21. This reveals a number of trends: 
 
 There is a long-run decline in the number of people who report only a work-
limited disability. The recession accelerates the decline in the number of people 
in this category, but by the end of the forecast period, the number of people with 
a work-limiting disability in employment is lower than in the early 2000s. 
 
 There was a marked increase in the number of people who were in employment 
and who were recorded as disabled according to the DDA. In the forecast 
period, the level of growth is expected to decrease. In part this is a product of 
the economic modelling, which assumes that the proportion of people classified 
as disabled remains more or less constant. If, however, labour demand is 
sluggish over the forecast period and if some employers regard hiring disabled 
people as being relatively costly, it is unlikely that the sharp increase in 
employment of disabled people (according to the DDA) will continue over the 
2008-13 period. 
 
 There is little difference between men and women in the projections. 
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Table 7.5 Employment outlook for disabled people 
 
Thousands 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Total employment 29,053 30,738 29,751 30,898 
  DDA & WL 1,455 1,658 1,615 1,694 
  DDA only 1,188 1,678 1,625 1,690 
  WL only 903 838 815 852 
  Non-disabled 25,507 26,564 25,695 26,662 
Full-time DDA & WL 745 743 712 729 
  DDA only 737 977 946 958 
  WL only 520 451 432 442 
  Non-disabled 15,776 16,041 15,369 15,726 
Part-time DDA & WL 475 634 613 688 
  DDA only 321 485 436 519 
  WL only 247 267 292 292 
  Non-disabled 6,708 7,045 6,846 7,505 
Self-employed DDA & WL 235 280 264 277 
  DDA only 131 216 162 212 
  WL only 136 121 134 119 
  Non-disabled 3,022 3,478 3,237 3,431 
    
AAGR (%)  2001-08 2008-13 2013-20 
Total employment    
  DDA & WL 1.9 -0.5 0.7 
  DDA only 5.1 -0.6 0.6 
  WL only -1.1 -0.6 0.6 
  Non-disabled 0.6 -0.7 0.5 
Full-time DDA & WL 0.0 -0.8 0.3 
  DDA only 4.1 -0.8 0.3 
  WL only -2.0 -0.9 0.3 
  Non-disabled 0.2 -0.9 0.3 
Part-time DDA & WL 4.2 -0.7 1.7 
  DDA only 6.1 -2.1 2.5 
  WL only 1.1 1.8 0.0 
  Non-disabled 0.7 -0.6 1.3 
Self-employed DDA & WL 2.6 -1.2 0.7 
  DDA only 7.4 -5.6 3.9 
  WL only -1.6 2.1 -1.7 
  Non-disabled 2.0 -1.4 0.8 
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Table 7.5 Employment outlook for disabled people (continued) 
 
Share of employment 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Total employment     
  DDA & WL 5.0 5.4 5.4 5.5 
  DDA only 4.1 5.5 5.5 5.5 
  WL only 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.8 
  Non-disabled 87.8 86.4 86.4 86.3 
Full-time DDA & WL 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 
  DDA only 4.1 5.4 5.4 5.4 
  WL only 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 
  Non-disabled 88.7 88.1 88.1 88.1 
Part-time DDA & WL 6.1 7.5 7.5 7.6 
  DDA only 4.1 5.8 5.3 5.8 
  WL only 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.2 
  Non-disabled 86.5 83.6 83.6 83.4 
Self-employed DDA & WL 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 
  DDA only 3.7 5.3 4.3 5.3 
  WL only 3.8 3.0 3.5 2.9 
  Non-disabled 85.8 84.9 85.3 84.9 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.21 Employment by disability status, 1998-2020 
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(c) Women 
-1,500
500
2,500
4,500
6,500
8,500
10,500
12,500
14,500
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
D
is
ab
le
d
 e
m
p
lo
ym
e
n
t 
(0
0
0
s)
DDA & Work-limiting disability DDA disabled only Work-limiting disability only Non-disabled
N
o
n
-d
isab
le
d
e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t (000s)
N
o
n
-d
isab
le
d
e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t (000s)
N
o
n
-d
isab
le
d
e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t (000s)
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
A set of alternative assumptions about employment over the recovery period are 
shown in Figure 7.22. These scenarios assume the following: 
 
 Baseline – baseline estimates produced by the IER model. 
 
 Scenario A – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is the 
same as that in the baseline projections but growth after the bottom is equal to 
that between 1998-2000. 
 
 Scenario B – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is equal 
to twice the percentage drop given in the baseline projections. The growth rate 
after the recession is also equal to that in the baseline. 
 
 Scenario C – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is equal 
to twice the percentage drop given in the baseline projections with the growth 
rate after the recession equal to that between 1998-2000. 
 
The series for the disability classifications used here begins only in 1998 after the 
LFS fully incorporated the implementation of the DDA. For this reason it is not 
PROJECTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 139 
possible to observe changes in employment for the disabled versus non-disabled 
groups in previous recessions. The alternative scenarios differ from those seen 
earlier in terms of both the decrease in employment between 2008 and the  
bottom of the recession and the growth rate over the recovery period. In all the 
different scenarios, the pre-recession levels of employment will revert to their  
long-run growth rate.  
 
Figure 7.22 Alternative medium-term trends: disability 
 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
(b) DDA disability only 
(c) Work-limiting disability only 
 
(d) Non-disabled 
(a) DDA & Work-limiting disability 
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Sectoral employment prospects 
Figure 7.23 shows the project level of sectoral change to 2020. It is apparent that 
there is little difference in the sectoral distribution of jobs either historically or over  
the forecast period between the employment of disabled and non-disabled people, 
the exception being the relatively greater reliance upon non-marketed services  
for the employment of disabled people. But as Figure 7.24 shows, it will be in 
business and financial services where there will be the greatest gain in employment 
for disabled people. 
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Figure 7.23 Sectoral employment by disability status 
 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
 Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.24 Changes in employment by sector and disability 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Occupational employment prospects 
Figure 7.25 shows the projected change in occupational employment to 2020.  
The overall pattern of change for disabled people is the same as for the population 
generally: a growth in higher-level occupations and sales and personal service 
occupations and a decline in administrative and secretarial, process plant and 
(b) DDA disability only 
(c) Work-limiting disability only 
 
(d) Non-disabled 
 
(a) DDA & Work-limiting disability 
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machinery, and elementary occupations. What is of interest is the relative distribution 
of disabled people across occupations. A number of features are apparent: 
 
 Those who are classified as disabled according to the DDA but who do not 
report a work-limiting disability share an occupational profile similar to that of 
non-disabled people. 
 
 Those who report a work-limiting disability are slightly less likely to be employed 
in higher-level occupations and more likely to be employed in elementary 
occupations. 
 
 There has been a particularly sharp drop in the number of people with a  
work-limiting disability working in skilled trades between 2001 and 2008  
but this decline is expected to become less sharp over the forecast period. 
 
Figure 7.26 shows the extent of change by occupation over the forecast period and 
shows that it is in the post-2013 period that employment will show anything other 
than negligible growth in any occupation.  
 
Overall, the projections of employment for disabled people reveal a slowing of the 
relatively rapid growth in their employment observed over recent years, but over  
the medium term, employment levels gradually return to their pre-recession level. 
Overall, the employment position of disabled people does not differ much from non-
disabled people over the forecast period. But as Chapter 5 demonstrates, disabled 
people have lower participation rates. The recession potentially slows the progress 
towards improving the participation rates of disabled people if there are fewer work 
opportunities in the labour market. 
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Figure 7.25 Occupational employment by disability status 
 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.26 Changes in employment by occupation by disability status  
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
(b) DDA disability only 
(c) Work-limiting disability only 
 
(d) Non-disabled 
 
(a) DDA & Work-limiting disability 
THE EQUALITY IMPACTS OF THE CURRENT RECESSION 
 
 146 
7.8 Projections of employment by ethnic group 
The projections of employment by ethnic group have been produced by apportioning 
the number of people who fall into each group and should be treated as indicative. 
 
Employment growth over the medium term 
The employment projections presented in Table 7.6 are for five broad ethnic 
groupings: White people, Black people, Indian people, Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
people taken together, and people from „Other‟ ethnic groups (which includes 
Chinese people). Overall, employment grew by over four million between 1993 and 
2008, but is projected to increase by only 160,000 between 2008 and 2020. Over the 
period 1993 to 2008, the number of White people in work grew by 2.6 million, while 
the minority workforce grew by around 1.5 million.  
 
White people will account for the majority of employment growth over the period 2008 
to 2020, and will account for just over a million of the increase of 1.25 million in total 
employment between 2013 and 2020. Between 2008 and 2013, total employment is 
projected to decline by just under one million while the number of White people in 
employment is projected to fall by just over 900,000. Figure 7.27a shows that 
following the end of the early 1990s recession, employment for all ethnic groups 
increased strongly in the 1990s, with the increase slowing down after 2001. The 
recession started in 2008, with a sharp decline in employment for all ethnic groups 
during 2008-09. The decline in employment is projected to end in 2010, and after a 
short period of stagnation, will be followed by growth from 2012 onwards. The trend 
in employment for males over the period 1993 to 2020 (Figure 7.27b) is very similar 
to the trend in overall employment, but with perhaps a slightly stronger rebound from 
the recession after 2010.  
 
Black employment more than doubled between 1993 and 2008, but is projected to be 
only 8,000 higher in 2020 than 2008, after a decline of 19,000 between 2008 and 
2013. Indian employment nearly doubled between 1993 and 2008, but is projected to 
decline by 8,000 between 2013 and 2020, after a loss of 18,000 jobs between 2008 
and 2013. Pakistani and Bangladeshi employment nearly trebled between 1993 and 
2008, but in the next 12 years is projected to increase by only 18,000. The loss of 
9,000 jobs between 2008 and 2013 is followed by a gain of 27,000 between 2013 
and 2020. Employment of „Other‟ people more than quadrupled between 1993 and 
2008 but is projected to increase by only 19,000 between 2008 and 2020, following  
a projected decline of 28,000 between 2008 and 2013. 
 
Annual rates of employment increase for ethnic minority groups were extremely high 
in the 1990s (for example, 6.2 per cent for Black, 7.8 per cent for Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis, and 8.3 per cent for the „Other‟ ethnic group). Rates of employment 
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growth remained high during 2001-08 for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic 
group, and reached 11.6 per cent for the „Other‟ ethnic group. Annual rates of 
employment change for full-time and part-time employees and the self-employed 
were even higher. The annual average rate of employment loss was smaller than 
average for people from the „Other‟ and Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups 
(and slightly slower for Black people).  
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Table 7.6 Employment outlook for ethnic minorities 
Thousands 1993           2001    2008         2013           2020 
Total employment 26,441 29,053 30,738 29,751 30,898 
  White 25,348 27,300 27,949 27,038 28.060 
  Black 320 517 651 632 659 
  Indian 367 476 658 637 662 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 153 280 442 433 460 
  Other 253 480 1,038 1,010 1,057 
Full-time White 15,337 16,730 16,537 15,845 16,212 
  Black 223 337 411 394 403 
  Indian 231 290 434 417 427 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 82 141 206 197 202 
  Other 159 280 623 597 611 
Part-time White 6,509 7,271 7,680 7,623 8,165 
  Black 75 139 173 174 190 
  Indian 62 123 150 151 165 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 33 85 147 152 172 
  Other 50 135 290 283 312 
Self-employed White 3,501 3,299 3,731 3,571 3,583 
  Black 22 41 67 64 66 
  Indian 75 63 73 69 71 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 38 55 89 84 85 
  Other 41 65 135 130 134 
AAGR (%)  1993-2001 2001-08 2008-13          2013-20 
Total employment  1.2 0.8 -0.7 0.5 
  White  0.9 0.3 -0.7 0.5 
  Black  6.2 3.4 -0.6 0.6 
  Indian  3.3 4.7 -0.7 0.6 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi  2.8 6.8 -0.4 0.9 
  Other  8.3 11.6 -0.5 0.7 
Full-time White  1.1 -0.2 -0.9 0.3 
  Black  5.3 2.9 -0.8 0.3 
  Indian  2.9 6.0 -0.9 0.3 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi  7.1 5.5 -0.9 0.3 
  Other  7.3 12.1 -0.8 0.3 
Part-time White  1.4 0.8 -0.1 1.0 
  Black  8.0 3.3 0.1 1.2 
  Indian  9.0 2.9 0.1 1.2 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi  12.2 8.4 0.6 1.8 
  Other  13.2 10.9 0.2 1.4 
Self-employed White  -0.7 1.8 -0.9 0.4 
  Black  7.9 7.3 -0.9 0.4 
  Indian  -2.1 2.0 -1.0 0.4 
Pakistani-Bangladeshi  4.7 7.1 -1.1 0.3 
  Other  5.1 11.1 -0.9 0.5 
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Table 7.6 Employment outlook for ethnic minorities (continued) 
 
Share of employment 1993                2001            2008                2013                 2020 
Total employment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  White 95.9 94.0 90.9 90.9 90.8 
  Black 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 
  Indian 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Pakistani-Bangladeshi 0.6  1.0 1.4 1.5 1.1 
  Other 1.0 1.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 
Full-time White 95.7 94.1 90.8 90.8 90.8 
  Black 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 
  Indian 1.4 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Pakistani-Bangladeshi 0.5  0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 
  Other 1.0 1.6 3.4 3.4 3.4 
Part-time White 96.7 93.8 91.1 90.9 90.7 
  Black 1.1 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 
  Indian 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Pakistani-Bangladeshi 0.5  1.1 1.7 1.8 1.9 
  Other 0.7 1.7 3.3 3.4 3.5 
Self-employed White 95.1 93.6 91.1 91.1 91.2 
  Black 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 
  Indian 2.0. 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 
Pakistani-Bangladeshi 1.0  1.6 2.2 2.1 2.1 
  Other 1.2 1.8 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.27 Employment by ethnic group, 1992-2020 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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In the recovery of 2013-20, employment is projected to increase fastest for people 
from the „Other‟ and Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups.  
 
The share of White people in total employment declined slowly during the 1990s, but 
fell from 94.0 per cent to 90.9 per cent over the seven years from 2001 to 2008. The 
share of Black people in employment grew from 1.2 per cent in 1993 to 2.1 per cent 
in 2008, while over the same period, the share of Indian people grew from 1.4 to 2.1 
per cent, that of Pakistani and Bangladeshi people increased from 0.5 to 1.1 per cent 
and the share of people from „Other‟ ethnic groups increased from 1.0 per cent to  
3.4 per cent. The projection methodology assumes that these shares would remain 
constant over the period 2008 to 2020, and hence they overestimate future White 
employment and underestimate employment for ethnic minority groups. It should be 
noted that no account is taken of migration in the projection methodology. 
 
The share of White people in part-time employment was higher than their share of 
full-time employment over the period 1993 to 2008, but by 2020 these shares are 
equal. These estimates indicate that people from ethnic minority groups appear to  
be more likely to work full-time than part-time. White people formed 95.1 per cent  
of the self-employed in 1993, and 91.1 per cent of this group in 2008, while their 
numbers of self-employed grew from 3.5 to 3.7 million over the period 1993 to 2008 
and is projected to fall slightly by 2020. The share of Indian people fell from two per 
cent in 1993 to 1.8 per cent in 2008. However, the relative share of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi people more than doubled over this period, from one per cent in 1993  
to 2.2 per cent in 2008. The share of Black people increased from 0.6 per cent to  
1.6 per cent, while that of people from „Other‟ ethnic groups increased from 1.2 to  
3.3 per cent over the same period. 
 
A set of alternative assumptions about employment over the recovery period  
are shown in Figure 7.28. There are some differences between the ethnic groups  
in terms of the assumptions underlying each of the three alternative scenarios  
as follows: 
 
 Baseline – baseline estimates produced by the IER model. 
 
 Scenario A – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is the 
same as that in the baseline projections, but growth after the bottom is equal  
to that in the recovery phase of the early 1990s recession. 
 
 Scenario B – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is equal 
to the decrease observed in the recession of the early 1990s for all groups 
except Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi. For these two groups, the decline in 
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employment for this scenario is assumed to be twice the percentage drop given 
in the baseline projections. The growth rate after the recession is also equal to 
that in the baseline projections. 
 
 Scenario C – the drop between 2008 and the bottom of the recession is the 
same as that developed in Scenario B while the growth rate after recession is 
equal to that of the 1990s recession recovery period. 
 
In those scenarios where the rate of growth in the recovery period of the current 
recession is set equal to that observed in the early 1990s recession (Scenarios A  
and C), this rate is set back to the value underlying the baseline projections once the 
pre-recession level of employment is re-established. The alternative assumptions 
suggest that a relatively deep recession followed by a relatively weak recovery in 
employment will affect non-White groups more than White ones. 
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Figure 7.28 Alternative medium-term trends: ethnicity 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Sectoral employment prospects  
Figure 7.29 presents the percentage of employment in each of six industry sectors  
by each of the five ethnic groupings used in this report for 1993, 2001, 2008, 2013 
and 2020.  
 
Figure 7.29 Sectoral employment by ethnic group 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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As Figure 7.29 shows, for White people, there is a clear trend for a falling share of 
employment in the manufacturing industry and increasing shares of employment  
in business and other services and non-marketed services. The shift from 
manufacturing to services shows signs of moderating after 2008. 
 
A smaller percentage of Black than White people worked in manufacturing in 1993, 
but even so there has been a similar shift away. There was a rapid increase in the 
share in business and other services in the 1990s, but the growth in the share of this 
sector is projected to slow after 2008. In 1993, over a third of Black people worked  
in non-marketed services; this percentage was lower in 2001, but has since grown 
steadily, being projected to approach a third again in 2020. This share is much higher 
than for White people. 
 
For Indian people, the percentage of employment in manufacturing has declined from 
a peak of over 20 per cent in 1993 to well under 10 per cent in 2008, and is expected 
subsequently to decline. Distribution, transport, etc (which includes the restaurant 
trade) accounted for nearly two-fifths of Indians in work in 1993, but is projected to 
decline to a third from 2008 onwards. There has been steady growth in the share 
working in business and other services, which are projected nearly to account for as 
large a share as the distribution, transport etc sector in 2020. The share of workers in 
non-marketed services has grown slowly during the period and is projected to reach 
nearly a quarter in 2020. 
 
Turning to Pakistani and Bangladeshi people, the most striking feature is the 
dominance of the distribution, transport etc sector. This accounts for more than half 
of employment throughout the period 1993 to 2020. As is the case for other ethnic 
groups, there is a shift from manufacturing employment towards service sector 
employment. The share of manufacturing employment is projected to fall from a fifth 
in 1993 to around five per cent in 2020. The shares of employment in both business 
and other services and non-marketed services were very low in 1993. Both are 
expected to grow steadily over the period 1993 to 2020, but still to account for less 
than a quarter and less than a fifth of employment respectively in 2020. 
 
People from the „Other‟ ethnic group display a very distinctive pattern of occupational 
employment change. Distribution, transport etc accounted for two-fifths of 
employment in 1993, but declined in relative importance subsequently, and is 
projected to account for just over a third of employees by 2020. This remained the 
largest sector of employment, just ahead of business and other services, which is 
expected to increase its share from around a quarter in 1993 to nearly a third in 
2020. The „Other‟ share of employment in non-marketed services is projected to 
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increase very slowly between 1993 and 2020, ending at accounting for just over a 
quarter of employment. 
 
Figure 7.30 Changes in sectoral employment by ethnic group 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
PROJECTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 157 
Occupational employment prospects 
Figure 7.31 presents the percentage of employment in each of nine major groups in 
the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) by each of the five ethnic groupings 
used in this report for 1993, 2001, 2008, 2013 and 2020. For White people, a shift 
from less to more skilled and from manual to non-manual occupations is apparent 
over this period. This shift is fairly consistent throughout the period described. Growth 
in employment shares is projected to be strong for managers and senior officials, 
professionals and associate professionals, and in personal service occupations,  
and less strong in sales and customer service occupations. There is expected to  
be a shift away from administrative and secretarial occupations, skilled trades 
occupations, process, plant and machine operatives, and (especially) elementary 
occupations. By 2020, the largest SOC major group is expected to be managers  
and senior officials. 
 
The same trends are apparent for Black people, but the occupational shifts are  
more exaggerated. In 1993, the largest occupational category was elementary 
occupations, accounting for over a fifth of Black workers. This is projected to decline 
to under 10 per cent by 2020. The most rapid increases in employment shares are 
displayed by personal service occupations and sales and customer service 
occupations. It is projected that by 2020 the two largest occupational groups for 
Black people will be associate professional and technical occupations and personal 
service occupations. 
 
The pattern of changing occupational shares of employment is more complex for 
Indian people. The share of managers and senior officials in total employment barely 
is expected to change little over the period 1993 to 2020, but that of professional 
occupations to increase rapidly, becoming the largest occupation and accounting for 
nearly a quarter of all workers in 2020. There is a less marked increase in associate 
professional and technical occupations. The shares of employment in skilled trades 
occupations and process, plant and machine operatives both declined rapidly in the 
1990s, thereafter continuing to decline at a slower rate. Personal service and sales 
and customer service occupations both increased their share of employment, but this 
increase is projected to be quite slow after 2008. The percentage of workers in 
elementary occupations declines more slowly than for most other ethnic groups. 
 
For Pakistani and Bangladeshi people, the share of managers and senior officials  
is projected to decline overall between 2001 and 2020. However, this percentage 
increases between 2008 and 2020. The share of professionals and associate 
professional and technical occupations is expected to increase, but the largest 
increase in employment share is projected to be for sales and customer service 
occupations. In 1993, the largest occupational groups were process, plant and 
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machine operatives, managers and senior officials, and skilled trades occupations, 
but the largest occupations in 2020 are projected to be process, plant and machine 
operatives and sales and customer service occupations, followed by managers and 
senior officials. Skilled trades occupations are expected to decline strongly over the 
period 1993 to 2020, while the share in elementary occupations first increased during 
the 1990s but is projected to decline slowly. 
 
For people from „Other‟ ethnic groups, it is projected that the share of managers and 
senior officials and professional occupations in total employment will increase slowly 
between 1993 and 2020, but more quickly for the share of associate professional and 
technical occupations. The largest occupational groupings are expected to be SOC 
major groups 1 to 3 throughout this period, and associate professional and technical 
occupations are projected to be the largest occupational category for this ethnic 
group in 2020. While the shares of employment in personal service and sales and 
customer service occupations are expected to grow steadily over the period, the 
share of employment in administrative and secretarial occupations is expected to 
decline faster than that of elementary occupations. The share of employment in 
skilled and semi-skilled manual jobs is expected to remain fairly constant over the 
period 1993 to 2020. 
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Figure 7.31 Occupational employment by ethnic group 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission. 
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Figure 7.32 Changes in occupational employment by ethnic group 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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7.9 The impact on employment and unemployment rates for particular groups 
The unemployment rates projected over the medium-term are presented in Table 7.7. 
The model from which the employment projections were derived is a demand side 
one. The determinants of the unemployment rate include a number of supply-side 
factors, so the projections of future unemployment should be treated with great 
caution. The projections of unemployment are based on the share of unemployment 
accounted for by each group in 2008 and held constant over the period to 2020. 
Hence the projections are crude indicators of what might happen and should be 
treated accordingly. For some groups, the projections suggest that unemployment 
will rise quite sharply over the short term but even by 2020, the unemployment rate 
for all groups will not have recovered to its pre-recession level. 
 
Table 7.7 Projected unemployment rates, 2008-20 
 
 Per cent: 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
All 2.8 5.1 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.3 
Male 3.1 5.6 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.8 6.5 7.4 6.1 6.0 5.7 
Female 2.5 4.5 5.8 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.0 4.9 4.7 
White 2.5 4.6 6.0 5.1 6.2 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.8 
Black 6.8 11.9 15.2 15.5 15.6 15.2 14.8 14.4 13.9 13.6 13.0 12.7 12.3 
Indian 3.7 6.7 8.7 8.9 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.2 7.9 7.7 7.4 7.2 7.0 
Pakistani/ 
Bangladeshi 
6.7 11.8 15.0 15.3 15.4 14.9 14.5 14.1 13.5 13.2 12.6 12.3 11.9 
Other 5.1 9.1 11.7 12.0 12.1 11.7 11.4 11.1 10.6 10.4 9.9 9.7 9.4 
1-24 7.5 13.0 16.5 16.8 16.9 16.4 15.9 15.5 14.9 14.5 13.9 13.6 13.1 
25-49 2.1 3.9 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.1 
50-64/59 1.7 3.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 
65+/60+ 0.8 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 
DDA &  
Work-limiting 
disability 
6.0 10.6 13.6 13.9 14.0 13.6 13.2 12.9 12.4 12.1 11.5 11.3 10.9 
DDA  
disability only 
2.0 3.6 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.8 
Work-limiting 
disability only 
5.1 9.0 11.7 11.9 12.0 11.6 11.3 11.0 10.6 10.3 9.9 9.7 9.3 
Non-disabled 2.5 4.6 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.1 5.0 4.8 
Source:  Source: Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and Human Rights 
     Commission. 
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7.10 Conclusion 
The projections presented in this chapter give an insight into how employment levels 
are likely to change over the course of the recession and during the recovery period. 
In aggregate, the impact upon employment is projected to be less damaging than 
that of the two previous recessions. In part, this stems from the economic stimulus 
packages put in place by governments across the world. But there remains great 
uncertainty about the recession and its impact over the short term. For instance, 
some commentators are concerned about the prospect of deflation (the fall in the real 
price of various consumer goods and wages) while others are uneasy about the 
prospect of rising inflation resulting from the increase in money supply (quantitative 
easing). For the time being, the pace of change in the economy is such that there is 
much uncertainty about the timing and pace of the recovery. 
 
In summary, the projections of future employment reveal the following points: 
 
 The nature of change in the labour market is skills biased. There has been,  
and there is expected to be, a growth in jobs in those occupations where the 
incumbents are highly skilled and qualified. Even in some of the less-skilled jobs 
in the economy, where growth is expected over the medium term, the minimum 
qualification for entry has been rising. So for those individuals in society who do 
not possess the skills and qualifications to gain entry to those occupations 
which are expected to grow over the medium term, their labour market 
prospects are likely to worsen. 
 
 Many of the groups with which this report is concerned have experienced an 
improved labour market position over recent years (for example, rising levels of 
economic activity and employment). The recession is likely to slow the pace at 
which these groups have improved their relative position, but over the medium 
term they are expected to recover their pre-recession levels. In other words,  
the projections suggest that the recession will slow, not stop, the movement 
towards increased levels of equality. 
 
 The pace at which various groups will recover their pre-recession position in  
the labour market depends upon the timing and the speed of the recovery. The 
baseline projections suggest that pre-recession levels of employment for nearly 
all groups will be recovered around about 2015-16. 
 
 For some groups, there is a relatively high dependence upon employment in 
non-marketed services, which includes the public sector. Within the forecasts, 
assumptions have been made about levels of government borrowing and the 
implications of this for public sector employment. The level of government 
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borrowing is dependent upon the extent of the bail-out of the financial services 
sector and the degree to which government can recover the money it has 
invested to date. Much uncertainty surrounds public expenditure for the time 
being and thereby the implications for public sector employment. As noted 
elsewhere in this report, the equality, diversity and work-life balance agenda  
is often much more established in the public sector. 
 
 The impact of the recession will be felt unevenly across Great Britain. London 
and the South East are expected to show a faster rate of recovery from the 
recession and this is likely to have an impact upon the employment of some 
ethnic minority groups which are disproportionately located in these regions. 
Wales and Scotland are projected to show the weakest rates of growth over  
the medium term. 
 
 The possible exception to the above relates to young people and the prospect 
that a cohort effect will arise whereby those people who were young during the 
current recession suffer continued disadvantage throughout their working lives 
because of the difficulties they encounter entering the labour market. This may 
become even more of a problem if, during the period of weakened labour 
demand, pensions policy leads more people to retire later thereby increasing 
the supply of labour. 
 
The above points are based on the projections of employment conducted as part of 
this study. It ought to be taken in account that there are a range of qualitative 
changes in employment which the previous chapters have identified. 
THE EQUALITY IMPACTS OF THE CURRENT RECESSION 
 
 164 
8. Projections of employment by nation 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Having outlined projections of employment for Great Britain (GB) in Chapter 7, this 
chapter presents and describes comparable sub-national estimates for England, 
Scotland, Wales and London.  
 
The same methodology and assumptions were used to prepare the GB and sub-
national estimates. Thus these projections are also based on the forecast by 
Cambridge Econometrics (CE) for the UK economy – and its nations and regions – 
from February 2009. Similarly, the employment projections by gender, age, ethnic 
group and disability have been produced by Institute of Employment Rights (IER) by 
apportioning the changing shares of total employment, occupational and sectoral 
employment for each of these groups based on historical data from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS).  
 
As in the case of the GB-wide projections, the estimates should be viewed with 
caution. All the caveats to the GB-wide projections outlined in section 7.3 apply to the 
sub-national projections as well; in addition, for the sub-national estimates, a stronger 
caveat applies given the higher level of disaggregation which is being undertaken. 
 
8.2 Overall trends 
Table 8.1 presents the overall trends in employment by country and London. In 
England, employment increased from 19.0 million in 1993 to 20.6 million in 2001  
and 21.9 million in 2008. It is projected to decline by nearly 700,000 by 2013, after 
which employment will recover to be 100,000 higher than 2008 levels by 2020.  
For Scotland, the pattern is very similar, but employment is not expected to recover 
to 2008 levels. In Wales, the recovery after 2013 is also weaker than in England. 
London contrasts strongly with the remainder of Great Britain, gaining 900,000 jobs 
between 1993 and 2008, then projected to lose 150,000 jobs between 2008 and 
2013, but ending the projection period with employment a quarter of a million higher 
than in 2013. 
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Table 8.1 Sub-national employment totals, 1993-2020 
 
000s 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
England 19,029 20,651 21,924 21,235 22,034 
Male 10,007 10,990 11,602 11,226 11,706 
Female 9,023 9,661 10,322 10,009 10,327 
Scotland 2,387 2,559 2,715 2,624 2,673 
Male 1,239 1,322 1,403 1,362 1,403 
Female 1,148 1,237 1,311 1,262 1,270 
Wales 1,208 1,261 1,388 1,327 1,373 
Male 627 674 729 698 730 
Female 581 587 659 629 643 
London 3,817 4,582 4,712 4,564 4,817 
Male 2,087 2,520 2,584 2,511 2,677 
Female 1,730 2,062 2,127 2,054 2,141 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Actual and projected annual rates of employment change vary considerably over  
time and between the countries of Great Britain and London (Table 8.2). In England, 
employment increased by one per cent per annum during 1993 to 2001, slowing 
slightly during 2001-08. Employment grew more slowly in Scotland and only  
half as fast in Wales during the 1990s, and while Scottish employment growth 
continued at the same rate after 2001, it accelerated dramatically in Wales. In 
London, employment grew at 2.3 per cent per annum during the 1990s, but by  
only 0.4 per cent between 2001 and 2008. Projected employment decline during 
2008 to 2013 is much faster in Wales than in the other parts of the country. The 
recovery of employment during 2013 to 2020 is projected to be fastest in London  
and slowest in Scotland. 
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Table 8.2 Sub-national annual rates of employment change, 1993-2020 
 
AAGR (%) 1993-2001 2001-08 2008-13 2013-20 
England 1.03 0.86 -0.64 0.53 
Male 1.18 0.78 -0.66 0.60 
Female 0.86 0.95 -0.61 0.45 
Scotland 0.87 0.85 -0.67 0.26 
Male  0.81 0.86 -0.59 0.42 
Female 0.94 0.83 -0.76 0.09 
Wales 0.54 1.38 -0.89 0.48 
Male  0.90 1.13 -0.86 0.63 
Female 0.14 1.65 -0.92 0.32 
London 2.31 0.40 -0.63 0.77 
Male  2.38 0.36 -0.58 0.92 
Female 2.22 0.44 -0.70 0.60 
Notes:       AAGR = annual average percentage growth. 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
8.3 Gender 
As Table 8.2 also shows, rates of employment change by gender fluctuate 
considerably over time and space. In general, male employment grew faster than 
female employment between 1993 and 2001 (the exception being Scotland) while 
female employment grew faster than male between 2001 and 2008 (Scotland again 
excepted). During 2008 to 2013, women‟s employment is projected to decline faster 
than male employment in all areas except England. The projected recovery of 
employment during 2013 to 2020 is projected to be faster for men than for women. 
 
Over the period 1993-2008, there was very little change or a marginal shift in the 
gender balance of employment (Table 8.3). In England, the percentage of jobs filled 
by women was 0.3 per cent lower in 2008 than 1993. In Scotland, the percentage 
remained constant, with women forming 48.3 per cent of workers. In Wales, the 
female share of employment was 0.6 per cent lower in 2008 than 1993. The share  
of women in employment was lowest in London (45.1 per cent), declining by  
0.2 per cent over this 15-year period.  
 
Over the period 2008-20, the female share of employment is projected to decline by 
0.2 per cent in England, by 0.6 per cent in Scotland, by 0.8 per cent in Wales and by 
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0.6 per cent in London. London is projected to continue to have a smaller share of 
jobs filled by women than any of the countries of Great Britain, while the female 
employment share remains highest in Scotland. 
 
Table 8.3 Sub-national gender shares of employment, 1993-2020 
 
% 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
England      
Male 52.6 53.2 52.9 52.9 53.1 
Female 47.4 46.8 47.1 47.1 46.9 
Scotland      
Male  51.9 51.7 51.7 51.9 52.5 
Female 48.1 48.3 48.3 48.1 47.5 
Wales      
Male  51.9 53.4 52.5 52.6 53.2 
Female 48.1 46.6 47.5 47.4 46.8 
London      
Male  54.7 55.0 54.9 55.0 55.6 
Female 45.3 45.0 45.1 45.0 44.4 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
The sub-national pattern of employment change by occupation is presented in Figure 
8.1 for men and Figure 8.2 for women, using the major group level of the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) 2000. For men, the overall shift from manual to 
non-manual employment is experienced in all four divisions of Great Britain. In 
England as a whole, employment in SOC major groups 1 to 3 was just under  
two-fifths of all employment in 1993, and is projected to nearly reach a half of all 
employment by 2020. Employment in skilled trades occupations contracted most 
substantially and semi-skilled and unskilled manual jobs is projected to comprise 
under a fifth of the total in 2020. The contraction of semi-skilled and unskilled manual 
employment is less pronounced in Wales and Scotland, and nearly a quarter of men 
are projected to be working in such jobs in 2020. The growth in the employment 
share for SOC major groups 1 to 3 is projected to be faster for Wales than for 
Scotland and England. In London, the shift from manual to non-manual employment 
is much stronger than for other parts of Britain, with SOC major groups 1 to 3 
accounting for over 40 per cent of employment in 1993 but projected to form almost 
two-thirds of employment in 2020. The share of skilled trades occupations is lower 
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than elsewhere and semi-skilled and unskilled manual employment is projected to 
decline to under 15 per cent of the total by 2020. 
 
For women, the shifting balance of employment away from manual towards non-
manual employment is also in evidence, but there is also a shift from employment in 
administrative and secretarial employment towards personal service and sales and 
customer service occupations. For England, the share of employment in SOC major 
groups 8 and 9 is estimated to decline from just over a fifth in 1993 to under a tenth 
in 2020. The decline of employment in these occupations is projected to be slightly 
faster in both Wales and Scotland. In London, their predicted decline is slower as 
they formed a much smaller percentage of total female employment in 1993, while 
they are projected to decline to form much less than a tenth of the total in 2020.  
For England, SOC major groups 1 to 3 increase their share of female employment 
from just over 30 per cent in 1993 to just over 40 per cent in 2020. Their increase in 
employment share is projected to be slightly faster in Scotland and slightly slower in 
Wales. However (and similar to the pattern for men), employment in these higher-
status non-manual occupations increases fastest in London, where they are 
projected to grow from two-fifths to three-fifths of female employment over the period 
1993 to 2020. In England, personal service and sales and customer service 
occupations are expected to double their share of female employment, accounting  
for 30 per cent of female employment in 2020. This trend is faster in Wales and 
slower in Scotland. In Wales, the projections suggest that over a third of women in 
employment will work in such jobs in 2020. The contraction of administrative and 
secretarial occupations is fastest in London and slowest in Scotland. 
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Figure 8.1 Sub-national male employment by occupation, 1993-2010 
a) England - male
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1993 2001 2008 2013 2020
Elementary Occupations
Process, Plant & Machine
Operatives
Sales and Customer Service
Occupations
Personal Service Occupations
Skilled Trades Occupations
Administrative and Secretarial
Occupations
Associate Professional &
Technical Occupations
Professional Occupations
Managers and Senior Officials
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c) Wales - male
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d) London - male
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Figure 8.2 Sub-national female employment by occupation, 1993-2010 
a) England - female
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b) Scotland - female
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c) Wales - female
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d) London - female
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
8.4 Age 
Table 8.4 presents the overall pattern of employment by age group in the countries of 
Great Britain and London over the period 1993 to 2020. The number of older people 
(aged over 60 for women and 65 for men) in employment will double in both England 
and Wales, but the increase will be much smaller in Scotland and London. The 
number of people aged 16-24 in employment will remain stable in three of the four, 
but will decline in London. The largest increases will occur in the pre-retirement age 
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group (aged from 50 to 59 for women and 64 for men), but this will be slowest in 
London. 
 
Table 8.4 Sub-national employment totals by age group, 1993-2020 
 
000s 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
England 19,029 20,651 21,924 21,235 22,034 
16-24 2,796 2,610 2,802 2,686 2,748 
25-49 12,007 12,408 12,611 12,262 12,787 
50-64/59 3,603 4,904 5,375 5,193 5,374 
65+/60+ 624 729 1,137 1,094 1,125 
Scotland 2,387 2,559 2,715 2,624 2,673 
16-24 363 337 345 326 323 
25-49 1,513 1,587 1,585 1,540 1,579 
50-64/59 438 559 664 643 656 
65+/60+ 74 76 121 115 116 
Wales 1,208 1,261 1,388 1,327 1,373 
16-24 197 159 185 174 176 
25-49 757 771 801 769 800 
50-64/59 219 284 328 314 325 
65+/60+ 35 47 74 70 72 
London 3,817 4,582 4,712 4,564 4,817 
16-24 518 584 498 472 483 
25-49 2,521 3,030 3,169 3,091 3,290 
50-64/59 653 824 855 823 860 
65+/60+ 125 144 189 179 184 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
For the period 1993 to 2001, the rate of employment growth was fastest for the pre-
retirement age group, while the number of people in employment above the formal 
retirement age increased fastest during 2001 to 2008 (Table 8.5). In England, Wales 
and Scotland, the number of 16-24 year olds in employment declined. Annual growth 
rates tended to be lower in London. All age groups are projected to lose employment 
during the period 2008 to 2013, but the rate of loss is fastest for 16-24 year olds and 
faster in England, Scotland and Wales than in London. Employment is projected to 
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increase in all age groups between 2013 and 2020, with the exception of 16-24 year 
olds in Scotland. 
 
Table 8.5 Sub-national annual rates of employment change by age group, 
1993-2020 
 
AAGR (%) 1993-2001 2001-08 2008-13 2013-20 
England 1.0 0.9 -0.6 0.5 
16-24 -0.9 1.0 -0.8 0.3 
25-49 0.4 0.2 -0.6 0.6 
50-64/59 3.9 1.3 -0.7 0.5 
65+/60+ 2.0 6.6 -0.8 0.4 
Scotland 0.9 0.8 -0.7 0.3 
16-24 -0.9 0.3 -1.1 -0.1 
25-49 0.6 0.0 -0.6 0.4 
50-64/59 3.1 2.5 -0.6 0.3 
65+/60+ 0.4 6.8 -0.9 0.1 
Wales 0.5 1.4 -0.9 0.5 
16-24 -2.6 2.1 -1.2 0.2 
25-49 0.2 0.6 -0.8 0.6 
50-64/59 3.3 2.1 -0.9 0.5 
65+/60+ 3.8 6.9 -1.0 0.4 
London 2.3 0.4 -0.6 0.8 
16-24 1.5 -2.3 -1.1 0.4 
25-49 2.3 0.6 -0.5 0.9 
50-64/59 2.9 0.5 -0.8 0.6 
65+/60+ 1.7 3.9 -1.0 0.4 
Notes:   AAGR = annual average percentage growth. 
 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Table 8.6 Sub-national employment shares by age group, 1993-2020 
 
%      1993       2001       2008       2013       2020 
England      
16-24 14.7 12.6 12.8 12.6 12.5 
25-49 63.1 60.1 57.5 57.7 58.0 
50-64/59 18.9 23.7 24.5 24.5 24.4 
65+/60+ 3.3 3.5 5.2 5.2 5.1 
Scotland      
16-24 15.2 13.2 12.7 12.4 12.1 
25-49 63.4 62.0 58.4 58.7 59.1 
50-64/59 18.3 21.8 24.5 24.5 24.5 
65+/60+ 3.1 3.0 4.4 4.4 4.3 
Wales      
16-24 16.3 12.6 13.3 13.1 12.8 
25-49 62.7 61.1 57.7 58.0 58.2 
50-64/59 18.1 22.5 23.6 23.7 23.7 
65+/60+ 2.9 3.7 5.3 5.3 5.3 
London      
16-24 13.6 12.8 10.6 10.3 10.0 
25-49 66.0 66.1 67.3 67.7 68.3 
50-64/59 17.1 18.0 18.2 18.0 17.9 
65+/60+ 3.3 3.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
The largest age group in employment is those of prime economically active age 
range (25 to 49 years), with the next largest those aged 50 to 59 or 64 (Table 8.6  
and Figure 8.3). There is little difference between England, Wales and Scotland in 
the share of 25 to 49 year olds in employment, which declined between 1993 and 
2008 in all three countries. In England, Scotland and Wales, the percentage of the 
employed aged 16-24 declined between 1993 and 2008, while the proportion of 
employees aged from 50 to retirement age increased from being just under a fifth of 
the total to around a quarter in 2008. The age breakdown of employment is projected 
to remain stable in all three countries after 2008. London has a larger share of the 
employed population aged 25-49 (around two-thirds) than England, Wales or 
Scotland, and this percentage is projected to increase to 2020. For London, the age 
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balance of those in employment is projected to change little over the period 1993 to 
2020, with little increase in the share of older workers and a decline in younger 
people in employment. 
 
The pattern of employment by occupation and age is presented for the three 
countries of Great Britain and London in the Appendix (Tables B1 to B4). The blue 
collar/white collar shift of employment is apparent for each country and London, as is 
the increase in employment of people aged from 50 to retirement age. Employment 
growth for younger people and people aged 25 to 49 is concentrated in SOC major 
groups 1 to 3. 
 
Figure 8.3 Sub-national employment by age group, 1993-2010 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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8.5 Disability 
The numbers of disabled people in employment increased as the employed 
workforce grew in all countries of Great Britain and London between 2001 and 2008, 
but numbers are projected hardly to change between 2008 and 2020 (Table 8.7).  
 
Table 8.7 Sub-national employment by type of disability, 1993-2020 
 
000s   2001   2008      2013      2020 
England 20,651 21,924 21,235 22,034 
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 907 1,030 986 1,008 
DDA disabled only 809 850 823 853 
Work-limiting disability only 523 664 636 652 
Non-disabled 18,412 19,381 18,790 19,521 
Scotland 2,559 2,715 2,624 2,673 
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 142 141 135 136 
DDA disabled only 143 134 130 132 
Work-limiting disability only 74 82 78 79 
Non-disabled 2,200 2,358 2,281 2,327 
Wales 1,261 1,388 1,327 1,373 
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 66 65 61 62 
DDA disabled only 72 68 65 68 
Work-limiting disability only 27 37 35 36 
Non-disabled 1,096 1,218 1,166 1,207 
London 4,582 4,712 4,564 4,817 
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 209 193 183 188 
DDA disabled only 154 191 184 193 
Work-limiting disability only 135 113 108 111 
Non-disabled 4,084 4,215 4,089 4,325 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Between 2001 and 2008, the numbers of disabled people increased much faster than 
the overall average in England, particularly for those with work-limiting disability only 
and DDA and work-limiting disability (Table 8.8). The numbers with work-limiting 
disability also increased particularly rapidly in Wales, and less fast in Scotland,  
but declined in London. London is distinctive from the rest of Great Britain in 
experiencing a decline in the number of people in work with work-limiting disability 
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only. Between 2008 and 2013, the numbers of all categories of disabled are 
projected to decline, at a faster rate in Wales and London than in England and 
Scotland. Between 2013 and 2020, the numbers of all categories of the disabled in 
employment are projected to increase in all parts of Great Britain, but not as fast as 
the numbers of the non-disabled in employment. The annual rate of increase in DDA 
disabled only people in employment is projected to be slightly higher than for all other 
categories of disabled people, fastest in London and slowest in Scotland. 
 
Table 8.8 Annual rate of change in sub-national employment by type of 
disability, 1993-2020 
 
AAGR (%) 2001-08           2008-13     2013-20 
England 0.8 -0.5 0.7 
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 1.6 -0.6 0.4 
DDA disabled only 0.6 -0.5 0.7 
Work-limiting disability only 3.0 -0.6 0.5 
Non-disabled 0.6 -0.4 0.8 
Scotland 0.7 -0.5 0.4 
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability -0.1 -0.6 0.1 
DDA disabled only -0.8 -0.5 0.4 
Work-limiting disability only 1.3 -0.6 0.2 
Non-disabled 0.9 -0.5 0.4 
Wales 1.2 -0.6 0.7 
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability -0.2 -0.8 0.4 
DDA disabled only -0.7 -0.6 0.7 
Work-limiting disability only 3.7 -0.8 0.5 
Non-disabled 1.3 -0.6 0.7 
London 0.3 -0.5 1.1 
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability -1.0 -0.8 0.5 
DDA disabled only 2.7 -0.5 1.0 
Work-limiting disability only -2.2 -0.7 0.7 
Non-disabled 0.4 -0.4 1.1 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
The share of disabled people in employment increased in England between 2001 
and 2008, but declined marginally in Scotland, Wales and London (Table 8.9).  
The share of DDA-disabled only declined in Wales and Scotland, but increased in 
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London. In contrast, the share of those with work-limiting disability only increased in 
all countries of Great Britain, but declined in London. The share of those with DDA 
disabled and work-limiting disability declined in Scotland, Wales and London, but 
increased slightly in England as a whole. The employment shares of all categories  
of disabled people are projected to change little between 2008 and 2020. 
 
Table 8.9 Sub-national employment shares by type of disability, 1993-2020 
 
% 2001 2008 2013 2020 
England     
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 4.4 4.7 4.6 4.6 
DDA disabled only 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Work-limiting disability only 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Non-disabled 89.2 88.4 88.5 88.6 
Scotland     
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.1 
DDA disabled only 5.6 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Work-limiting disability only 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 
Non-disabled 86.0 86.8 86.9 87.0 
Wales     
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 
DDA disabled only 5.7 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Work-limiting disability only 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Non-disabled 86.9 87.8 87.8 87.9 
London     
DDA disabled & Work-limiting disability 4.6 4.1 4.0 3.9 
DDA disabled only 3.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Work-limiting disability only 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.3 
Non-disabled 89.1 89.5 89.6 89.8 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
8.6 Ethnicity 
The number of people from ethnic minority groups in employment increased by  
about half in each of the countries of Great Britain between 1993 and 2001, with  
the greatest increase in London (Table 8.10).  
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Table 8.10 Sub-national employment by ethnic group, 1993-2020 
 
000s   1993  2001  2008   2013   2020 
England 19,029 20,651 21,924 21,235 22,034 
White 18,528 19,883 20,541 19,892 20,637 
Ethnic minorities 501 767 1,383 1,343 1,397 
Black 116 162 249 243 254 
Indian 192 242 381 372 391 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 90 166 255 244 248 
Other 103 198 498 484 504 
Scotland  2,387 2,559 2,715 2,624 2,673 
White 2,367 2,529 2,643 2,554 2,601 
Ethnic minorities 20 30 72 70 72 
Black 0 3 11 11 11 
Indian 5 4 14 14 14 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 5 8 16 16 16 
Other 9 14 31 30 30 
Wales 1,208 1,261 1,388 1,327 1,373 
White 1,193 1,241 1,357 1,298 1,342 
Ethnic minorities 14 20 31 30 31 
Black 2 5 1 1 1 
Indian 4 3 5 5 6 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 2 5 5 5 5 
Other 6 7 19 18 19 
London 3,817 4,582 4,712 4,564 4,817 
White 3,169 3,520 3,278 3,189 3,385 
Ethnic minorities 649 1,061 1,433 1,375 1,433 
Black 255 408 439 418 429 
Indian 195 259 294 284 299 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 50 101 162 154 160 
Other 150 294 539 520 544 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
In England and Wales, the largest increase was for the „Other‟ ethnic groups.  
In London and Wales, employment increased most for the Black ethnic groups. 
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Between 2001 and 2008, the number of people from ethnic minority groups more 
than doubled in Scotland. The rate of increase was slightly slower in England, while 
ethnic minority employment increased by half in Wales and two-fifths in London. 
However, ethnic minority group employment was only 72,000 in Scotland and 31,000 
in Wales in 2008. Employment for ethnic minority groups is projected to decline 
slightly between 2008 and 2013, but recover to 2008 levels by 2020. 
 
In England and London, Indian, Pakistani/Bangladeshi and „Other‟ employment grew 
faster than White employment between 1993 and 2001, but rates of increase 
declined during 2001-08 (Table 8.11). The number of Black people in employment 
grew more slowly than White employment throughout the period 1993 to 2008. The 
fastest increase was in the „Other‟ ethnic groups. In Wales and Scotland, annual 
rates of employment change are very volatile for individual ethnic groups, because  
of the small numbers involved. All ethnic groups are projected to lose employment  
in all parts of Great Britain between 2008 and 2013, with the highest rates of decline 
recorded by Indian people and those from „Other‟ ethnic groups in Wales and 
London. Employment is projected to increase again between 2013 and 2020, fastest 
for Black people in London and for Pakistani and Bangladeshi people elsewhere. 
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Table 8.11 Annual rate of change in employment by ethnic group, 1993-2020 
 
AAGR (%) 1993-2001 2001-08 2008-13 2013-20 
England     
White 1.0 0.9 -0.6 0.5 
Black 0.9 0.5 -0.6 0.5 
Indian 4.2 6.4 -0.5 0.6 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 2.9 6.7 -0.4 0.7 
Other 7.9 6.3 -0.9 0.3 
Scotland     
White 0.9 0.8 -0.7 0.3 
Black 0.8 0.6 -0.7 0.3 
Indian 31.5 17.7 -0.4 0.4 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi -3.6 20.0 -0.1 0.8 
Other 5.6 10.0 -0.5 0.4 
Wales     
White 0.5 1.4 -0.9 0.5 
Black 0.5 1.3 -0.9 0.5 
Indian 9.2 -18.0 -1.2 0.2 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi -4.8 9.2 0.1 1.3 
Other 12.0 0.3 -1.1 0.4 
London     
White 2.3 0.4 -0.6 0.8 
Black 1.3 -1.0 -0.6 0.9 
Indian 6.1 1.1 -1.0 0.4 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 3.6 1.8 -0.7 0.7 
Other 9.1 7.0 -0.9 0.5 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
Between 1993 and 2001, the share of employment for people from ethnic minorities 
increased from 2.6 to 3.7 per cent in England and from 17.0 to 23.2 per cent in 
London, but the ethnic minority share of employment was far lower in Scotland and 
Wales and grew more slowly, to reach 1.2 per cent in Scotland and 1.6 per cent in 
Wales (Table 8.12).  
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Table 8.12 Sub-national employment shares by ethnic group, 1993-2020 
 
% 1993  2001  2008  2013  2020  
England      
White 97.4 96.3 93.7 93.7 93.7 
Ethnic minorities 2.6 3.7 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Black 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Indian 1.0 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.8 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Other 0.5 1.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Scotland      
White 99.2 98.8 97.4 97.3 97.3 
Ethnic minorities 0.8 1.2 2.6 2.7 2.7 
Black 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Indian 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Other 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Wales      
White 98.8 98.4 97.8 97.8 97.8 
Ethnic minorities 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Black 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Indian 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Other 0.5 0.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 
London      
White 83.0 76.8 69.6 69.9 70.3 
Ethnic minorities 17.0 23.2 30.4 30.1 29.7 
Black 6.7 8.9 9.3 9.1 8.9 
Indian 5.1 5.6 6.2 6.2 6.2 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 1.3 2.2 3.4 3.4 3.3 
Other 3.9 6.4 11.4 11.4 11.3 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
As Table 8.12 shows, there was a much more rapid increase between 2001 and 
2008, with ethnic minorities forming 30.4 per cent of those in employment in London, 
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6.3 per cent in England, 2.7 per cent in Scotland and 2.2 per cent in Wales in 2008. 
The increase in employment share was greatest for people from „Other‟ ethnic 
groups in all parts of Great Britain. Employment shares are projected to remain fairly 
stable between 2008 and 2020. The largest of the ethnic minority groups is now 
those from „Other‟ ethnic groups, followed by Indian people. 
 
Figure 8.4 Sub-national employment by ethnic group, 1993-2010 
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Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
The information presented here has summarised recent and projected future 
employment trends for the countries of Great Britain and London. The key trends are 
largely shared across all regions; a falling share of female employment; a growing 
percentage of workers in the pre-retirement age range; increasing employment of 
work-limiting disabled people, and a considerable increase in the number of people 
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from ethnic minorities employed, particularly in London. People from „Other‟ ethnic 
groups are gaining employment faster than Black, Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
people. After a sharp decline between 2008 and 2013, employment is projected to 
recover by 2020. 
 
Differences between nations (England, Scotland, and Wales) are driven by variations 
in the demographic composition of their workforces and the relative rate of recovery 
in their economies. The forecasts reveal weaker growth over the medium term in 
Scotland and Wales compared with England. Because of the way in which the 
forecasts are compiled, this is reflected in the relative rate of change in employment 
of all the groups of interest. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
9.1 The economy and employment 
The recession which commenced in mid 2008 differs from the recessions of 1980-81 
and 1990-91 in two important respects: 
 
 The worldwide nature of the economic downturn which means there is no 
economy in the world that can provide a level of demand to stimulate growth in 
the world economy. 
 
 The near collapse of the financial system in the UK, and in the US and Europe.  
 
The employment effects of the two previous recessions were severe, with 
unemployment continuing to rise and employment continuing to fall for some time 
after the recession technically came to an end in that output growth became positive. 
Yet despite the severity of the current recession – reflected in the steep falls in output 
– the initial indications are that the employment effects may not be as damaging as 
they were in the 1980s and 1990s. There are potentially a number of reasons for this: 
 
 The fiscal stimulus government has given the economy is beginning to work 
through the system. 
 
 The extent of flexibility in the labour market is now considerably greater than 
during the two earlier recessions and this is slowing the decline in employment. 
For example, the use of the extended leave used by some companies may 
have this effect. This may, however, slow the pace of recruitment once the 
economy recovers. 
 
While, at face value, the impact of the recession may not be as bad as feared, 
conditions in the labour market are difficult. Unemployment continues to rise - though 
its rate of increase slowed in the second half of 2009 - and year-on-year comparisons 
reveal redundancy levels to be up and the number of vacancies to be down. The 
projections of future employment growth presented in this report suggest that 
employment will return to the earlier trend over the medium term, in other words 
returning to its long-run growth path. This is dependent upon growth picking up over 
the medium term much as it has following previous economic downturns and, based 
on the experience of recent economic history, there is every reason to believe that it 
will do so. However, some forecasts suggest that the pace of recovery will be 
sluggish (in part as a consequence of the level of national debt) (HM Treasury, 
2009b). So rather than the trend in output having a „V‟ shape, it may be like a „W‟ 
where there is a prolonged period of upturns and downturns, or an „L‟ shape where a 
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lower equilibrium level of output materialises. The projections provided in this report 
factor in the need to re-pay some of the national debt over the medium term, and 
reveal that levels of output and employment will have recovered to their pre-
recession levels over the medium term. 
 
9.2 The recession and equality 
Economic theory – as outlined in Chapter 2 of this report – demonstrates that during 
a period of labour surplus there will be a bumping down in the economy where those 
best qualified (however defined) take the jobs of those lower down the skill ladder. 
While the decline in the financial services sector, for instance, may result in job 
losses amongst the highly skilled and qualified, these people will be expected to 
return to work, possibly at the expense of less skilled and qualified people. So over 
time, the impact of the recession will again assume the characteristics of previous 
ones where more vulnerable groups bear the brunt of the economic downturn. 
 
Where there is an excess supply of labour, employers are, other things being equal, 
better able to obtain a match between employees and the jobs they undertake, where 
the term „better match‟ may relate to objectively defined capabilities of employees 
and the employer‟s perceptions of certain groups of workers. Perceptions may relate 
to the relative costs of employing certain groups, for example, where workers may 
have special needs, or a range of other factors that cannot be objectively determined. 
This is likely to affect hiring and firing decisions.  
 
At this early stage of the recession – and given that employment levels are expected 
to fall for some time after the economy returns to growth – it is too early to say 
whether the current recession will either slow the momentum of the equality agenda 
or lead to reversals. It is possible, however, to provide evidence from previous 
recessions and relate this to projections of future employment.  
 
9.3 The evidence from previous recessions  
The evidence from previous recessions suggests the following in relation to each of 
the groups on which this study has focused. 
 
Men and women 
 Due to male concentration in cyclically sensitive occupational sectors, men 
have had higher levels of unemployment than women in previous recessions. 
 
 Women were more likely to be employed in less cyclically sensitive occupations 
and so were relatively protected from unemployment, but those women 
employed in male-dominated sectors were often the first to be let go. 
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 Women with childcare responsibilities were often at a greater disadvantage than 
either men or other women in continuous employment due to restricted internal 
labour markets and employer perceptions of unreliability and inflexibility. 
 
 Single mothers, older women and those with lower skills and long-standing 
disability were especially negatively affected, with little support provided by the 
UK‟s deregulated labour market. 
 
 During more recent recessions, there is some evidence of an increase in lower-
qualified women entering the labour market, possibly to compensate for a 
reduced household income. 
 
Younger and older people 
 Demand for the labour of young people and old people is hyper-cyclical (that is, 
it responds more closely to the cycle than demand for core-age workers). 
 
 When demand is low, this shows up in inactivity as much as in unemployment 
(that is, people drop out of the labour market entirely). 
 
 Young people have difficulty entering the labour market and if they are in jobs, 
they are likely to lose them. 
 
 Older people are encouraged to take early retirement whilst those that lose their 
jobs find it particularly hard to re-enter work. 
 
 Older and younger people can be „scarred‟ (the implications of failing to enter 
work smoothly or being obliged to leave the labour market entirely, are long 
term and not merely short term). 
 
Disabled people 
 Before the last recession, the wage gap between disabled and non-disabled 
people had narrowed, but following the recession the wage gap had widened 
and struggled to get back to its pre-recession level. 
 
 The recession also affected activity rates with a fall in these for disabled people 
as a result of the recession. 
 
 Recessions also increase the level of disabilities reported with a notable rise in 
work-related disability resulting from psychological problems. 
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 Where labour demand is weak, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has noted that disabled people may be encouraged 
to withdraw from the labour market on medical-related financial support. 
 
 It should be noted that comparisons across time by disability are difficult to 
gauge because of changes in the definition of disability and policy change  
(such as the introduction of the Disability Discrimination Act). 
 
People from different ethnic groups 
• The labour market situation of ethnic minority groups first began to deteriorate 
in the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
• The Racial Disadvantage in Britain reports produced by the Policy Studies 
Institute first highlighted the phenomenon of „hyper-cyclical‟ unemployment for 
ethnic minority groups; that is, their unemployment rate rising faster than White 
unemployment rates in a recession and falling faster in a recovery. 
 
• Historical data reveal that unemployment for Caribbean and African men  
was more sensitive to the business cycle than that for White men, but  
that unemployment for Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men was  
relatively insensitive. 
 
• There is evidence of the „partial‟ hyper-cyclicality for ethnic minority groups 
during the 1990s; that is, minority unemployment rates increased faster  
than White unemployment rates on entry to recession, but did not fall faster 
during a recovery. This suggests that minority unemployment may stay high 
after a recession.  
 
9.4 The economic recovery 
The projections of employment suggest that the economy will enter recovery during 
2011, but that employment levels will not pick up until the mid part of the next 
decade. This will affect all groups in the labour market, but it appears to be especially 
marked for men, younger people, and those from selected ethnic minority groups. 
Men and people from selected ethnic groups lose out because they are to some 
extent more concentrated in sectors of the economy where the long-run decline in 
employment has been accelerated by the recession. With regard to younger people, 
this relates very much to difficulties they have accessing employment upon exit from 
the education system. 
It is also apparent – notwithstanding replacement demands due to retirement, etc – 
that future labour demand will be concentrated in relatively high-skilled and qualified 
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jobs (managers, professionals and associate professionals), and sales and personal 
service jobs. Much of the increasing demand for labour will be concentrated in 
business and financial services and non-marketed services. This also has 
implications for the groups which form the focus of interest to this study given  
the relative reliance of different groups on different types of job. Hence, some  
ethnic minority groups, older workers and women are more dependent upon  
public sector employment. 
 
It is also apparent over the period covered by the projections that there is a degree  
of equalling out in the labour market with, for example, prime-age men entering  
those sectors of employment in which they have been disproportionately under-
represented, such as part-time employment. In many respects, this reflects long-run 
changes in the structure of employment, but it is likely that this change may be 
hastened by the current recession. 
 
9.5 Future implications of the recession 
There are also qualitative differences in the demand for labour which need to be 
considered in relation to each of the groups of interest, as well as the indirect 
consequences of a weakening demand for labour; for example, the impact on the 
household of a person losing their job.  
 
Men and women 
 Work-life balance and diversity initiatives, as well as the right to request flexible 
working, are likely to be given lower priority by employers during the current 
recession, with implications for both men‟s and women‟s employment. 
 
 Equal pay and sex discrimination claims made by women have decreased 
during the current recession, as a result, presumably, of women being 
increasingly fearful of losing their jobs. 
 
 While men have sustained higher job losses to date in the current recession, 
women may be more likely to be affected later, with a second wave of job 
losses expected in the public sector. 
 
 The indirect effects of the current recession will affect both men and women (for 
example, in terms of marital problems). It may, however, be women who bear a 
disproportionately high share of the costs, given what is known about the impact 
of job loss in the household, and in view of reports of increased domestic 
violence, relationship breakdown and reduced divorce settlements, with 
associated longer-term concerns over child wellbeing. 
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 The erosion of traditionally female administrative and secretarial occupations 
will coincide with a higher proportion of men moving in to the service sector, 
with some evidence that men are taking on an increasing share of part- 
time jobs. 
 
Younger and older people 
 In order to ensure that the labour force continues to grow rather than shrink  
and that pension systems are sustainable, more older people will be required  
to work.  
 
 However, the current recession might see a return to the encouragement of 
early retirement by employers and might deflect them from making adjustments 
to employment practices to accommodate older people. 
 
 High levels of youth unemployment are foreseen and this will affect „highly 
qualified‟ young people as well as those with few or no qualifications. 
 
 The productive capacity of young people might be devalued by extensive 
periods of being without work or of precarious employment. 
 
Disabled people 
 In light of the recession and the increased difficulty for disabled people to  
find jobs, there is likely to be increased demand for, and use of, support 
programmes for such people. The availability of such programmes is likely to be 
constrained, due to changes in government spending priorities, and thus the 
needs of disabled people may be unmet. 
 
 The overall decline in employment is likely to have a levelling effect in which the 
gap between disabled and non-disabled people will narrow. Unfortunately, this 
is likely to be due to decreased employment rates for non-disabled people as 
opposed to any significant gains for disabled workers. 
 
 Disabled people appear to be a group that is afforded a degree of employment 
protection during the current recession. Current social attitudes, policy and 
legislation help to ensure that disabled people are not easy targets for job cuts. 
This protection is unlikely to be taken away from this group in the future, but the 
need for employers to contain costs during recessionary periods may pose an 
obstacle for disabled people requiring extra support in work.  
 
 In the current benefit regulatory system, it is unlikely that there will be mass 
movement of people from unemployment into disability-related inactivity as  
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was witnessed in previous recessions. Some movement of disabled people 
from unemployment to inactivity is likely, however, in the face of decreasing 
labour market opportunities. Increased inactivity has implications for future 
labour supply and for the quality of workers that re-enter the labour market  
in the future. 
 
 The duration of the recession will impact on the duration of spells of 
unemployment and inactivity that people may experience. Longer spells of 
unemployment or activity may negatively impact on people‟s health, particularly 
in terms of psychological and mental wellbeing. This may result in a higher 
incidence of disability or health problems in the working-age population.  
 
People from different ethnic groups 
 Claimant count data indicate that the increase in unemployment in late 2008 
was faster for White than ethnic minority groups. The share of ethnic minority 
groups in the total claimant count fell as unemployment rose. 
 
 Ethnic minority groups still experience labour market disadvantage, but the 
differential between White and ethnic minority groups has been narrowing. 
 
 The impact of the current recession on unemployment has been greater for 
White than ethnic minority groups. 
 
 Ethnic minority groups may be relatively insulated from the recession because a 
high percentage of them live in London. 
 
 This pattern may change as the recession progresses. Spending cuts in the 
public sector may have a disproportionate effect on ethnic minority groups.  
 
 Moreover, there is great diversity in the experience of the current recession by 
ethnic minority groups. While the impact of the recession seems to be greater 
on White people than on ethnic minority groups as a whole, this may disguise 
the much greater impact on Black and Black British people and the lesser 
impact on Asian and Asian British people. 
 
9.6 The equality agenda and the recession 
The report highlights a number of issues in relation to the equality agenda. At the 
moment it is too early to assess the full implications of the recession for different 
groups, but a number of issues can be highlighted which may require a watching 
brief to see how they develop. 
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 There is evidence of changes in the structure of employment between men and 
women with men increasingly likely to take employment in those sectors of the 
economy where women have been disproportionately employed. As labour 
demand weakens, it does so in those sectors of the economy more likely  
to be dominated by men, such that men will be increasingly forced to seek 
employment in sectors where women are dominant. Over the medium term, the 
increase in the number of jobs is such that it is likely that men and women can 
be accommodated without one losing out to the other, but over the short term 
when labour demand is weak, there is the potential for men to take the jobs of 
women. Hence, the labour market position of women may be weakened, other 
things being equal, as a result of more men looking for jobs. 
 
 Improvements in equality and diversity have been observed over recent years, 
hence the increasing employment rates of disabled people and some ethnic 
minority groups. There have also been great strides made in the extent to which 
people are able to achieve some form of work-life balance with the introduction 
of a range of flexible working practices. Whether these can withstand the 
pressures of the recession is an interesting issue. Certainly in relation to work-
life balance, the evidence has suggested that this benefits employers and 
employees, so there is, other things being equal, no reason why this should  
not prove resilient to the recession. There are, however, two principal dangers: 
(i) where reductions in the number of people employed result in more 
demanding jobs for those who remain. For instance, the capacity of people to 
work long hours when needed may affect decisions about hiring and firing; and 
(ii) where employers have engaged in certain recruitment and human resource 
practices because of the extent of labour demand rather than recognition of the 
intrinsic merits, say, of work-life balance policies. Hence where employers 
perceive greater costs attached to hiring a person with certain characteristics, 
they are unlikely to take them on. 
 
 The role of the public sector is of central importance to certain groups and the 
public sector has been in the vanguard of diversity and work-life balance 
policies. There are continued uncertainties about the employment levels in the 
public sector. The baseline projections produced for this study suggest that non-
marketed services will continue to grow over the medium term, even after taking 
into account public sector spending cuts, but there remain uncertainties about 
the future of public service employment levels. 
 
 Employers view recruitment and retention differently. There is a risk posed to 
young people who are unable to gain access to the labour market upon exit 
from the education system. Their response to this is to stay on in full-time 
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education in the hope that gaining additional qualifications will aid job search 
and the period of additional education will tide them over the recessionary 
period. However, if their window of opportunity in which employers expect them 
to enter the labour market closes, then they may miss out on getting onto the 
first rung of the career ladder. Evidence from Japan suggests that young people 
during the 1990s failed to gain progression in the labour market which their 
counterparts before and after them were able to achieve. 
 
 There are also the indirect effects of the recession upon employment to 
consider. Evidence has been presented in this report that job loss causes 
psychological stress, especially among men. Moreover, this can impact upon 
the household with increased levels of marital breakdown and domestic 
violence, with repercussions long after the recession has ended and 
employment has returned to its long-run growth path. 
 
 Finally, government policy can potentially impact on the labour market. The 
OECD points to policies being used by national governments during economic 
downturns in the past to constrain the supply of labour through policies such as 
early exit from the labour force, the use of benefits which foster inactivity and so 
on. This can make the unemployment problem seem less daunting than it might 
otherwise be, but whether this is to the advantage of those who are persuaded 
into inactivity is questionable. Given the pressures on public finances, there is 
limited scope to achieve this end; it also runs counter to government policy over 
recent decades, which has been very much focused upon boosting, not 
constraining, labour supply. 
 
The points made above point relate to uncertainties which might result from the 
current recession and the risk to the equality agenda, and the need to monitor 
developments until the recovery in employment commences in earnest.  
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Annex A  Sectoral and occupational change 
 
Figure A1  Sectoral change in detail, 2008-20 
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Source: Institute for Employment Research. 
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Figure A2 Occupational change in detail, 2008-20 
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Annex B  Additional tables for national projections 
 
Table B1 England: employment by age group and occupation, 1993-2020 
 
 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Managers and senior officials      
16-24 147 95 107 107 117 
25-49 1,804 2,030 2,234 2,242 2,445 
50-64/59 559 816 905 908 990 
65+/60+ 80 95 151 151 165 
Professional occupations      
16-24 92 102 117 119 132 
25-49 1,291 1,465 1,647 1,681 1,857 
50-64/59 361 572 748 764 843 
65+/60+ 55 68 114 116 128 
Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
     
16-24 234 246 278 277 297 
25-49 1,564 1,849 1,958 1,954 2,090 
50-64/59 334 517 636 635 679 
65+/60+ 52 72 131 131 140 
Administrative and  
secretarial occupations 
     
16-24 554 350 316 288 276 
25-49 1,731 1,576 1,453 1,325 1,269 
50-64/59 416 651 651 594 569 
65+/60+ 96 116 209 191 183 
Skilled trades occupations      
16-24 454 314 330 305 300 
25-49 1,681 1,535 1,438 1,327 1,306 
50-64/59 542 672 720 664 653 
65+/60+ 47 62 88 81 80 
Personal service occupations      
16-24 229 233 306 324 368 
25-49 616 883 1,078 1,143 1,298 
50-64/59 166 312 377 400 454 
65+/60+ 38 62 111 118 134 
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Table B1  England: employment by age group and occupation, 1993-2020 
(continued) 
 
 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Sales and customer  
service occupations 
     
16-24 348 530 640 654 720 
25-49 706 769 773 789 869 
50-64/59 202 277 287 293 323 
65+/60+ 40 63 108 110 121 
Process, plant and  
machine operatives 
     
16-24 259 156 145 135 132 
25-49 1,217 1,114 995 925 906 
50-64/59 426 526 545 506 496 
65+/60+ 33 41 64 59 58 
Elementary occupations      
16-24 478 583 562 477 406 
25-49 1,397 1,187 1,034 877 747 
50-64/59 596 560 506 429 366 
65+/60+ 184 150 162 137 117 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Table B2 Scotland: employment by age group and occupation, 1993-2020 
 
 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Managers and senior officials      
16-24 14 12 10 10 11 
25-49 192 229 252 256 277 
50-64/59 62 78 95 97 105 
65+/60+ 12 6 13 13 15 
Professional occupations      
16-24 14 15 20 21 24 
25-49 171 196 218 230 259 
50-64/59 41 73 101 106 120 
65+/60+ 5 6 13 14 15 
Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
     
16-24 33 28 29 29 30 
25-49 203 250 269 266 277 
50-64/59 40 59 80 79 82 
65+/60+ 6 6 10 10 10 
Administrative and  
secretarial occupations 
     
16-24 77 46 40 37 37 
25-49 203 214 197 184 180 
50-64/59 50 68 78 73 71 
65+/60+ 9 14 28 27 26 
Skilled trades occupations      
16-24 72 42 42 38 37 
25-49 198 186 169 156 151 
50-64/59 64 74 89 83 80 
65+/60+ 5 8 9 8 8 
Personal service occupations      
16-24 21 22 24 24 25 
25-49 80 96 112 112 116 
50-64/59 15 37 46 46 47 
65+/60+ 5 7 10 10 10 
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Table B2 Scotland: employment by age group and occupation, 1993-2020 
(continued) 
 
 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Sales and customer  
service occupations 
     
16-24 46 65 79 78 84 
25-49 91 99 88 87 93 
50-64/59 20 26 31 31 33 
65+/60+ 5 5 9 9 10 
Process, plant and  
machine operatives 
     
16-24 27 21 17 16 15 
25-49 155 143 122 113 110 
50-64/59 58 58 73 68 66 
65+/60+ 4 4 7 7 7 
Elementary occupations      
16-24 58 87 85 72 61 
25-49 219 174 158 135 115 
50-64/59 89 88 71 61 51 
65+/60+ 22 20 21 18 15 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Table B3 Wales: employment by age group and occupation, 1993-2020 
 
 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Managers and senior officials      
16-24 8 6 8 7 8 
25-49 87 100 112 110 118 
50-64/59 36 40 46 46 49 
65+/60+ 7 8 11 10 11 
Professional occupations      
16-24 6 5 8 8 9 
25-49 83 88 106 108 120 
50-64/59 19 35 45 47 52 
65+/60+ 2 5 7 7 8 
Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
     
16-24 17 14 14 13 14 
25-49 86 114 124 122 131 
50-64/59 26 25 36 35 38 
65+/60+ 3 4 8 8 8 
Administrative and  
secretarial occupations 
     
16-24 33 21 18 17 17 
25-49 96 84 92 84 84 
50-64/59 22 32 36 33 33 
65+/60+ 6 8 10 9 9 
Skilled trades occupations      
16-24 35 21 22 20 20 
25-49 118 100 94 86 84 
50-64/59 31 44 48 44 43 
65+/60+ 1 5 8 7 7 
Personal service occupations      
16-24 17 14 19 20 23 
25-49 41 63 70 73 82 
50-64/59 11 18 31 32 36 
65+/60+ 3 5 8 8 9 
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Table B3 Wales: employment by age group and occupation, 1993-2020 
(continued) 
 
 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Sales and customer  
service occupations 
     
16-24 20 28 40 39 42 
25-49 48 48 51 50 55 
50-64/59 12 18 16 16 17 
65+/60+ 3 3 7 7 7 
Process, plant and  
machine operatives 
     
16-24 23 12 16 15 15 
25-49 94 86 79 74 74 
50-64/59 25 38 39 36 36 
65+/60+ 0 2 4 4 4 
Elementary occupations      
16-24 37 39 41 34 29 
25-49 105 88 74 62 52 
50-64/59 37 35 30 25 21 
65+/60+ 10 8 13 11 9 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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Table B4 London: employment by age group and occupation, 1993-2020 
 
 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Managers and senior officials      
16-24 38 31 22 22 25 
25-49 452 625 688 700 791 
50-64/59 101 136 162 165 186 
65+/60+ 11 15 21 21 24 
Professional occupations      
16-24 31 42 33 34 39 
25-49 332 443 535 560 645 
50-64/59 67 110 142 148 171 
65+/60+ 13 20 31 33 38 
Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
     
16-24 62 90 92 95 110 
25-49 424 600 671 697 801 
50-64/59 67 109 137 142 163 
65+/60+ 16 17 37 38 44 
Administrative and  
secretarial occupations 
     
16-24 140 113 67 52 38 
25-49 434 404 324 254 183 
50-64/59 94 124 108 84 61 
65+/60+ 25 29 35 27 20 
Skilled trades occupations      
16-24 54 43 41 38 37 
25-49 265 265 240 219 214 
50-64/59 77 92 93 85 83 
65+/60+ 8 11 9 9 8 
Personal service occupations      
16-24 37 38 37 37 40 
25-49 108 157 175 175 188 
50-64/59 32 54 57 57 62 
65+/60+ 7 11 14 14 15 
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Table B4 London: employment by age group and occupation, 1993-2020 
 (continued) 
 
 1993 2001 2008 2013 2020 
Sales and customer  
service occupations 
     
16-24 67 108 113 112 124 
25-49 108 138 146 144 160 
50-64/59 27 33 31 30 34 
65+/60+ 10 10 10 10 11 
Process, plant and  
machine operatives 
     
16-24 23 14 15 14 13 
25-49 158 151 143 131 125 
50-64/59 68 65 54 49 47 
65+/60+ 8 7 7 6 6 
Elementary occupations      
16-24 66 106 79 67 58 
25-49 242 246 247 212 183 
50-64/59 120 100 72 62 53 
65+/60+ 28 24 25 21 18 
Source:  Based on IER/CE Employment Forecasting Model produced for the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. 
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This report examines the impact of the current recession in terms of gender, age, race/
ethnicity and disability. Based on a literature review focusing on previous recessions, a 
descriptive analysis of Labour Force Survey data and estimates of future employment levels 
up to 2020, it examines the likely impact of the recession for women and men, younger and 
older people, ethnic minorities and the disabled. The authors conclude that the recession is 
likely to slow progress towards meeting equality objectives rather than lead to a reversal of 
gains made to date.
